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I. INTRODUCTION 
During the past decade, and especially since 1983, a controversial 
national debate has been taking place relative to the question whether 
banksl should be allowed to sell and underwrite all types of insur-
ance.2 This is but a segment of the debate concerning the limits of 
1. Unless otherwise indicated, the term "bank(s)" includes commercial banks, and 
where the context permits, bank holding companies, but excludes savings banks, 
savings and loan institutions, investment banks and other depository or nonde-
pository institutions. 
2. At present banks are permitted very limited insurance activities. What type of 
activities are permissible depends on the regulatory entity exercising control over 
the particular bank. 
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financial services and products that banks and bank holding compa-
nies should be allowed to offer. This matter has been brought to a 
head by the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 (CEBA).3 The 
purpose of this study is to focus on the question of whether the con-
sumer4 of bank and insurance services or products would retain the 
protections envisioned by the regulatory schemes imposed since the 
1930s if bank services and products were expanded to include the un-
derwriting and selling of insurance of all kinds. 
One of the main goals of the federal and state banking and insur-
ance regulatory schemess is the maintenance of bank and insurer sol-
vency6 to the end that consumers of their services and products be 
protected from failure of the institutions to which their money was 
entrusted. 7 Each financial institution carries its own particular type of 
3. Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (1987)(codified at scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) 
It is the intent of the Congress, through the Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Bank-
ing, Finance and Urban Affairs of the House of Representatives, to con-
duct a comprehensive review of our banking and financial laws and to 
make decisions on the need for financial restructuring legislation in the 
light of today's changing financial environment both domestic and inter-
national before the expiration of such moratorium. 
Id. § 203(a), 101 Stat. at 584. 
4. The term "consumer" refers to the bank depositor, insurance policyholder, or 
beneficiary of the policy. 
5. "[B]anking has historically been one of the most heavily regulated industries." 
LAsH, BANKING LAWS AND REGULATIONS 22 (1987) [hereinafter LAsH]. 
6. Id. at 23; WILLIAM H. LoVETI', BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS LAW IN A 
NUTSHELL 121-25 [hereinafter LoVETI']. Between 1920 and 1933, when there was 
little regulation, 16,000 banks were closed. Between 1934 and 1982, after the 1933 
regulations came into existence, only 765 banks failed. Id. at 125. However, bank 
failures have started rising in recent years, due to, according to some commenta-
tors, deregulation of interest limitations on commercial banks. Geoffrey P. 
Miller, Banking Regulation, The Future of the Dual Banking System, 53 BROOK. 
L. REV. 1, 8 (1987). During the entire decade of the 1970s there were only 76 bank 
failures, but in 1985 alone 118 failed outright or received FDIC assistance. Id. 
"The assurance of the safety of deposits, therefore, is a basic objective that bank 
regulation is designed to achieve." Richard H. Whiting, A Perspective on Finan-
cial Services Restructuring, 37 CATH. U. L. REv. 347, 357-58 (1988)(emphasis ad-
ded)[hereinafter Whiting]; "Since the primary regulatory goals of the members of 
the NAIC [National Association of Insurance Commissioners] are maintaining in-
surer solvency and consumer protection .... "Bruce W. Foundree, Statement on 
Behalf of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, submitted to the 
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs on the Integration of 
Financial Services, 2 NAIC PROCEEDINGS 91 (1983)[hereinafter Foundree]; 
"Wrapped in the wonders of the new and exciting, there is a danger that even the 
most seasoned public policy-makers can lose sight of their basic insurance regula-
tory goal-solvency." John R. Dunne, Risk, Reality, and Reason in Financial Serv-
ices Deregulation: A State Legislative Perspective, 2 JOURNAL OF INSURANCE 
REGULATION 342, 348 (1983)(emphasis added)[hereinafter Dunne]. 
7. Other goals of banking regulation are: (1) providing competition to prevent con-
centration of economic power, (2) lending for social purposes, (3) protecting the 
consumer (e.g. Truth in Lending Act, Fair Credit Reporting Act, Consumer 
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risk.B Would consolidating or concentrating several risks into a con-
glomerate financial entity increase those risks? When the iron curtain 
of institutional separation and segregation is removed, would the 
forces of competition exert their muscle with the potential result that 
efficient entities will thrive and grow, but the less efficient ones shall 
fail and the consumers' savings get the knockout blow?9 
Credit Protection Act), and (4) providing an environment for monetary policy. 
Whiting, supra note 6, at 357-59 and LAsH, supra note 5, at 22-25. Other goals of 
insurance regulation are: (1) product dependability, (2) strong insurance mar-
kets with adequate capacity and availability of coverage, (3) competition for busi-
ness with fair pricing, buying opportunities and claim settlement, and (4) 
deconcentration of power and risks. See Dunne, supra note 6, at 348; see also, 
Bush Task Group Report on Regulation of Financial Services: Blueprint for Re-
form (Part 1), Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Gov-
ernment Operations, 99th Congress, 1st Sess. 307 (1985) [hereinafter Bush Task 
Force Report]. 
8. One of the primary concerns of insurance regulators is the concentration 
of risks which appears to be contemplated or occurring in the financial 
services sector. Individually, operations of insurers, securities broker-
dealers, banks, savings and loans, and real estate companies involve 
enough hazards and difficulties in today's environment. A growing in-
terest in offering insurance, banking and lending, securities, and real es-
tate services under one roof carries with it the potential combination of 
insurance, credit, investment, and property risks not previously known 
or foreseen. It is this concentration, to the extent it occurs, which insur-
ance regulators look upon with considerable apprehension. Problems of 
regulation are compounded by such combinations; the ability of regula-
tors to protect consumers is affected. 
Foundree, supra note 6, at 92. 
In the course of their lending activities, banks take credit risks with a 
duration of years in many cases. Whether the borrower is an individual, 
a corporation or even a government entity, the bank must make a judg-
ment whether future conditions will be such that the borrower will be 
able to repay the loan, and this judgment is subject to all the unforeseen 
events that may shape domestic or foreign economies. Regulatory con-
trols such as lending limits, capital ratios and bad debt reserves are 
designed to insure that credit risks are diversified, and that the bank has 
adequate resources to absorb losses that may occur. Nevertheless, so 
long as banks lend funds to borrowers the banking business necessarily 
involves substantial risks that are generally greater than found in most 
other financial activities. Because of the degree of credit risk necessarily 
involved, for example, corporate lending by banks is inherently more 
risky than any type of strictly brokerage activity, whether involving real 
estate, insurance or securities, so long as the broker is not acting as a 
principal. 
Bush Task Force Report, supra note 7, at 330-31. 
9. Several commentators have raised concern about competitive forces: 
As the number of conglomerates and holding companies has grown to be 
the predominant form of business, the pressure for positive financial re-
sults has increased. The recent recession, high but uncertain interest 
rates, and the on-again-off-again financial deregulation proposals of the 
federal and state governments have intensified the pressure for in-
creased positive results. 
Managers have responded with some of the most inventive, creative 
and aggressive financial tactics. But some of those methods, involving 
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Divergent views are being expressed, sometimes with great vehe-
mence, and numerous proposals suggesting various deregulatory mod-
ifications to present law are being submitted. To understand the 
nature of these proposals it is necessary to analyze the nature and 
structure of our dual banking system, its evolution, the jurisdictional 
framework of the regulating bodies, and the present statutory um-
brella, all as related to the protection of the consumer. Similarly, the 
regulatory system of the insurance industry, as related to the protec-
tion of the policyowner and the beneficiary, needs to be reviewed. Re-
gardless of action by Congress, it is almost certain that: 
the distinctions between different types of depository institutions, and be-
tween depository and other financial services institutions, will continue to 
fade. The Garn-St Germain Act greatly expanded the bank-like powers of 
thrift institutions, while retaining the legal distinction of these institutions as 
a separate industry. This Act built upon the expansion of powers initiated by 
the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980. 
the use and abuse of holding company systems and the transactions that 
occur within them, have raised serious fundamental questions regarding 
corporate and regulatory laws insofar as adequate protection of the pub-
lic interest is concerned. 
John R. Dunne, Intercompany Transactions Within Insurance Holding Compa· 
nies, 20 FORUM 445 (Spring 1985) [hereinafter Dunne, FORUM]. 
We have concluded that the holding company device, when it involves 
affiliation with non-insurance enterprises, jeopardizes the interest of 
both the public and the policyholder, and especially will do so if its devel-
opment is indiscriminant and without benefit of close regulatory 
supervision. 
I d. at 446, citing Insurance Department, State of New York, Report of the Special 
Committee on Insurance Holding Companies (Feb. 15, 1968) p.7. 
Other observers believe that competitive forces rather than government 
agencies or laws should be allowed to structure the marketplace. In this 
view unrestrained entry into financial services markets will produce effi-
cient markets, free of the distortions and inefficiencies that are usually 
created by government attempts to organize market activity. Many of 
these observers believe that the appropriate focus of government should 
be to promote efficient, competitive markets by prohibiting negative 
practices (such as monopolization, fraud, inadequate disclosure or capi-
talization, etc.) .... These observers believe that institutions should have 
the maximum possible degree of flexibility to determine their own busi-
ness activities in light of market conditions and competition, with gov-
ernment rules restricted to those necessary to prevent unfair 
competition and to encourage, but not require, favored types of activities. 
Bush Task Force Report, supra note 7, at 319-20. 
In theory, product diversification would make it possible for banks to 
reduce the volatility of their earnings, thereby reducing their likelihood 
of failure .... The freedom to diversify, however, could increase instabil-
ity in the banking system because of the danger that funds raised from 
insured depositors will be used to support unduly risky investments. 
This danger arises not only from the fact that managers and sharehold-
ers of some banks may be risk-seeking, but also from the "moral hazard" 
created by fixed-rate deposit insurance. 
Robert E. Litan, Evaluating and Controlling the Risks of Financial Product De-
regulation, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 2 (1985). 
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Many new state laws in recent years have also significantly expanded the per-
missible activities of state-chartered credit unions, thrift institutions and 
banks. Accordingly, many of the purely legal distinctions between the tradi-
tional categories of depository institutions have disappeared, although many 
individual institutions will almost certainly continue to specialize in particular 
products or services. In addition, depositories will increasingly enter activities 
traditionally limited to investment banking, brokerage and insurance firms, 
and vice-versa. 
* * * 
To the extent they occur the foregoing changes will tend to intensify the 
difficulties of the existing regulatory system in providing equitable and consis-
tent regulatory treatment of financial institutions. They will also cause in-
creasingly severe problems of conflicting regulatory policies and duplication, 
as more and more institutions become subject to multiple regulatory agencies. 
Without modification the current system is probably incapable of resolving 
the conflicts and inequities that have already occurred among financial insti-
tutions, and such problems can only be expected to worsen over time.lO 
II. EVOLUTION OF BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. Banking Prior to the Civil War 
1. From the Revolutionary War to 1836 
731 
The Revolutionary War was financed in a haphazard manner; both 
the Continental Congress and the states issued paper money which 
depreciated rapidly.n If the new republic was to survive, a more for-
mal method of conducting financial transactions had to be developed. 
At the urging of Alexander Hamilton, the Bank of North America was 
created and chartered by the Continental Congress in 1782. Its notes12 
were redeemable in specie and its business was conducted profitably. 
Unfortunately, its very success brought about its demise as a "na-
tional" or "central" bank.13 The general agrarian attitude that such a 
"central" bank was business oriented to the detriment of agricultural 
interests caused the Continental Congress to repeal its perpetual char-
ter and issue a short term charter.14 
10. Bush Task Force Report, supra note 7, at 320-21. 
11. The notes issued were not freely convertible into specie. In fact the Continental 
notes were eventually redeemed at one cent on the dollar. See LAsH, supra note 
5, at 2. 
12. During this period, extension of credit was by means of notes, not deposits. Bor-
rowers from banks were given bank notes which became "money" since they 
were transferable from person to person. 
13. Its function, aside from accepting deposits and making short term loans, was to 
assist in government financing. LAsH, supra note 5, at 1. However, it was by no 
means a central bank. 
14. This occurred a mere four years after the original charter was issued. In 1787 it 
obtained a charter from Pennsylvania and continued its activities as a state bank. 
The hostility against concentrated banking power, both private and public, has 
continued throughout the history of the United States and has lead to an ex-
tremely complicated dual banking system. The dual system is also at least partly 
responsible for the haphazard regulatory system that has evolved. Instead of ere-
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Notwithstanding the opposition of Thomas Jefferson and James 
Madison, Hamilton, then Secretary of the Treasury, was able to con-
vince Congress to charter the First United States Bank in 1791 for a 
period of twenty years. It had broader powers than the Bank of North 
America, but it still could not be considered a central bank since it was 
not a clearinghouse, a depository of banks, a creator of reserves nor 
the lender of last resort. The bank's charter prohibited it from owning 
real estate other than its place of business and from buying or selling 
goods and real estate.1s 
Meanwhile, many state chartered bankslG issued notes in huge 
quantities.17 The ability of these state banks to redeem the notes was 
rather questionable. The regulatory schemes of the statesls were not 
adequate to control the volume and quality of the notes issued.19 As a 
result, the First Bank of the United States, whenever it received state 
bank notes, would immediately present them to the issuing banks for 
redemption in "real" money, gold or silver coins issued by the First 
Bank of the United States. To a degree, this restrained state bank 
note issues, but it did not endear the Bank to the state banks, who 
added their voices to the anti Bank forces.2o Because of the com-
plaints of state banks, among other reasons, Congress21 allowed the 
Bank's charter to expire and the Bank to cease operations in 1811. 
Consequently state banks proliferated,22 issuing notes without limita-
tion.23 The War of 1812 proved the need for a strong national bank 
ating a well planned regulatory system, Congress and state legislatures enacted 
laws in knee-jerk fashion, responding to financial crises as they arose. See gener-
ally, Daviel R. Fischel, et al., The Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding Compa-
nies, 73 VA. L. REv. 301 (1987). The discussion and analysis in this paper will 
reflect the development of the banking system in the United States in light of this 
antibank phobia. It is for this reason that a certain portion of this paper is being 
devoted to the historic aspects of banking. It may be observed that when Penn-
sylvania issued its 1787 charter to the Bank of North America it expressly prohib-
ited the bank from owning more real estate than needed for its place of business. 
Under present law national banks are similarly limited. 12 U.S.C. § 29 (1988). 
15. To make sure that the Federal Government would not usurp economic power 
through the Bank, its stock ownership was limited to 20%, the other 80% to be 
owned by private stockholders. 
16. By 1811 there were 88 state chartered banks. 
17. In 1811 state bank notes outstanding amounted to $22.7 million, an immense sum 
for that time. 
18. Until1863, bank regulation was almost entirely a state matter. 
19. Paradoxically, the states themselves were prohibited by the Constitution from 
issuing notes. 
20. Jefferson, Madison and Randolph believed that the Bank was unconstitutional. 
However, the Supreme Court held the Second Bank of the United States to be 
constitutional in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
21. In spite of the fact that the Bank had operated successfully, was well managed, 
and had accomplished the objectives sought when it was chartered. 
22. By 1816 there were 246. 
23. By 1816 $68 million was outstanding. 
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because the overissued notes of the state banks24 depreciated quickly, 
giving rise to rampant inflation. 
Viewing the chaotic monetary situation, Jefferson and Madison, in 
a complete tum-about, proposed and fervently supported the creation 
of the Second Bank of the United States. In 1816 Congress issued a 
twenty year charter to the Second Bank. Although it began its trans-
actions during a financial crisis, the Bank worked well,25 bringing dis-
cipline to the economy.26 However, between 1829 and 1837 Andrew 
Jackson and his agrarian party campaigned to destroy the Bank. The 
classical fear, suspicion and resentment against concentrated power, 
foreign domination27 and mercantile interests and the desire for more 
latitude for state banks impelled the Jacksonians to bring about the 
end of the Bank.2s The response of the economy was the Panic of 1837 
which started a depression that lasted until1842. 
2. The State Free Banking System, 1837 to 1864 
Mter the rise and fall of the first and second national banks, it 
should have been apparent that without the discipline of a strong cen-
tral bank, the unrestrained and unfettered practices of state banks 
could result only in economic chaos. Nevertheless, the anti-national 
bank sentiment was so strong that not only was there no new national 
bank charter issued by Congress, but the states made entry into the 
banking field easier. Until1837 bank charters were issued only by 
special legislative acts, a practice which amounted to a grant of monop-
olistic power.29 This did not comport with democratic ideals and lais-
24. Notes were, for the most part, the only currency available to finance the war. 
25. It did not do well in its first three years under its first president, William Jones. 
Under his lax leadership, issuance of state bank notes were not properly re-
strained. The proliferation of state bank notes lead to speculation in land which 
culminated in the panic of 1819. Jones was then replaced. 
26. Under the next two presidents, Chives and Biddle, note issues were curtailed 
through prompt presentation for redemption in specie. Lending practices were 
also tightened, and Bank notes were issued through all branches, making the cur-
rency more uniform througbout the country. 
27. A large portion of the stock of the Bank was held by foreigners. 
28. Jackson transferred all United States deposits from the Bank to state banks and 
vetoed the bill extending its charter. The Bank ceased as a national bank in 1836. 
It continued its existence for a short while as a Pennsylvania state bank but even-
tually went bankrupt in 1841. 
29. The economic advantage of a bank charter was well appreciated by both the ap-
plicants and the politicians granting it. Chicanery and bribery were not excluded 
as a means of obtaining the license to such a fruitful tree. All parties concerned 
benefitted from the transaction: the legislators received meaningful gifts, the 
state had access to a source of low interest loans and the banker obtained the 
right to issue notes. See Thomas F. Huertas, The Regulation of Financial Institu-
tions: A Historical Perspective on Current Issues, in F'JNANCIAL SERVICES: THE 
CHANGING INSTITUTIONS AND GoVERNMENT POLICY, 9 (George J. Benston ed., 
1983). 
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sez-faire principles and thus the "free banking" method of chartering 
was introduced.ao 
The State of New York passed the Free Banking Act in 183831 
which allowed anyone to obtain a charter so long as the applicant com-
plied with minimum capital requirements and submitted to supervi-
sion and control.32 By 1860 eighteen states adopted free banking. With 
the vast proliferation of bank notes which followed, the nation fell 
into financial chaos. 
B. The National Free Banking System, 1864 to 1933 
1. Prior to 1913 
To finance the Civil War, Congress in 1863, and with substantial 
revision in 1864, passed the National Bank Act of 1864.33 The Act's 
immediate goal was to bring about a system of national banks with a 
single uniform currency.34 The Act established the Office of the 
Comptroller of Currency (OCC) to screen applicants for charters, is-
sue charters, supervise the national banks and regulate the currency. 
The chartering was modeled on the New York free banking system. 
The dual banking system has thus been brought into existence, even 
though not so intended. In fact the intention was to displace the state 
banking system. To "encourage" state banks to switch to national 
charters and to cease issuing bank notes, a two percent tax on state 
bank notes was imposed. The response was less than spectacular; few 
state banks made the switch and state bank notes continued to prolif-
erate. By hiking the tax to ten percent35 Congress persuaded the ma-
jority of state banks to change to national charters. as State bank notes 
30. From 1837 to 1863 banking became entirely a state matter. 
31. Michigan was the first state to pass a free banking law in 1837. 
32. Interestingly enough, a concomitant of free banking was the introduction of bank 
regulation. New York and other states, concerned about the safety of bank notes, 
required the posting of collateral, mainly bonds, and participation in safety funds, 
a precursor of today's FDIC. In case of bank failure, the sale of the collateral and 
monies from the safety fund would provide for the redemption of the notes. 
However, lax implementation of collateral requirements, the rise of "wildcat" 
banks and the rapid spread of free banking resulted in many failures. Many note-
holders and depositors lost their money. In the early 1840s, the Treasury with-
drew all its deposits from the state banks (see supra note 28) and established the 
Independent Treasury System, with "subtreasuries" throughout the country 
designed to transact business with the public. 
33. National Bank Act of 1864, Ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 12 U.S.C.). The Act squeaked through the Senate by two votes. Had 
the Southern states still been represented in Congress, the Act would have failed 
because the fear of federal centralization of power and the antibank feeling could 
not have been overcome. 
34. It was hoped that state banks would recharter themselves as national banks. 
35. Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 78, § 6, 13 Stat. 484. 
36. By 1870, the ratio of national banks to state banks was five to one. 
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soon went out of existence. The goal of uniform currency had been 
achieved, but the dual bank system endured. The inclination for de-
centralization and the fact that checking accounts or demand deposits 
replaced bank notes as money motivated banks to obtain state char-
ters.37 By the turn of the twentieth century more than seventy per-
cent of the nation's banks were state banks, a ratio that is still true 
today. Unfortunately there were many deficiencies in the structure of 
the national banking systemas which resulted fairly regularly in bank 
runs, panics and depressions.39 Free, decentralized banking had not 
proven itself; a better system was needed. It came in 1913. 
2. After 1913 
The most pressing need facing reformers was the need for the es-
tablishment of a banking system with a strong centralized supervisory 
power to provide safety and stability and an elastic currency to provide 
liquidity. All this was to be accomplished in the now traditional envi-
ronment of decentralized banking.40 The result was compromise leg-
islation which gave birth to the Federal Reserve System41 in 1913. All 
national banks were required to join, but state banks could elect to 
join.42 The Act retained the three tier reserve requirements of the 
national banking system,43 empowered the District Banks44 to become 
lenders of last resort by rediscounting commercial paper of member 
banks,45 thereby alleviating the liquidity crises that plagued the prior 
system, and authorized what is now known as "open market opera-
tions"46 by permitting district banks to buy and sell government 
securities. 
37. The more stringent regulatory aspects of national banks were also a weighty fac-
tor in the resumption and growth of state banking. 
38. Typical structural deficiencies included the inelasticity of the currency, weakness 
in the reserve requirements and pyramiding of reserves. 
39. The panics of 1873, 1893 and 1907. 
40. There was general agreement as to the desirability of these goals, but little agree-
ment on how to implement them. The bankers proposed a National Reserve As-
sociation of Banks, to be controlled by the bankers themselves. The populists 
wanted strong government supervision with government issue of currency, and 
no private control. How attitudes have changed! 
41. The Federal Reserve Act, Ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (1913)[hereinafter "the 
Act"](codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
42. This attempt to bring the state banks under Federal regulation was not success-
ful. In 1930, about 15,000 banks out of a total of 24,000 were not member banks; in 
1985, about 10,000 out of a total of 15,000 banks were not member banks. 
43. As provided in the National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (codified as a 
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
44. The United States was divided into 12 districts, each with its own District Federal 
Reserve Bank. 
45. The so called "discount window''. 
46. At present, the most powerful tool to control the money supply. 
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As has been indicated, 47 a compelling motivation for passage of the 
National Bank Act was the need for a stable bank system to finance 
the Civil War. Similarly, during World War I the Federal Govern-
ment sought the aid of the banking system to participate in the financ-
ing of the war by underwriting government bonds. Thus, the 
commercial banks (both state chartered and national) became accus-
tomed to intermingling commercial and investment banking. State 
chartered banks had no impediment to actively engaging in securities 
activities since state charters did not prohibit them from so doing. 
However, even though the National Banking Act of 1864 did not pro-
hibit investment banking activities, judicial4S and administrative49 
barriers prevented national banks from participating in this lucrative 
post World War I business.so To reduce the exodus of national banks 
into the state chartered camps51 and to legitimize the status of securi-
ties affiliates,s2 the McFadden Act53 was passed in 1927, to permit, 
among other things,54 the underwriting activities which the national 
47. See supra text accompanying note 33. 
48. In Logan County National Bank v. Townsend, 139 U.S. 67 (1891), the Supreme 
Court held that a national bank is prohibited from performing investment bank-
ing services (in this case purchasing municipal bonds) because the National Bank-
ing Act of 1864 did not expressly confer such power. In California National Bank 
v. Kennedy, 167 U.S. 362 (1897), the Court held, based on the same grounds, that a 
national bank may not purchase or deal in the stock of another corporation. 
49. In 1902, the Comptroller of the Currency issued regulations severely restricting 
investment activities of national banks. See Robert J. Rogowski, Commercial 
Banks and Municipal Revenue Bonds, 95 BANKING L.J. 155, 157 (1978). To over-
come these impediments (see supra note 48) many national banks pursued one of 
two courses; they converted to state charters or established "securities affiliates" 
by purchasing state chartered banks or establishing new entities. The legality of 
these affiliates was strongly denounced in 1911 and 1912. See Comment, Securi-
ties Industry Association v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 31 
N.Y. L. SCH. L. REv. 215, 222-23 (1986). However, due to the need of bank assist-
ance in financing World War I, neither the Justice Department nor the Federal 
Reserve attempted to halt the securities activities of the commercial banks. 
50. After World War I, corporations began to rely on internal financing, from their 
own profits or from new security issues, thus reducing their dependence on or 
need for bank short term loans. This put banks under pressure to find other 
sources of income. As a result, more and more commercial banks engaged heav-
ily in investment bank functions, the national banks using the securities affiliate 
system. 
51. Robert J. Rogowski, Commercial Banks and Municipal Revenue Bonds, 95 BANK-
ING L.J. 155, 157 (1978). 
52. Id. 
53. Ch. 191, 44 Stat. 1224 (1927)(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 
U.S.C.) 
54. The National Banking Act prohibited national banks from establishing branches. 
This reduced their ability to compete against state chartered banks which had no 
such impediment. The McFadden Act made provision to permit national banks 
to branch. See infra note 142. Several other provisions liberalized other limita-
tions on national banks in order to make them more competitive with state 
chartered banks. 
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banks had been practicing all along. Meanwhile, in order to offset the 
competition of the commercial bank affiliates, investment banks en-
tered the commercial banking field by accepting deposits and making 
commercial loans. By 1929 there was little left to distinguish these 
two classes of institutions; the separation of banking functions had 
practically disappeared.ss Then came the stock market crash of 1929, 
followed by thousands of bank failures in the early 1930s.ss The accus-
ing finger (for the causes of the crash and failures) pointed at the in-
vestment activities of commercial banks. The hearings57 Congress 
held to investigate the causes of the crash brought forth a long cata-
logue of perceived ill-deeds by the commercial banking fraternity. 
The stage was thus set for the Glass-Steagall Act.ss 
III. REGULATION OF BANKING 
A. The Glass-Steagall Act and the FDIC 
In view of the catastrophic results59 of the 1929 stock market crash 
and the views expressed in the Congressional hearingsso thereon, 
policymakers were compelled to reevaluate the system61 and pass leg-
islation to bring about the recovery and reform of banking. The im-
mediate goals to be accomplished were: 
(1) to restore public confidence in banking following the 1929 stock market 
crash and the accompanying widespread bank failures; (2) to insure and main-
tain general economic stability by prohibiting unsound and imprudent bank 
investments; and (3) to forestall potential conflicts of interest between com-
mercial and investment banking operations. 52 
To achieve these goals Congress passed the Banking Act of 1933,63 
four sections64 of which are referred to as the Glass-Steagall Act or 
the Glass-Steagall wall. The "wall" alluded to is the wall between 
55. See Edwin J. Perkins, The Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking: A 
History, 88 BANKING L. J. 483, 495-96 (1971). 
56. By 1933 almost 9000 banks failed, ostensibly due to losses on speculative invest-
ments. See Matthew Clark & Anthony Saunders, Judicial Interpretation of 
Glass-Steagall: The Need for Legislative Action, 97 BANKING L. J. 721, 723 (1980). 
57. See Operation of the National and Federal Reserve Banking Systems: Hearings 
Pursuant to S. Res. No. 71 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Comm. on Bank-
ing and Currency, 71st Cong., 3d Session (1931). 
58. The Banking Act of 1933, Ch. 89, §§ 16, 20, 21, 32, 48 Stat. 162, 184, 188, 189, 194 
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 377, 378, 78 respectively (1988)). 
59. See Clark and Saunders, supra note 56, at 723. 
60. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
61. See supra text accompanying notes 52-54. 
62. See Clark and Saunders, supra note 56, at 725. 
63. The Banking Act of 1933, Ch. 89, §§ 16, 20, 21, 32, 48 Stat. 162, 184, 188, 189, 194 
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 377, 378, 78 respectively (1988)). 
64. Id. 
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commercial and investment banking.ss The most notable activity pro-
hibited to commercial banks is the underwriting£6 of securities. To 
help restore public confidence in banking, the Banking Act of 1933 
established the FDIC67 (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) to in-
sure deposits up to a specified amount, ss guaranteed by the full faith 
and credit of the United States. The expectation was the restoration 
of public faith in the banks and prevention of future waves of panic 
induced bank runs. The results have been gratifying. The period fol-
lowing 1933 has been stable and marked by relatively few bank 
failures. 59 
Changes in the legislative and regulatory scheme during 1933-1986 
were relatively minor7o and largely represented a fleshing out of the 
themes established in and prior to 1933. The major exceptions were 
the Bank Holding Company Act of 195671 and its amendment in 197072 
and the Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982.73 
B. Policy Goals of Federal Regulation 
This section delves into the broad goals of bank regulation, the pol-
65. Glass-Steagall: 
a) Prohibits national banks from buying or selling securities for their own 
account. Ch. 89 § 16, 48 Stat. 184 (1937). 
b) Restricts national banks from investing in debt securities. Ch. 89 § 20, 48 
Stat. 188 (1933). 
c) Bans national banks from underwriting or issuing securities, with excep-
tions. Ch. 89 § 21, 48 Stat. 189 (1933). 
d) Prohibits national banks from affiliating with investment banking firms. 
Ch. 89 § 32, 48 Stat. 194 (1933). 12 U.S.C. § 335 (1988) imposes these prohibitions 
on state member banks, i.e. state banks which are members of the Federal Re-
serve System. 
66. Underwriting securities is a practice whereby a financial intermediary, in effect, 
buys the debt or equity of its client and in turn sells it to investors. The under-
writer has the potential exposure that the market will not buy the securities at or 
above the price paid to its client. This risk creates a potential for particular li-
quidity problems or abuses by banks. A bank, faced with undesirable securities, 
may either hold them or abuse its trust and fiduciary capacity and unload them 
on unsuspecting dependent customers. 
67. The Banking Act of 1933, Ch. 89, § 8, 48 Stat. 168, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-32 (1988). 
68. At present the amount is $100,000 in any insured bank. 
69. During the boom years of the 1920s, an average of about 600 banks annually sus-
pended operations. Then in the four years between 1930 and 1933, approximately 
9000 commercial banks were closed. From 1934 to 1985 (52 years) there were 875 
FDIC insured bank failures and 136 non insured bank failures, a total of 1011. 
This averages to about 20 per year. CARTER H. GoLEMBE AND DAVIDS. HOLLAND, 
FEDERAL REGULATION OF BANKING 1986-87, 115-16 (1986). 
70. But see sources cited supra note 3. 
71. Ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-49 (1988)). 
72. Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, 84 Stat. 
1760 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
73. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 
U.S.C.). 
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icy tools created to pursue these goals and the constraints that limit 
the government in their pursuit. 
1. The Broad Goals 
Because of its tremendously profound role in the national econ-
omy, the Federal Government has a vital interest in regulating bank-
ing. The specific goals of federal banking policy fall into three 
identifiable but overlapping categories: depositor or consumer protec-
tion; credit distribution/macroeconomic goals; and monetary/cyclical 
economic policy. 
Consumer protection includes all of those policies aimed at protect-
ing depositors' funds, insuring competitive pricing, and insuring that 
banks act as relatively impartial fiduciaries for the public. Thus, the 
safety of deposits is a primary objective pervading banking public pol-
icy and is considered the salient point in this study. 
Credit distribution entails the government's concern for suitable 
capital apportionment. Any distortion in the flows74 would have the 
potential for powerful macroeconomic effects. Any geographic con-
centration of banking power or significant affiliation with a particular 
economic segment would have such implications. Such distortions 
could profoundly misshape economic growth and development. 
The banking system plays a key role in the monetary system, the 
manipulation of which has been used as a policy tool to direct or cor-
rect economic cycles. The Federal Reserve Board ("The Fed") at-
tempts to reach the desired results by affecting the supply of bank 
liquidity through open-market operations, reserve requirements and 
the discount rate.7s 
2. General Constraints on Federal Banking Policy 
Federal banking policy is constrained by concerns.for economic ef-
ficiency, the balancing of federal authority and states' rights,76 and the 
fungible and global nature of capital and capital markets. 
In pursuing any of the three aforementioned areas of banking pol-
icy, policy makers must be aware of the costs of their actions.77 Bank-
74. Proper credit allocation involves the furthering of general economic growth 
through capital flow to its most productive use free of any systematic, geographic, 
industrial or other biases that would work against a healthy free market 
economy. 
75. The Board is required under 12 U.S.C. § 225a (1982) to "maintain long run growth 
of the monetary and credit aggregates ... so as to promote effectively the goals of 
maximum employment, stable prices and moderate long-term interest rates." 
76. See supra text accompanying notes 34-48. 
77. As with any public policy, the makers must balance the costs and benefits associ-
ated with particular actions. For banking policy, this implies a balancing of finan-
cial safety and economic efficiency. 
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ing policy makers must constantly maintain the right balance of risk 
and efficiency. A particular policy may be to ensure deposit safety, 
but come only at a prohibitive cost. For example, Congress could fully 
guarantee the stability of deposit institutions by requiring all deposito-
ries to hold U.S. Treasury bonds exclusively. This however would not 
be an appropriate mix of risk and efficiency. In this case the decrease 
in risk does not offset the high opportunity costs of channeling money 
into relatively low yield and low productivity areas. 
The balancing of federal and state authority over banking is a con-
cern where such regulation affects local matters and also has national 
implications. Banking represents an important part of intrastate ac-
tivity with interstate implications. Consequently much of the federal 
banking legislation reflects this concern. 78 
The business of banking is money. This creates specific concerns 
for the public policy maker. Money and its derivatives, debt and eq-
uity, are highly fungible and fluid and are relatively inexpensive to 
transfer and change form.79 As a result banking is a regulated indus-
try that lends itself to avoidance and evasions. A bank, by slightly 
modifying a particular practice, may be able to achieve substantially 
the same result as that which is prohibited by law or regulation.so 
78. Under our dual banking system, the states and the federal government may char-
ter banks. The National Bank Act of 1864, Ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), regulates federally chartered banks 
but not state banks, nor affiliates of national banks. Thus a national bank, 
through a holding company, could engage in activities that would have been for-
bidden to the national bank itself. This loophole became apparent in the two 
decades prior to the 1930s. See supra note 49. Congress attempted to remedy the 
situation through the Glass-Steagall provisions. However, the means attempted 
by those measures proved ineffective. To cure the problem Congress passed the 
Bank Holding Company Act in 1956. Ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (codified as amended 12 
U.S.C. §§ 1841-49 (1988)). Congress was careful in its provisions not to encroach 
on the power of the states to regulate their state chartered banks or their bank 
holding companies. The present issue of the "South Dakota Loophole" is one of 
the manifestations of this deference to state sovereignty. See infra text accompa-
nying note 295. 
79. Money is simply a medium of exchange and a store of value. Debt and equity 
instruments all have values in present terms and are readily exchangeable. 
80. An example is the sale of loans. A bank originating a loan is free to sell the loan 
as it would a bond or other asset. Quite often a loan is sold off in pieces corre-
sponding to different maturity periods in the future. For example, a bank 
originating a five year loan may sell off the first two years to one party, the sec-
ond two years to another party and keep the last year for itself. This practice is 
confined to very large scale loans and the periods sold are typically 30-90 days. 
Phillip L. Zweig, Major New York Banks Initiate Tactic of Selling Short Term 
'Strips' of Loans, W AU. ST. J., Jan. 23, 1986, at 10. This practice is, from a regula-
tory perspective, similar to underwriting commercial paper or very short term 
marketable credit which is prohibited by Glass-Steagall. But see infra note 219 
for a decision (June 13, 1988) permitting limited underwriting activity in commer-
cial paper. 
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These effects are further aggravated by the existence of integrated 
and global financial markets81 which make it more difficult for regula-
tors to contain banking within the desired limits. 
C. The Policy Implementing Tools (Regulatory Mechanisms) 
The foregoing concerns have produced a broad arsenal of policy 
regulating tools which are administered by several regulatory entities. 
Unfortunately these entities overlap,s2 as do the laws creating the reg-
ulatory scheme. The regulatory limitations will be examined in a 
functional sense rather than chronologically or by statutory classifica-
tion. A caveat is necessary at this point: It is not the objective of this 
portion of this study to set forth a thorough analysis of the regulatory 
scheme but merely to present a simple and broad summary which fo-
cuses on the concept of safety and soundness with a view to examining 
the underlying question raised in the introductory portion of this pa-
per. Thus the following generalizations do not include all the relevant 
substance and detail. 
1. Entry Restrictions 
Except during the short periods when the Bank of the United 
Statessa exerted some restraining influence, entry into banking was 
practically unregulated.S4 The threshold requirement for the promo-
tion of safety, soundness and diminishment of risk (the first of the 
aforementioned policy goals) would logically impose a standard on the 
qualifications of persons to be permitted to enter the field and place 
restrictions on the environmental structure in which a bank is to be 
81. The computer technology has enabled instantaneous communication of financial 
information on a global scale facilitating bank activity in underwriting, distribut-
ing and dealing in debt and equity securities in foreign markets such as the 
Euromarket. See Hearing on Globalization of Capital Markets and the Securi-
tization of Credit, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). For legal authorization of such 
activities see 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(d)(13)(1992). 
82. National banks are regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 
Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, § 8, 13 Stat. 99, 101 (codified in scattered sections of 12 
U.S.C.), and because they are required to be members of the Federal Reserve and 
the FDIC, they also are regulated by the Federal Reserve Board (12 U.S.C. 
§ 248(a) and (j)(1988)), as well as the FDIC (12 U.S.C. §§ 1811 and 1814 (1988)). 
State member banks (state banks may elect to join th_e "Fed" or the FDIC; but 
joining the "Fed" requires also joining the FDIC) are regulated by the Federal 
Reserve Board (12 U.S.C. § 321 (1988)) and the FDIC (12 U.S.C. § 1814 (1988)) and 
the appropriate state regulatory agency. State nonmember banks which elect to 
be insured by FDIC are regulated by the FDIC (12 U.S.C. § 1815 (1988)) and the 
appropriate state regulatory agency. 
83. See supra text accompanying notes 14 and 24. 
84. See supra text following note 31. 
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opened. The National Bank Act of 186485 did just that. It established 
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currencyss charging that Office 
with the responsibility of determiningB7 which applicants shall be per-
mitted to "commence business."ss The several states have similar re-
quirements which are more or less stringent. State banks applying for 
Federal Reserve membershipS9 are to be approved or rejected by the 
Federal Reserve Board90 under criteria similar to those used by the 
OCC.91 State banks, member or nonmember, applying for FDIC cov-
erage are to be evaluated by the Board of Directors of the FDIC by a 
similar yardstick.92 It appears that application of these standards has 
85. National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
86. 12 u.s.c. § 1 (1988). 
87. Id. § 26. 
88. Applicants for a bank charter must file a formal "application" with ex-
tensive supporting data. The organizers must outline their plan of oper-
ations, describe earning prospects, provide details on management 
capabilities (involving bank executives with appropriate experience, 
under contract or part of the organizing group), show adequate capitali-
zation and soundness, and offer reasonable service to their community. 
In addition, the Comptroller's Office (OCC) and State Bank Depart-
ments require information on market circumstances, i.e., size and 
growth potential, and competition from existing banks and related finan-
cial institutions. Notice of the application must be published, which al-
lows other interested parties (normally competing institutions already in 
the market) to file protests and relevant data. This provides ample basis 
for determining whether a particular charter might meet the conven-
ience and needs of its community, taking into account competitive cir-
cumstances. 
* * .. 
In other words, new entrants often have to demonstrate not only fi-
nancial resources and managerial competence but show also that the 
market in question (a city or rural area) could accommodate another 
banking institution. This means, in practice, that a substantial limitation 
on the flow of new entry may be asserted by the existing banks in an 
area as protestants against additional rivals. Whether or not this resist-
ance will be effective depends on how these factors are evaluated, in the 
discretion of federal and state chartering authorities. 
LoVETr, supra note 6, at 103 and 104. 
89. Under 12 U.S.C. § 321 (1988). 
90. Under 12 U.S.C. § 322 (1988). 
91. See LoVETr supra note 6, at 103 and 104. 
92. § 1816. 
The factors to be enumerated in the certificate required under section 
1814 of this title and to be considered by the Board of Directors under 
section 1815 of this title shall be the following: The financial history and 
condition of the bank, the adequacy of its capital structure, its future 
earnings prospects, the general character of its management, the conven-
ience and needs of the community to be served by the bank, and whether 
or not its corporate powers are consistent with the purposes of this 
chapter. 
12 U.S.C. § 1816 (1988). The court in City National Bank v. Smith, 513 F.2d 479, 
480-1, (D.C. Cir. 1975)(citing 12 C.F.R. § 4.2(b)(1974)), explained that: 
The dual purpose of the chartering process is to regulate entry into the 
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worked well in the chartering process of banks. 
2. Capitalization Requirements 
Safety and soundness of any business entity, especially a banking 
business, requires a minimum infusion of initial capital by the or-
ganizers of the business. The National Bank Act so provides for the 
minimum initial capital.93 Although present federal minimums range 
between $50,000 and $200,000,94 depending on the location of the bank, 
as a practical matter the minimum is $1,000,000 by ace require-
ments.95 Capital adequacy requirements are measured as a percentage 
of total assets. The "Fed" and the ace recently issued a single set of 
guidelines for capital adequacy of national banks, state member banks 
and bank holding companies.96 
An adjunct to the capital adequacy requirement is the reserve re-
quirement. The Fed is mandated97 to prescribe by regulation the rate 
of reserves to be maintained by member banks against their transac-
tion or deposit accounts. The function of the reserve is to force banks 
to hold enough cash as a buttress against potential bank runs. More 
importantly, by having the power to change reserve requirements, the 
Fed can, to some degree, also implement monetary policy.9S The Fed 
banking industry on the basis of economic considerations and to assure 
that national banks are competently and honestly operated. These 
objectives are reflected in the topics subject to investigation prior to ap-
proval of applications for charters: 
(1) The adequacy of the proposed bank's structure. 
(2) The earning prospects of the proposed bank. 
(3) The convenience and needs of the community to be served by the 
proposed bank. 
(4) The character and general standing in the community of the appli-
cants, prospective directors, proposed officers, and other employees, and 
other persons connected with the application or to be connected with the 
proposed bank. 
(5) The banking ability and experience of those officers and other 
employees. 
93. 12 U.S.C. § 51 (1988). State laws have similar requirements. 
94. Id. 
95. LoVE'IT, supra note 6, at 106. 
96. Acceptable ratios are: above 6.5% for multinational and regional banks, above 7% 
for community banks. The FDIC has a 2% total capital to total asset ratio, 12 
C.F.R. § 325.4 (1992). What these ratios mean is that for every $1 of assets, $.02 
(the FDIC ratio) must come from bank capital. The bank regulatory agencies 
have the discretion to raise these minimums for individual banks based on their 
financial histories or present financial conditions such as loans of questionable 
quality, earnings capacity and other considerations. 
97. 12 u.s.c. § 461 (1988). 
98. The Federal Reserve System has two additional means to manipulate the money 
supply. Each Federal Reserve bank (see supra note 44) has the power to buy and 
sell U.S. securities in the open market, 12 U.S.C. § 355 (1988). For every dollar of 
such securities sold, the money supply decreases by one dollar. The more the 
money supply decreases, the higher interest rates go. This is a supply and de-
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can raise reserve requirements to contract lending and lower reserve 
requirements to expand lending. In summary, minimum capital re-
quirements and reserve requirements are a safeguard against declines 
in bank asset value99 or, in case of excessive depositor withdrawals, 
they provide a cushion against insolvency. Thus, these capital and re-
serve requirements are designed to promote liquidity and further the 
goal of deposit safety. 
3. Limitation of and Prohibition Against Specific Activities 
The most direct and powerful mechanism of implementing the pol-
icy goals which have been outlinedlOO is the legislative and regulatory 
manifestation of permitted and prohibited activities of banks.lOl A 
mand reaction to the increase in the scarcity of money. The second means is 
control over the discount rate. 12 U.S.C. § 357 (1988) empowers each Federal Re-
serve bank to establish discount rates. These banks lend money to commercial 
banks. By changing the rate of interest charged, the Fed influences the amount 
of money borrowed by banks, which in turn affects the money supply and interest 
rates. The manipulation of money supply and interest rates is in effect a control 
of the credit available to the national economy which in turn can be used to con-
tain cyclical inflation and recession. 
99. As witnessed by loans to third world countries and certain domestic economic 
sectors such as energy and agriculture, bank loans can go bad. The net present 
value of a bank's asset portfolio, which includes loans, is, therefore, subject to 
variation. A bank's capital has a subordinate claim to the assets of the bank rela-
tive to deposits. An unexpected fall in the value of a bank's loans will cause de-
positors to lose money only after all the bank capital has been lost. 
100. See supra Part III.A.l. 
101. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1988 & Cum. Supp. II 1990) provides in part: 
A national banking association ... shall have power ... to exercise ... , all 
such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of 
banking; by discounting and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills of 
exchange, and other evidences of debt; by receiving deposits; by buying 
and selling exchange, coin, and bullion; by loaning money on personal 
security; and by obtaining, issuing, and circulating notes according to the 
provisions of title 62 of the Revised Statutes. The business of dealing in 
securities and stock by the association shall be limited to purchasing and 
selling such securities and stock without recourse, solely upon the order, 
and for the account of, customers, and in no case for its own account, and 
the association shall not underwrite any issue of securities or stock; Pro-
vided, That the association may purchase for its own account investment 
securities under such limitations and restrictions as the Comptroller of 
the Currency may by regulation prescribe. In no event shall the total 
amount of the investment securities of any one obligor or maker, held by 
the association for its own account, exceed at any time 10 per centum of 
its capital stock actually paid in and unimpaired and 10 per centum of its 
unimpaired surplus fund, except that this limitation shall not require 
any association to dispose of any securities lawfully held by it on August 
23, 1935. As used in this section the term "investment securities" shall 
mean marketable obligations, evidencing indebtedness of any person, co-
partnership, association, or corporation in the form of bonds, notes and/ 
or debentures commonly known as investment securities under such fur-
ther definition of the term "investment securities" as may by regulation 
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careful examination of the statute quoted supra note 101 shows that, 
in general, national banks are allowed to do the business of banking 
and the activities incidental and necessary to carry on such busi-
ness.I02 These activities clearly include deposit taking, making loans, 
and discounting and negotiating debt.I03 
State banks derive their powers from the laws of the state of incor-
poration. Becoming a member of the Federal Reserve does not dero-
gate these powers,I04 even though such banks become subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Fed.IOS However, the Fed may, in evaluating a state 
bank's application, consider "whether its corporate powers are consis-
tent with the purposes of the Federal Reserve Act"I06 and may subject 
the applicant "to such conditions as it may prescribe pursuant [to the 
provisions of this chapter]" in order to "permit the applying bank to 
become a stockholder of such Federal Reserve bank."I07 However, 
the Glass-Steagall provisions (the bane of banking activity restrictions 
from the banker's point of view) do apply to state member banks.IOS 
Member banks are prohibited from "acting as agent for [any] non-
banking borrower in making loans on securities to [securities] dealers 
[or brokers]."I09 Insured nonmember state banks are subject to the 
be prescribed by the Comptroller of the Currency. Except as hereinafter 
provided or otherwise permitted by law, nothing herein contained shall 
authorize the purchase by the association for its own account of any 
shares of stock of any corporation. The limitations and restrictions 
herein contained as to dealing in, underwriting and purchasing for its 
own account, investment securities shall not apply to [enumerated gov-
ernment, state and local securities]. 
Section 108 of CEBA, Pub. L. No.100-86,101 Stat. 552 (1987)(codified at scattered 
sections of 12 U.S.C.), added subsection "tenth" which expanded the power of 
national banks "[t]o invest in tangible personal property, including, without limi-
tation, vehicles, manufactured homes, machinery, equipment, or furniture, for 
lease financing transactions on a net lease basis, but such investment may not 
exceed 10 percent of the assets of the association." 
102. Because the statute does not define ''banking business" nor "incidental" thereto, 
a great deal of litigation has resulted. Judicial and administrative rulings have 
identified forty-two specific activities that are considered to be within the param-
eters of these phrases. For the list and sources of authority of the forty-two activ-
ities see 1 HARVEY L. Prrr, THE LAw OF FINANCIAL SERVICES 16-21 (Supp. 1990-
92). 
103. See irifra Part ID.C.5. 
104. 12 U.S.C. § 330 (1988) provides that "any bank becoming a member of the Federal 
reserve system shall retain its full charter and statutory rights as a State bank or 
trust company, and may continue to exercise all corporate powers granted it by 
the State in which it was created." 
105. See supra note 82. 
106. 12 C.F.R. § 208.5(a)(4)(1992). 
107. 12 u.s.c. § 321 (1988). 
108. 12 U.S.C. §§ 78, 377 (1988) are made applicable by the terms of these sections; § 24 
is applied through § 335 and § 378 is applicable to all organizations that accept 
deposits subject to check, thus including state member banks. 
109. Id. § 374a. 
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jurisdiction of the FDIC; no it also imposes some prohibitions on activi-
ties it considers inconsistent with the purposes of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Act.lll 
Aside from the Glass-Steagall oriented regulatory mechanism, 
there are other tools in the arsenal of policy implementation. To pre-
vent funneling of money into highly nonliquid assets, national banks 
are limited to those real estate activities necessary for the accommoda-
tion and transaction of its business.ll2 This includes real estate ac-
quired in collecting previously contracted debts.ll3 Real estate 
acquired in this manner may only be held for five years. The purpose 
of the real estate restrictions are to "keep bank capital flowing into 
daily channels of commerce, to deter banks from embarking on haz-
ardous real estate speculation and to prevent accumulation of large 
masses of such property."ll4 
Permissible insurance activities of banks are extremely limited. 
Interestingly, neither the National Bank Actns nor Glass-Steagall116 
specifically prohibit such activities. It was merely an accepted view 
that national banks do not have the power to sell or underwrite insur-
ance. The "incidental powers"ll7 clause was not considered broad 
110. See supra note 82. 
111. 12 C.F.R. § 332.1 (1992) Inconsistent powers. 
A State nonmember insured bank (except a District bank) which does 
not have any of the powers hereinafter enumerated, or which, although 
it has any such power, does not exercise the same, shall not hereafter 
exercise, take, or assume the power: (a) To do a surety business; (b) to 
insure the fidelity of others; (c) to engage in insuring, guaranteeing nor 
certifying titles to real estate; or (d) to guarantee or become surety upon 
the obligations of others, except as provided in§ 347.3(c)(1). 
The limitations prescribed in § 332.1(d) do not include acceptances, endorse-
ments, or letters of credit made or issued in the usual course of the banking busi-
ness. 12 C.F.R. § 332.1 (1992). 
§ 332.2 Exercise prohibited. After the effective date of this part, any 
State nonmember bank (except a District bank) becoming an insured 
bank shall not thereafter exercise any of the powers enumerated in 
§ 332.1. 
Id. § 332.2. 
Additionally, in 12 C.F.R. Part 337, entitled "Unsafe and Unsound Banking 
Practices", the FDIC has imposed restrictions on the following activities: (1) issu-
ance of standby letters of credit, Id. § 337.2 (1988); (2) extension of credit to exec-
utive officers, directors and principal shareholders, Id. § 337.3; and (3) securities 
activities through subsidiaries or with affiliated securities companies, Id. § 337.4. 
Finally, under 12 C.F.R. § 333.2 (1992) no change in the general character of the 
business is permitted without prior written approval by the FDIC. 
112. 12 u.s.c. § 29 (1988). 
113. Id. 
114. First Nat'l Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of the Currency, 697 F.2d 674, 681 (5th 
Cir. 1983). 
115. See supra note 33. 
116. See supra note 63. 
117. See supra note 101. 
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enough to include insurance activities.ns Apparently Congress agreed 
with this view. In 1916, when Congress decided that it would be in the 
public interest to allow national banks in towns with populations less 
than 5,000 to sell but not underwrite insurance, it added a new sec-
tion119 to the national banking laws to enable such activity.12o How-
ever, almost fifty years later, James J. Saxon, Comptroller of the 
Currency decided to be contrary.121 He ruled that: 
Incidental to the powers vested in them under 12 U.S.C. Sections 24, 84 and 
371, National Banks have the authority to act as agent in the issuance of insur-
ance which is incident to banking transactions. Commissions received there-
from or service charges imposed therefor may be retained by the bank.122 
(Emphasis added.) 
This ruling was not limited in scope to cities of less than 5,000 popula-
tion and purported to authorize every national bank, regardless of its 
location, to enter the insurance agency field and to compete with in-
surance agents. 
This ruling did not go unchallenged. An association of insurance 
agents brought an action for declaratory judgment to declare the 
comptrollers ruling unlawful and to enjoin a national bank from act-
ing as an insurance agency in places of more than 5,000 population. 
The agents' association was granted summary judgment on both 
118. The Federal Reserve Board declared that "writing insurance on commission is in 
no sense incidental to any of the enumerated powers of a national bank." PrrT, 
supra note 102 at 573, citing 2 Fed. Res. Bull. 73, 74 (1916). 
119. 12 U.S.C.A. § 92 (West 1945). Section 92 was omitted when Rev. Stat. 
§ 5202 (to which it was added by the Act of Sept. 7, 1916, ch. 461, 39 Stat. 
753) was amended in 1918. See Act of Apr. 5, 1918, ch. 45, § 20, 40 Stat. 
512. Revisers of the United States Code in 1952 accordingly omitted the 
section. Nevertheless, the courts have continued to treat Section 92 as if 
it exists, and Congress even purported to amend it as part of the Garn-St 
Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982. See e.g. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 
tit. IV, § 403(b), 96 Stat. 1469, 1511 [(1982)]. 
Prrr, supra note 102, at 574 n.14. 
120. The apparent purpose of this legislation was expressed as follows: 
It clearly appears, then, that 12 U.S.C. § 92 was enacted not out of a be-
lief that there was any significant connection between banking and the 
sale of insurance in small communities, but merely because it was be-
lieved that banks needed an additional source of income to improve their 
stability and profitability. Congress thus did not indicate that the sale of 
insurance in small towns was part of "banking'', but rather that it was an 
unrelated business which would provide a source of income that would 
then be available for use in the separate banking activities of small town 
national banks. 
Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 533 
F.2d 224, 243 (5th Cir. 1976), vacated in part on other grounds, 558 F.2d 729 (5th 
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978). 
121. Letter from James J. Saxon, Comptroller of the Currency, to the Presidents of all 
National Banks (Feb. 18, 1963). 
122. O.C.C. Ruling No. 7110 (1963). 
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counts.123 The OCC, however, was not overly impressed with its de-
feat. When the United States National Bank of Oregon (Bank), lo-
cated in Portland, Oregon, requested permission to establish an 
operating subsidiary in Banks, Oregon, a town with a population 
under 5,000, so that the Bank could sell a full range of insurance prod-
ucts through branches in Banks, Oregon, the OCC ruled that: 
Based on our analysis of the relevant legal precedent, we have concluded that 
[our attorney, in prior correspondence] correctly determined that a national 
bank or its branch which is located in a place of 5,000 or under population may 
sell insurance to existing and potential customers located anywhere. In other 
words, while the bank or bank branch must be located in a small town, it can 
sell insurance to persons and businesses located outside that town.124 
Naturally the insurance agents were less than enthusiastic about this 
decision, foreseeing vigorous entry by national banks into insurance 
on a national scale. The National Association of Life Underwriters 
(NALU) and the Independent Insurance Agents of America, Inc. 
(IIAA) brought declaratory and injunctive actions to challenge the 
ruling.12s The Comptroller had more success with other aspects of in-
surance activities of national banks. In respect to credit life insurance, 
he ruled that "national banks, wherever located, may [sell as agents] 
individual or group credit life coverage and charge their loan custom-
ers accordingly."126 He was upheld in Independent Bankers Associa-
tion of America v. Heimann127 where the court said that credit life 
insurance is "a limited special type of coverage written to protect loans 
... [and] is now commonplace and essential where ordinary loans on 
personal security are involved,"128 that is, it is incidental to the busi-
123. Georgia Ass'n of Independent Insurance Agents v. Saxon, 268 F. Supp. 236 (N.D. 
Ga. 1967), ciff'd 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968). The court stated: 
In interpreting the meaning of one provision of an act it is proper that all 
other provisions in pari materia should also be considered. So, in con-
structing the general authority contained in Section 24(7} we must give 
equal consideration to Section 92 as it specifically deals with the power of 
national banks to act as insurance agents, and when the general language 
in Section 24{7) dealing with "incidental" powers is construed in con-
junction with the specific grant in Section 92 it is clear that application of 
the expressio unius est exclusio alterius rule requires the construction 
that national banks have no power to act as insurance agents in cities of 
over 5,000 population. 
Id. at 1013. 
124. Comptroller Staff Interpretive Letter No. 366, [1985-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. 
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 11 85,536 (Aug. 18, 1986). 
125. The Court of Appeals held that section 92 had been repealed and the Comptrol-
ler's decision was, therefore, without statutory authority. Independent Ins. 
Agents of America v. Clarke, 955 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
126. COMPI'ROLLER'S DIGEST OF OPINIONS§ 9420 (1960)(emphasis added) quoted in 41 
Fed. Reg. 29,846, 29,847 (1976)(codified as amended at 12 C.F.R. Part 2). 
127. 613 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 823 (1980). 
128. Id. at 1170. The court's characterization of the transaction as "loans on personal 
security" intimates that the court was referring to the express wording of permis-
sible activities spelled out in 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1988 & Cum. Supp. II 1990), thus 
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ness of banking. The expression "written to protect loans" was taken 
by the Comptroller as a suggestion by the court that national banks 
may enter into a variety of insurance activities. He ruled that a na-
tional bank or its operating subsidiary may sell129 or underwrite130 ti-
tle insurance in connection with mortgage loans made by them, since 
such insurance is "incidental to banking within the meaning of 12 
U.S.C. (Seventh)"131 because "[t]here is a close connection between 
mortgage lending (the express banking service) and title insurance on 
the mortgage loan collateral (the incidental service)."132 Meanwhile, 
the Comptroller also ruled that national banks may underwrite credit 
life insurance.133 
These prohibitions, especially the ones contained in the provisions 
of Glass-Steagall incorporated into 12 U.S.C. § 24,134 have a double ob-
jective: first to achieve the policy goal of consumer protection by limit-
ing banks to safe transactions, and second to insure the policy goal of 
free flow of capital. The perception was that bank involvement in 
nonbanking activities would prejudice credit decisions in favor of affil-
iated businesses.135 
4. Restrictions on .Affiliations and Geographic Expansion 
Although 12 U.S.C. § 24136 prohibits national banks and state mem-
ber banks (through§ 335) from owning stock in any corporation, both 
the Comptroller and the Federal Reserve Board have ruled within 
their respective regulatory jurisdictions that banks may create subsidi-
aries137 but with an absolute limitation of activities to such as permit-
characterizing credit life insurance as incidental to lending money on personal 
security. 
129. Comptroller Staff Interpretive Letter No. 368 [1985-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. 
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 85,538 (July 11, 1986). 
130. Comptroller Staff Interpretive Letter No. 377, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. 
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 85,601 (Feb. 6, 1987). 
131. Id. at 77,901. 
132. Id. at 77,902. 
133. Comptroller Staff Interpretive Letter No. 277, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. 
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 85,441, at 77, 959 (Dec. 31, 1983): 
As e."qllained below, the underwriting or reinsurance of credit life is a 
logical complement to a national bank's power to sell credit life. This 
activity is incidental to banking under even the more restrictive inter-
pretations of 12 U.S.C. 24(Seventh) since it is "convenient or useful in 
connection with the performance of one of the bank's express powers 
under the National Bank Act," specifically the express power to lend 
money. M & M Leasing Corp. v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 563 F.2d 1377, 
1382 (9th Cir. 1977). 
Limits on BHC insurance activities discussed infra note 283 and accompanying 
text. 
134. See supra note 101. 
135. See supra note 74. 
136. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh)(1988 & Cum. Supp. 1990). 
137. 12 C.F.R. §§ 5.34 and 225.22(d)(1992) respectively. 
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ted their parents.13S To prevent circumvention of the prohibited 
securities activities of§ 24,139 §§ 377, 378 and 78140 prohibit any affilia-
tion or interlocking personnel between entities considered to be banks 
and entities which by nature are securities dealers or investment 
bankers. The long and short of these sections is to keep the twain 
apart, each to its own turf.141 
The fear of concentration of economic power142 which may lead to 
political power impelled not only the above-mentioned product limita-
tions but also the imposition of geographic restrictions. Sections 36 
and 81 generally prohibit national banks and state member banks 
from establishing branches outside of the bank's home state, and per-
mit intrastate branch banking only to the extent that state law per-
mits the creation of branches to its own banks. Two policy goals are to 
be implemented by these geographic restrictions: (1) safety and sound-
ness and (2) credit allocation. Because strong competition could cause 
failure of smaller or weaker banks, limiting entry of competitors 
would reduce such risks. As to the credit allocation aspects, the 
Supreme Court said that geographic restrictions "preserve a close re-
lationship between those in the community who need credit and those 
who provide credit."143 The perception existed that with free inter-
state banking, depositors' money would be channelled to the large 
money centers and local businesses would not have sources of credit. 
5. Lending and Borrowing Limitations 
To further bolster the availability of credit to large numbers of bor-
rowers and maintain safety for depositors, the geographic restrictions 
are supplemented by limitations on lending power. A national bank 
may make unsecured loans of no more than fifteen percent of its 
unimpaired capital stock and surplus to any one person,144 with an 
additional ten percent if the loan is secured by readily marketable col-
lateral having a market value at least equal to the amount of funds 
· 138. Id. at §§ 5.34(d)(2)(i) and 225.22(d)(2)(ii). 
139. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1988 & Cum. Supp. II 1990). 
140. 12 u.s.c. §§ 377, 378, 78 (1988). 
141. Indeed, this is the burning issue to which Congress is presently devoting a great 
deal of attention. CEBA is but one example. Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 
(1987). 
142. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. This draws attention to the fact that 
the Jacksonian view of keeping banks decentralized is still alive as seen in 12 
U.S.C. §§ 36 and 81. Section 36 is derived from the National Bank Act of 1865, ch. 
78, § 7, 13 Stat. 484 and § 81 is derived from the National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 
106, § 8, 13 Stat. 101, both as amended by the McFadden Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1224 
(1927)(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). Also see Northeast 
Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 472 U.S.159,177 (1985) where the Court said 
that "our country traditionally has favored widely dispersed control of banking." 
143. Northeast Bancrop, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 472 U.S. 159, 178 (1985). 
144. 12 U.S.C. § 84(a)(1)(1988). 
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outstanding.145 The Comptroller of the Currency explains that these 
limitations are "intended to prevent one individual or a relatively 
small group, from borrowing an unduly large amount of the bank's 
funds. It is also intended to safeguard the bank's depositors by spread-
ing the loans among a relatively large number of persons engaged in 
different lines of business."146 
The Garn-St Germain Act147 repealed14S 12 U.S.C. § 82 which lim-
ited the amount of money a national bank could borrow. Prior to the 
repeal of § 82, the apparent assumption of the drafters was that bank 
solvency would be strengthened if a bank could not be "indebted ... to 
an amount exceeding the amount of its capital stock ... plus 50 per-
cent of the amount of its unimpaired surplus fund."149 However the 
present view is that borrowing should be limited by principles of 
safety and soundness, which can be monitored by the regulatory 
agencies. 
IV. REGULATION OF THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 
A. The Nature of Regulation 
In contradistinction to the dual system of bank regulation, insur-
ance is regulated almost exclusively by the states.1so Regulation, how-
145. Id. at § 84(a)(2). 
146. 12 C.F.R. § 32.1 (1992). The term "person" is defined at 12 U.S.C. § 84(b)(2)(1988) 
and "capital" is defined at 12 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1992). 
147. Garn-St Germain Act, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
148. Id. at 1510, title IV, § 402. 
149. 12 u.s.c. § 82 (1976). 
150. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1868) held that the business of insurance is not com-
merce and therefore not subject to Congressional jurisdiction under the Com-
merce Clause. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8 cl. 3. Thus, regulation of insurance 
companies was reserved to the states. However, in United States v. South-East-
em Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), the Court overruled Paul v. Vir-
ginia. Congress quickly reacted to this decision and a year later passed the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act, Pub. L. No. 79-15, 59 Stat. 34 (codified at 15 U.~.C. 
§§ 1011-15 (1988)). Sections 1 and 2 state as follows: 
Section 1: 
Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and taxation by 
the several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, 
and that silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed to 
impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by the 
several States. 
Section 2: 
(a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall 
be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation 
or taxation of such business. 
(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or super-
sede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the busi-
ness of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, 
unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance: Pro-
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ever, came slowly. Prior to 1865 the number of insurance companies 
and the assets they controlled were small. There was no pressure on 
legislatures to remedy abuses of insurers. However, after the Civil 
War, with the new American prosperity, the insurance industry began 
growing rapidly.l51 But with this growth came many unsound insur-
ance practices. Unreasonably large amounts of money were being 
spent-and misspent-by various insurance companies on salaries, 
commissions, dividends, and lobbying activities. After paying premi-
ums for years, many insureds found their companies bankrupt, under-
capitalized, or non-existent. Something had to be done to regulate the 
insurance business and to protect the insured policyholders from 
many of these abuses. 
The New York Armstrong Committee Investigation of 1906, under 
the counsel of Charles Evans Hughes, dramatically, factually, and im-
partially exposed various unsavory practices among life insurance 
companies. The investigation resulted in radical state legislation, both 
in New York and elsewhere, designed to regulate the life insurance 
industry. Today, the business of insurance is subject to regulation by 
the various states and their administrative agencies, due in large part 
to the findings of the Armstrong Committee. Since the goals of insur-
ance regulation152 are the same as the goals of bank regulation, sol-
vency and protection of the consumer, there are strong similarities 
between insurance and bank regulatory measures.153 However, the 
extensive variety of insurance policies compels additional regulation 
relative to standard forms (e.g. fire policies) and rate making 
procedures. 
After World War II there was a tremendous surge in life insurance 
vided, That after January 1, 1948, [the Sherman Act of 1890, the Clayton 
Act of 1914, and the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914] shall be 
applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is 
not regulated by State law. 
151. Whereas in 1850 there were only 48 companies with assets of $4.7 million, by 1870 
there were 129 companies with assets of $2.0 billion. 
152. It is the continued financial ability of the insurer to fulfill its side of the 
bargain that generates the value of insurance to the policyholder. Con-
tinued financial ability is ... neither self-regulating nor within the prac-
tical power of the individual policyholder to ascertain or enforce. Its 
ascertainment and enforcement must be conducted by government to as-
sure the integrity of the insurance transaction itself. 
State of New York, Insurance Department, Regulation of Financial Condition of 
Insurance Companies, 3, (March 1974), quoted in Dunne, supra note 6 at 349. 
[T]he fading of traditional lines between bank, insurance, securities, and 
real estate activities may hold benefits for consumers. On the other 
hand, they could have serious negative effects on consumers, including 
insurance policyholders, and the efficacy of existing regulation. 
Bruce Fondree, NAIC Wary on Financial Controls, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, May 
20, 1983, at 39. 
153. For example, both require minimum capital requirements, reserve requirements, 
and licensing and both place limitations on investments. 
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salesl54 as well as in other insurance sales.1ss Furthermore, inflation-
ary pressureslSG forced the creation of innovative and competitive in-
surance products, such as universal life policies, variable annuities, 
single premium annuities and other variations. These events brought 
about a radical change in the composition of insurance company port-
folios and also compounded the difficulties of insurance regulators in 
the quality of their supervisory functions. 
B. Items of Regulationls7 
1. Entry and Capital Requirements 
Insurance companies are creatures of the state. The state insur-
ance department issues charters subject to certain capital minimums 
which are required to be recorded partly as capital stock and partly as 
paid-in surplus.1ss 
2. Reserves 
a. Property and Liability Insurance 
Property and liability insurance companies must maintain two 
types of reserves: unearned premium reserves and loss reserves. The 
former is the unearned portion of grossl59 premiums of all outstand-
154. By 1955 there were some 1100 life insurance companies with assets of 372 billion, 
and by 1981 there were almost 2000 life insurance companies with assets in excess 
of four trillion dollars! Compare these figures with those in supra note 151. 
155. By 1982 there were almost 3000 property-liability insurance companies with as-
sets of $212 billion. 
156. The classic life insurance policy no longer was an attractive investment. 
157. This section discusses only those items which are relevant to and have an impact 
upon the main focus of this study: the solvency of the institution and the safety 
of the consumer's money. See supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text. 
158. For example, assume that state X requires $3 million initial minimum capitaliza-
tion with $1 million assigned to capital stock account and $2 million to paid-in 
surplus. Because mutual companies have no capital stock, the full minimum capi-
tal is credited to the paid-in surplus account. 
159. For example, assume a $240 semi-annual premium on an auto liability policy. 
The agent's commission would be $48 and other overhead expenses approxi-
mately $10. The unearned premium reserve at the inception of this policy would 
be the full $240. The $58 deficiency would be "drawn" from the paid-in surplus 
account, along with the loss reserves. The unearned premium reserve decreases 
with the passage of each month. Thus, the cash flow of the insurer, at the incep-
tion of a new policy, is less than the reserve requirement. As a result: 
[i]f new business increases quickly enough, it is conceivable that the in-
surer could become insolvent because of the exhaustion of surplus and 
the resultant impairment of its capital or reserve account. Of course, 
long before such impairment would be allowed, the insurer would stop 
writing more business. This point was reached in the United States im-
mediately following World War II. Many insurers legally were "sold 
out" of insurance; they had written as much new business as possible 
without reducing their surplus accounts to dangerously low levels. Un-
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ing policies at the time of valuation. The latter is the insurer's esti-
mate of future claims and related expenses which is computed by 
formula or loss ratio methods. Commentators indicate that these 
methods are poor indicators of future liabilities. There is hardly a 
mathematical way to predict disasters or unforseen events. 
b. Life Insurance 
In life insurance the predictability of future losses (i.e. deaths) does 
not involve the same risk of variance from period to period. Therefore 
loss reserves, like the premiums charged for the policies, are based on 
mortality tables. Barring any external events such as large losses on 
investment, fraud, or embezzlement, the normal flow of premiums 
which are normally invested in income producing assets should pro-
vide the proper cushion for payment of claims. The premiums during 
the earlier years of the policy are greater than the actuarial mortality 
claim projection, and less in the later years. 
3. Examination, Valuation of Assets and Liabilities and 
Investments 
If the fox could be appointed to guard the chicken coop, then insur-
ers could be relied upon to maintain adequate reserves without exter-
nal supervision. However, such is not the case. State insurance 
departments conduct examinations to ascertain the solvency of insur-
ers doing business within the state. An insurer is solvent when its 
admitted assetsl60 exceed its liabilities. This excess is the statutory 
policyholders' surplus.l61 Since the largest liability of an insurer is its 
reserves, an examination and valuation of the assets amounts to a val-
uation of its reserves. 
To further promote the solvency of insurance companies, the statu-
tory provisions for allowable admitted assets places both qualitative 
less able to attract new capital (generally not a viable solution), they 
were forced to discontinue writing new insurance or became overly se-
lective in underwriting. Only the most profitable business was accepted, 
and the less profitable was left uninsured. This feature of the postwar 
insurance scene, the "capacity problem,'' has been one of the most widely 
discussed issues in property and liability insurance. 
ROBERT J. MEHR AND EMERSON CAMMACK, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE, 687 (1976). 
160. The term "admitted assets" is sui generis to the insurance industry. State law 
specifies which assets are admitted assets, the only assets counted in determining 
the excess of assets over liabilities. In addition, to qualify as "admitted,'' the as-
sets must truly be under the control of the insurer. Thus, if an otherwise quali-
fied admitted asset were pledged as security for the debt of a parent company, 
especially a non-insurer parent, the issue would arise as to whether this asset 
could be counted as an admitted asset in determining the statutory solvency 
requirements. 
161. This surplus consists of the original capital (see supra note 158) and accumulated, 
undistributed profits. In the world of finance it is referred to as equity. 
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and quantitative restrictions on the kind of investments insurers may 
make. There are, of course, variations from state to state, but gener-
ally the qualitative restrictions limit the portfolio to high grade bonds, 
mortgages, preferred and common stock and a very limited amount of 
real estate investment. The quantitative limitations refer to percent-
ages of admitted assets that may be invested in a single corporation 
and the percentage of the corporation's stock that may be held by the 
insurer.162 
4. Rate Making 
An additional tool of indirectly promoting the solvency of insur-
ance companies is the supervision of rates charged on insurance poli-
cies. Cutthroat competition could undermine the stability and safety 
of insurers (especially the smaller ones) and could lead to chaotic di-
sasters affecting numerous policyholders.163 On the other hand, "co-
operation" among insurers to set rates might lead to excessive rates 
leading to bilking the public. To deal with both horns of this dilemma, 
the New York legislature in 1911 and the National Association of In-
surance Commissioners (NAIC) in 1914 investigated the problem and 
recommended supervised rate making. All states have now passed 
some form of rate legislation, though such legislation is not uniform 
throughout the United States. However, the goals of these statutes 
are uniform: to achieve rates which are adequate,164 not excessive165 
and not discriminatory.lGG 
162. For example, the investment in the securities of a single issue may not exceed 
five percent of the insurer's total admitted assets and may not exceed two percent 
of the issuer's security. Generally there are no quantitative limitations as to in-
vestments in Government and state securities. 
163. During the latter half of the 19th century large cyclical losses caused the collapse 
of many insurers. 
164. To yield a reasonable profit in light of past and future (projected) losses. 
165. To prevent premiums which are too high. 
166. Reasonable classification is permitted and, therefore, certain preferred risks 
might be insured at lower rates than standard risks. The Virginia statute, VA. 
CODE ANN. § 38.2-1900 (Michie 1990 Repl. Vol.), expresses the public policy be-
hind its rate making provisions as follows: 
PuRPosES OF CHAPI'ER. [Ch. 19] A. This chapter shall be liberally con-
strued to achieve the purposes stated in subsection B of this section. 
B. The purposes of this chapter are to: 
1. Protect policyholders and the public against the adverse effects of 
excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory rates; 
2. Encourage independent action by insurers and reasonable price com-
petition among insurers as the most effective way to produce rates that 
conform to the standards of subdivision 1; 
3. Provide formal regulatory controls for use if independent action and 
price competition fail; 
4. Authorize cooperative action among insurers in the rate making pro-
cess, and regulate such cooperation in order to prevent practices that 
tend to create monopoly or to lessen or destroy competition; 
756 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:726 
Rate making is an extremely complex and beyond the scope of this 
paper.167 Suffice it to say that life insurance is not subject to rate 
making since the reserve requirements necessarily set the premium 
requirements.1ss The rates of property and liability insurance and 
workman's compensation, however, are frequently regulated.169 
C. Insurance Holding Companies 
The 1960s witnessed a sharp decline in the profits of insurance 
companies creating an impetus to seek additional ways to employ large 
pools of liquid funds. Life insurers experienced a drop in earnings be-
cause of long term inflation which became acute in 1963. Inflation 
made investment in life insurance less attractive and quickened public 
investment in higher yielding equity instruments. Furthermore, the 
conservative investments of life insurers required by law produced a 
lower return than portfolios of non-insurers. Property and liability 
insurers faced a rapid rise of replacement costs and rising damage 
judgments which could not be matched by increases in premium rates. 
As a result, their loss ratios rose steadily.170 
Finally, the emergence of "one stop" financial service entities171 
5. Provide rates that are responsive to competitive market conditions 
and improve the availability of insurance in this Commonwealth; and 
6. Regulate the business of insurance in a manner that will preclude 
application of federal antitrust laws. 
167. Some states require property and liability insurers to belong to rating bureaus 
and file rates based on the bureaus' published rates; other states, although per-
mitting bureaus, allow insurers to file independently of the bureaus. Some states 
follow the "prior approval" method (the rates filed become effective after 15 days 
of the filing date, unless disapproved within that period), other states follow the 
"file and use" approach, wherein the filed rates become effective immediately, 
subject to disapproval within a statutory period. Some states have "use and file" 
statutes, permitting the use of new rates with filing later (within a statutory pe-
riod). Still other states have no filing requirements at all (pure laissez-faire), 
whereas others prohibit rating bureaus. For a more complete discussion of rate 
regulation, see 19 JOHN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAw AND PRACTICE§§ 10491-96 
(1982) and ROBERT E. KEETON, INSURANCE LAw 557-567 (1971). See generally 
JOHN G. DAY, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 20-30 
(1970) and Spencer L. Kimball & Ronald N. Boyce, The Adequacy of State Insur-
ance Rate Regulation: The McCarran-Ferguson Act in Historical Perspective, 56 
MICH. L. REV. 545 (1957). 
168. See supra part IV.B.2b. 
169. Regulation and licensing of insurance agents and brokers, financial reporting re-
quirements, requirements of standard contracts (or standard clauses in contracts) 
or forms and classification regulations are not discussed herein. 
170. To add to their woes they incurred heavy losses during the civil disturbances and 
riots of the 1960s. 
171. For example, Sears Roebuck owns Allstate Insurance, Dean Witter Securities, 
Allstate Savings and Loan Association and Greenwood Trust and Bank which 
handles the Discover credit card; American Express owned Firemans Fund In-
surance Company and Shearson-Lehman; Merrill Lynch created the CMA ac-
count, has a major interest in Insurance Systems Unlimited and owns the Family 
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worsened the competitive status of insurers and impelled the search 
for activities that would more fully and profitably utilize 
"[t]he management expertise and specialized knowledge required for effective 
insurer operation in such fields of investments, engineering, and electronic 
data processing as are needed in related financial businesses .... It seems 
apparent that the prospect of higher earnings through diversification would 
secure better access to the capital markets by insurers and would help to insu-
late them against 'take overs,' while facilitating insurer acquisition of other 
businesses.172 
However, most states prohibit insurers from pursuing other busi-
ness activities and place strict limitations on their investment portfo-
lios.173 Additionally insurers may issue only a single class of common 
stock and no senior securities. To overcome these regulatory handi-
caps, insurance company management looked to the holding company 
structure to supplement underwriting and investment income by di-
versifying activities and gaining better access to capital markets. 
Many insurers formed "upstream"174 holding companies transferring 
surplus funds175 to the newly created parent. The parent then in-
vested these funds in a variety of businesses and avoided the regula-
tory prohibition against diversification. Since the holding company 
was not an insurance company it, was beyond the jurisdiction of the 
regulators.176 Similarly, the limitations on an insurer's portfolio in-
Life Insurance Company; Bank America owned discount broker Charles Schwab 
and Company; Prudential Insurance Company owns the Capital City Bank of 
Hapeville, Georgia and Bache Securities. The list could continue. 
172. Report of the Industry Advisory Committee to the (D1) Subcommittee of the 
NAIC on Holding Company Legislation, 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAIC, 177 (1969), 
(hereinafter 1969 Advisory Committee). 
173. See supra part IV.B.3. 
174. The normal procedure would be for the insurer to organize a subsidiary 
holding company. The stock of the insurer is then exchanged for the 
stock of the holding company and the holding company becomes the par-
ent of the insurer. It is then necessary for the insurer to declare a sub-
stantial dividend to the holding company to finance the expansion into 
new fields. 
Milton S. Wolke, Jr., Insurance Companies as Parents and Subsidiaries, SECI'ION 
OF INSURANCE, NEGUGENCE AND COMPENSATION LAW, 167, 168 (1970). 
175. Funds in excess of reserve requirements referred to as "surplus surplus." Many 
large insurance companies accumulated assets, generally liquid assets, well in ex-
cess of minimum reserve requirements. 
176. Since 1965 the movement toward formation of holding companies has 
been an outstanding feature in insurance company history. Over half of 
the major property and casualty companies as well as the bulk of the 
larger life insurance companies have restructured their corporate form 
of organization to place their operating companies under holding com-
pany ownership. In conjunction with these moves or shortly after the 
formation of the holding companies, steps have been taken to bring in 
other subsidiaries in the field of financial services related to or ancillary 
to the insurance business. For example, both Life Insurance Company 
of Virginia and St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company brought 
title insurance companies under their newly formed holding companies. 
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vestmentl77 were bypassed because the holding company could invest 
in common stocks without restriction. Again, the non-insurer parent 
could issue a variety of securities (different classes of common stock, 
preferred stock, debt, convertible or nonconvertible, etc.) with distinct 
advantages over the restricted typesl7S that the operating insurance 
company was permitted to issue. 
Other insurers formed "downstream" holding companies: 
An alternative to the exchange approach is to have the insurance operations 
of the insurer transferred to a subsidiary and to convert the insurer into a 
general business corporation. This way, no dividend is necessary, and the 
stockholders do not have to approve a plan of exchange with a newly organ-
ized (and usually thinly capitalized) holding company. However, it will be 
necessary, of course, to obtain stockholder approval of the conversion.l79 
The holding company movement was not restricted to these up-
stream and downstream devices. The large liquid asset holdings of the 
insurance industry suddenly drew the attention of the conglomerate 
fraternity. Rapid takeovers of insurers resulted.lBO One commentator 
cites the following reasons for the rash of insurance company take-
overs by the conglomerates: 
1. The subnormal underwriting results of the property and casualty insur-
ance companies as a group during recent years caused the stocks of most of 
these companies to sink to record lows early this year. Prices were depressed 
both in relation to earnings and in relation to estimated liquidating values. 
Even such highly regarded companies as Hartford Fire Insurance Company, 
Insurance Company of North America and United States Fidelity and Guar-
anty sank below the value of their capital and surplus, let alone their total 
liquidating values which would attribute some extra amount for the value of 
unearned premium reserves. 
2. At the same time the stocks of many of the conglomerates had risen to 
exceptionally high levels in relation to their earnings and book values. 
3. With this set of valuations-extremely low for the insurance companies 
and fantastically high for the conglomerates-it was possible for the latter to 
try to acquire the sound investment values of the insurance companies, using 
And it didn't take the CNA Financial Corporation long to add the Tsai 
Management Corporation and General Finance Corporation to its princi-
pal subsidiaries which include Continental Casualty Company, Conti-
nental Assurance Company and National Fire Insurance Company of 
Hartford. 
William W. Amos, The Merger Movement in the Insurance Industry, FEDERATION 
OF INS. COUNSEL Q., Winter 1968-69, 11, 12. 
177. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
178. Generally only common stock of one class. 
179. Wolke, supra note 174, at 167-68. Additional advantages afforded by the holding 
company structure include more liberal accounting methods, repurchase of capi-
tal stock in the open market and merchandising superiority. See Amos, supra 
note 176. 
180. Although conglomerate general take-over activity reached feverish heights by 
the early 1960s, it was not till1968 that take over bids were made to large insurer 
groups, such as Reliance Insurance, Fund American Companies, Great American 
Holding Corporation and Home Insurance. See Amos, supra note 176, at 14. 
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the cheap money of the conglomerates' stock.181 
The acquiring conglomerate could then sell off the portfolio of the 
acquired insurer (which was carried on the books of the insurer at low 
original acquisition cost) at current high market prices, realizing huge 
profits. These profits would be included in the overall earnings of the 
conglomerate which, when applied to the high price earnings multiple 
of the conglomerate, would further increase the market price of the 
conglomerate stock.1s2 Thus, insurance holding companieslss 
emerged in large numbers placing great strain on the insurance regu-
latory system. State insurance laws were designed to control and reg-
ulate insurance companies, not holding companies whose members 
could be-and often were-non-insurers. The regulators needed stat-
utory means to protect policyholders by supervising the financial con-
ditions of the insurance companies, despite the layers of ownership 
and the diversification of activities. The National Association of Insur-
ance Commissioners (NAIC) reacted to these new conditions by estab-
lishing a committee184 to "propose to the NAIC such legislation as the 
states should enact and such regulatory procedures as the Insurance 
Commissioners should adopt in order to assure adequate and proper 
supervision of insurers in their relationships with holding compa-
nies."lss After many discussions, reports, drafts and debates, the 
NAIC adopted the Model Insurance Holding Company Systems Regu-
latory Act of 1969 (the Model Act), the goals and policies of which are: 
(1) to maintain the solvency of insurance companies by policing takeovers of 
181. Amos, supra note 176, at 14. 
182. For a humorous and instructive description of the "pooling" method of account-
ing for mergers and acquisitions, see JAMES D. Cox, FINANCIAL INFORMATION, 
ACCOUNTING AND THE LAw, 744-47 (1986). 
183. An "insurance holding company" is defined as "consist[ing] of two (2) or more 
affiliated persons, one or more of which is an insurer." NAIC, Insurance Holding 
Company System Regulatory Act, in 2 NAIC MODEL INSURANCE LAws, REGULA-
TIONS AND GUIDELINES § lD (1992)[hereafter MODEL ACT]. 
184. See supra note 172. 
185. 1969 Advisory Committee, supra note 172, at 175. The Committee, after lengthy 
study, submitted the following conclusions and objectives: 
1. Holding companies serve a beneficial, valid and legitimate function 
in the insurance industry. 
2. There should be an effective and comprehensive state supervision of 
insurers in their relationship with holding companies in order to protect 
their financial integrity. 
3. The most effective regulatory system is one premised on disclosure 
and regulation of significant intra-system transactions involving the in-
surer, and verification by examination when necessary. 
4. To prevent shifting of assets from an insurer to other affiliates 
(whether parent, subsidiary or other) disclosure of dividends and distri-
butions need be required. 
5. The domiciliary state should bear the primary responsibility for reg-
ulation of the insurer in its relationship and transactions with insurance 
holding company systems. 
Id. at 181-83. 
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insurers and extraordinary distributions by insurers to the holding company 
parent or to noninsurance affiliates; (2) to protect policyholders by continuing 
intensive supervision of the adequacy of insurance companies' surplus; (3) to 
provide standards to assure that intrasystem transactions involving insurers 
are fair and reasonable; (4) to encourage domiciliary states to continue their 
established role as the primary regulators of the insurance industry by giving 
them full responsibility for regulation of insurers within an insurance holding 
company system; and (5) to predicate regulatory activities on the principles of 
registration, disclosure, and prior approval of certain transactions (e.g. ex-
traordinary dividends and distributions) and relationships impacting an 
insurer.186 
Underlying the provisions of the Act was the belief that although the 
potential for "milking" of insurance company assets by affiliates (es-
pecially parent holding companies) was a valid concern, the problem 
could be effectively regulated.1S7 Furthermore, to protect policyhold-
erstss and maintain insurer solvency the NAIC placed its reliance on 
the effectiveness of domiciliary states to adequately regulate its insur-
ers.ts9 A reading of the Model Act would seem to indicate that the 
safety of the insurer and policyholder could be achieved through its 
provisions.t9o A comprehensive analysis of the Model Act is not 
within the scope of this paper, however, a description of its structure is 
necessary, along with the foregoing explanation of banking regulatory 
law, in order to understand some of the problems inherent in the 
questions posed by this study.t91 
186. Report of the Industry Advisory Committee on Model Insurance Holding Com-
pany Legislation to the Insurance Holding Companies (B1) Subcommittee, 1 
NAIC PROCEEDINGS 213, 221 (1978). 
187. Id. at 222. 
188. Protection of insurance company stockholders was not a concern of the Model 
Act. 
189. See supra note 186, at 222. 
190. The error of this conclusion surfaced years later when Baldwin-United collapsed. 
See infra note 198 and accompanying text. 
191. The act is divided into several sections, each of which focuses on a partic-
ular aspect of the relationship between the insurer and other members 
of the insurance holding company system and specifies how that particu-
lar aspect will be regulated. 
After defining key terms, such as "affiliate" and "insurance holding 
company system," in Section 1, the act goes on in Section 2 to deal with 
downstream diversification by insurers. Section 2(a) enumerates types 
of businesses in which subsidiaries of insurers may engage, including in-
vestment management, data processing, and accounting. The ultimate 
determination as to the scope of the activities in which an insurers' sub-
sidiaries may permissibly engage is left to each domiciliary state. 
Section 2(b) allows a domestic insurer additional investment author-
ity beyond that; permitted under the insurance code, so that it can, for 
example, invest in the stock, debt obligations, and other securities of its 
subsidiaries up to certain percentage limits. However, an individual 
state can modify the liberalized investment approach so that insurers' 
investment activity continues to conform to that state's public policy .... 
Section 3 of the act provides protections against detrimental take-
overs of insurance companies by regulating mergers with, and acquisi-
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In response to the Model Act, the vast majority of states have 
passed comparable legislation. Most have adopted crucial registration 
requirements and prior approval requirements for certain transactions 
such as dividend payments to affiliates and prior approval require-
ment of mergers, acquisitions and takeovers. A few states imposed 
only part of the regulation proposed by the Model Act. Portions of the 
statutes did not go unchallenged,192 but, in the main, the statutes were 
tions of, domestic insurers. Persons who propose to acquire or merge 
with a domestic insurer are required, under subsections (a), (b), and (c), 
to file a statement with the commissioner, disclosing the principal ac-
quiring parties; giving certain financial and other information about 
them; describing their plans, agreements, and activities concerning the 
proposed takeover; and including any other information the commis-
sioner may request. Section 3(d) provides that all takeovers are subject 
to prior approval by the commissioner, after a public hearing, which 
hearing is optional with the commissioner. Section 3(d)(1) lists the sev-
eral grounds upon which any denial of such approval must be based, e.g. 
a finding by the commissioner that the proposed takeover might lead to 
the insurer's insolvency or undercut policyholders' interests .... 
Registration requirements for insurers are delineated in Section 4. 
Under subsection (a), all authorized insurers that are members of insur-
ance holding company systems must register with the commissioner, un-
less they are foreign insurers that are subject to substantially similar 
requirements in their domiciliary states. Section 1 of the act indicates, 
through its definitions of "affiliate," "control," "person," and "insurance 
holding company system," that 10% stock ownership of an insurer by 
another person (or 10% stock ownership of another person by an in-
surer) creates a rebuttable presumption of the insurer's membership in 
an insurance holding company system. Section 4(b) states that the regis-
tration statement shall contain current information about the financial 
condition of the insurer, and about certain specified relationships and 
transactions between the insurer and its affiliates .... 
Section 5 contains the provisions applicable to material transactions, 
dividends and distributions. There are standards provided in Section 
5(a) for evaluation of material transactions between insurers and their 
affiliates and, in Section 5(b), for evaluation of adequacy of surplus. Sec-
tion 5(c) provides a prior approval procedure for extraordinary dividends 
and other distributions ...• 
Sections 6(a) and (b) confer upon the domestic commissioner the 
power to conduct an examination of any insurer where it is necessary to 
ascertain the financial condition or legality of conduct of that insurer in 
order to protect the interests of policyholders. 
Report of the Industry Advisory Committee on Model Insurance Holding Com-
pany Legislation to the Insurance Holding Companies (Bl} Subcommittees, 
supra note 186, at 222-23. 
192. Some courts held takeover provisions in violation of the Commerce Clause and 
the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d), (e) & 78n(d)(t)(1982); e.g., Edgar v. Mite 457 
U.S. 624 (1982), (examining the illinois Business Take-Over Act); Terry v. 
Yamashita, 643 F. Supp. 161 (D. Hawaii 1986), (examining the Hawaii Control 
Share Acquisition statute). Other courts found violations of the Commerce 
Clause: e.g., Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 
1982)(examining the Michigan Take-Over Offers Act); lcahn v. Blunt, 612 F. 
Supp. 1400 (W.D. Mo. 1985)(examining the Missouri Control Share Acquisition 
Act); Sharon Steel Corp. v. Whaland, 466 A.2d 919 (N.H. 1983)(examining the 
New Hampshire Security Takeover Disclosure Act). Other courts held the take-
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accepted by the industry. The statutes were made applicable to any 
affiliate193 that was in control of or controlled by another insurer, a 
corporation, a partnership, any other entity or an individual. How-
ever, the realization that changing events and conditions require ad-
justment and modification to current laws persuaded the NAIC to 
undertake a thorough review of the Model Act. 
The first review was prompted by the Equity Funding Corporation 
of America fiasco.194 The frightening and dismaying aspect of this 
scandal is that apparently a large financial organization was able to 
over statute in violation of the Williams Act: e.g., Gunter v. AGO Int'l B.V., 533 F. 
Supp. 86 (N.D. Fla. 1981)(examining the Florida Insurance Holding Company 
Act). However, some courts upheld takeover statutes: e.g., John Alden Life Ins. 
Co. v. Woods, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1)98,617 (D. Idaho 1981), (examining the 
Idaho Acquisitions of Control and Insurance Holding Company Systems Act); 
Professional Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Rousall, 528 F. Supp. 391 (D. Kansas 1981), 
(examining the Kansas Insurance Holding Company Act); L. P. Acquisition Co. v. 
Tyson, 772 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1985)(examining the Michigan Take-Over Offers 
Act). 
193. Defined in Section 1(A) of the Model Act (see supra note 183) as follows: "[a]n 
'affiliate' of, or person 'affiliated' with, a specific person, is a person that directly 
or indirectly through one or more intermediaries, controls, or is controlled by, or 
is under common control with, the person specified." 
194. Equity Funding was a holding company with several life insurance company sub-
sidiaries. Early in 1973 Equity Funding was linked to rumors about its financial 
condition and questions concerning "certain" operations. Based on these rumors 
the Illinois Insurance Department conducted a surprise audit on Equity Funding 
Life Insurance Company and discovered that 60,000 fake life insurance policies 
were issued, then sold for cash to other insurance companies that do a reinsur-
ance business, and that $24 million in bonds that were supposed to be on deposit 
at American National Bank & Trust Company were nonexistent. These discover-
ies triggered investigations by the insurance departments of California, Massa-
chusetts, Mississippi, Ohio, Pennsylvania and New York. Eventually the FBI also 
entered the picture and uncovered a massive counterfeit securities operation in-
volving as much as $100 million in bogus securities printed by printing subsidiar-
ies of Equity Funding. These bogus securities were then counted as part of 
Equity assets (inflating the net worth of Equity Funding and consequently inflat-
ing its stock market price). An officer of Bankers National Life Insurance Com-
pany (another life insurance subsidiary of Equity Funding) stated that he was 
repeatedly asked by Equity Funding officials to illegally transfer Bankers Na-
tional assets to the parent company. The California insurance department 
charged that two-thirds of insurance in force, $2 billion out of $3 billion, claimed 
by Equity Life was bogus and that bogus loans were issued to the phantom policy-
holders. The Massachusetts Commissioner stated that out of 4200 life insurance 
policies claimed to have been sold in the state his department could account for 
only 700. The California commissioner's office strongly criticized the First Na-
tional City Bank for relinquishing stock certificates of Northern Life Insurance 
Company, another Equity subsidiary, held as loan collateral, during the week 
prior to disclosure of the scandal, upon the urging of an Equity Funding officer. 
The scandal triggered dozens of civil and criminal lawsuits involving major bro-
kerage firms, banks, other financial institutions, national accounting firms, secur-
ity analysts and executives of various Equity affiliates. For the sake of 
completeness, I might add that Equity Funding Corporation was reorganized in 
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deceive the Securities Exchange Commission, the New York Stock 
Exchange, the banking regulatory entities, state insurance authorities, 
accounting firms and security analysts. Such a spectre exposes the 
weaknesses inherent in regulating the types of computer operations 
which had played a substantial rolel95 in perpetrating the fraud. 
Mter lengthy deliberations, the NAIC (Bl) Task Force to Consider 
Insurance Holding Company Legislation submitted its report to the 
Insurance Holding Companies (Bl) Subcommittee, with the recom-
mendation that eight key provisionsl96 in the Model Act be amended. 
Notwithstanding the Equity Funding scandal, the Committee came to 
the conclusion that no amendments were needed.l97 It took another 
bankruptcy proceedings and several of the insurance company affiliates were re-
habilitated under state insurance regulatory proceedings. 
195. A system of computer codes was programmed to manufacture $120 million of fic-
titious assets and to create about 60,000 bogus life insurance policies for nonexis-
tent persons and to handle phantom death benefits and nonexistent policy lapses. 
The California and Illinois insurance commissioners stated that it is impossible to 
protect the public with the antiquated methods of audit available to state insur-
ance regulatory bodies and that the fraudulent practices of Equity Funding would 
not have been detected except for rumored irregularities and the resulting sur-
prise audits ordered by both states. The information in notes 194 and 195 was 
obtained from numerous articles in the New York Times and Wall Street Journal 
which appeared during 1973. 
196. The eight items concerned dividends and distributions, the surplus test, the mate-
riality test (for disclosure of "material" transactions), the solvency test, independ-
ent directorships, and several matters relating to investigations and state 
reciprocity. Report of the NAIC Task Force on Model Insurance Holding Com-
pany Legislation, 1 NAIC PROCEEDINGS 215 (1978). 
197. As to the committee's objectives, the committee was appointed to com-
ment on the report of the NAIC (B1) Task Force to Consider Insurance 
Holding Company Legislation. The task force reviewed the Model In-
surance Company System Regulatory Act first issued in 1969 by the 
NAIC, under cover of a letter from the then Director of the Nebraska 
Department of Insurance, :Mr. E. Benjamin Nelson, the task force issued 
its report on October 26, 1976. The task force considered several propos-
als to amend the act, which are the eight specific areas covered in our 
committee paper. 
The advisory committee took a new look at the Holding Company 
Act. Essentially, the committee decided that after nearly ten years of 
experience it was time to see whether a major overhaul of the act and 
the regulatory principles affecting insurance holding companies were in 
order. The committee considered the 1968 report of the industry advi-
sory committee on this same subject. As the committee deliberated, it 
was mindful that in 1977, even more than in 1967-68, the insurance in-
dustry has a very direct interest in the enhancement of the regulatory 
system in view of the guarantee laws almost universally applicable to 
casualty property companies, and rapidly becoming so for the life compa-
nies. 
As to the committee's conclusions, the essential conclusion was that 
the act does not require a major change. It provides the commissioners 
with the regulatory powers they need and the insurance industry with 
the flexibility it needs. 
The committee endorsed the NAIC's 1967-69 positive attitude to-
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disaster, the Baldwin-United collapse,19B to motivate the regulators to 
wards insurance holding companies and again concluded that insurance 
holding companies can be effectively regulated. The committee believes 
the act does promote effective state regulation of the insurance holding 
company system through extensive registration, disclosure and prior ap-
proval mechanisms. 
Id. at 216. 
198. Baldwin-United began as the Baldwin Piano Co. in 1862. One hundred years later 
it was transformed into a financial conglomerate. This metamorphosis was born 
out of the economic changes then occurring in the United States. The high infla-
tion of the 1960s and 1970s caused the public to feel that savings were being di-
luted. Additionally, the income tax "bracket creep" pushed people into higher 
and higher tax brackets motivating them to seek havens where their money 
would receive the highest returns and simultaneously shelter their income from 
the ravenous tax collector. New, high yielding financial instruments were being 
created by various investment industries resulting in a flood of disintermediation 
of bank deposits into these new vehicles of wealth accumulation. Not to be left 
out in the cold, insurance companies devised new products in order to gamer 
some of this "hot money". Universal Life and variable life products such as varia-
ble annuities were among the new creations. However, a product which had been 
in existence for some time, but not previously "pushed", developed into the great-
est tap to the ocean of tax shelter seeking funds-the Single Premium Deferred 
Annuity (SPDA). Enter Morley P. Thompson, president and chief executive of-
ficer of D.H. Baldwin Co., a subsidiary of Baldwin-United, a brilliant innovator 
and corporations intermingler par excellence who masterminded the most com-
plicated conglomerate that ever bedazzled (and then duped and confused) the 
moneyed tycoons of Wall Street. Prior to its collapse Baldwin-United consisted of 
almost 500 separate business entities, including banks, savings and loans, mort-
gage bankers, real estate firms, twenty-two property and casualty insurers, fif-
teen life and annuity underwriters as well as numerous non-financial entities. 
In terms of surface complexity the events that have come under the 
[bankruptcy examiner's] scrutiny could hardly be matched. Any devotee 
of baroque puzzles could find no happier pastime than losing himself for 
hours, days, or weeks in the endless mazes of intercorporate transactions 
and transfers among [Baldin-United's] myriad subsidiaries that have 
been the constant activities [for the three fiscal years preceding the com-
mencement of the bankruptcy proceedings, September 26, 1983]. 
Examiner's Statement of Investigation in Re: Baldwin-United Corporation and 
D.H. Baldwin Company, United States Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of 
Ohio, Western Division, 5 (1985)(on file with author). 
An SPDA is a product purchased with a lump sum premium. When the 
SPDA matures years later periodic payments are made to the annuitant either 
for life or a definite period of time. Between the time of the original premium 
payment and the maturity date, interest is credited to the account, but is not taxa-
ble until the time for payout, creating tax shelter feature which made SPDAs so 
attractive). 
Between 1970 (the time of Thompson's ascendancy to the presidency of Bald-
win) and 1982, numerous financial entities were acquired including National In-
vestors Life Insurance Company (NILIC) which became the main issuer of 
Baldwin's SPDA. 
The SPDA was the right product at the right time, and Baldwin made 
the most of it by a marketing concept of promoting the product primarily 
through major national brokerage firms such as Merrill Lynch instead of 
through established insurance agents. During a period when most of its 
other business activities were showing losses or minimal growth, Bald-
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question whether the 1969 Model Act sufficiently protected the sol-
win was reporting awesome increases in revenues in its SPDA insurance 
subsidiaries. In 1979 revenues from SPDAs were $9 million. In 1980 
they jumped to $233 million. In 1981 they exploded to over $1.5 billion. 
The company's stock was soaring, and its president was acclaimed as one 
of the great financial wizards of the decade. 
Id. at 20. 
The profits shown by this astounding growth were illusory. In the industry 
the premiums received by the insurer were invested with the goal that the in-
come therefrom should cover expenses, a profit and the interest to be credited. 
Even when interest rates are stable, matching assets to liabilities is a difficult 
task. But when interest rates fluctuate (as they did during the 1970s the early 
1980s) the task is almost impossible. The Baldwin SPDAs carried interest rates 
higher than those of competitors, but the assets (i.e., the investments) did not 
produce income sufficient to cover the aforementioned elements, resulting in a 
negative spread between the net earnings and crediting rates. How then did 
Baldwin show profits? Answer: By creating them from thin air through clever 
manipulation of tax laws. At the time it acquired NILIC, it also formed National 
Investors Pension Insurance Company (NIPIC) which was a non-life insurance 
company designed to act as reinsurer of NILIC. 
Upon sale of a SPDA policy NILIC would, for income tax purposes, rec-
ord the initial premium as revenue and expense an identical figure as 
initial reserve. It would also expense all acquisition costs such as com-
missions at the time of sale. It would reinsure the policy with NIPIC 
which would pay it a 12% ceding commission. The difference the acquisi-
tion expenses of approximately 6% and the receipt of the 12% ceding 
commission would be income to NILIC and taxed at the rates applicable 
to life insurance companies, generally approximately 23%. The expenses 
reflected in the payment of the ceding commission were thus incurred by 
NIPIC which was not a life insurance company for tax purposes. This 
created for tax purposes significant losses. Since NIPIC was consoli-
dated with the rest of Baldwin-United non-life insurance affiliates, those 
affiliates could offset what would otherwise be taxable income, taxed at 
the general corporate rate of 46%, against the NIPIC losses. This plan 
served to shift income from the 46% general corporate rate to the 23% 
life insurance company rate. In 1981 this ta:r: arbitrage contributed $40. 7 
million to Baldwin's net income. 
Id. at 20-21 (emphasis added). 
To illustrate this sleight-of-hand income creation, assume the sale of a 
$100,000 SPDA: NILIC would pay $6000 in commissions and overhead expenses. 
Upon reinsurance with NIPIC it would receive $12,000 of ceding commissions, 
resulting in a $6000 profit upon which it would pay taxes of $1380, at the life 
insurer rate of 23%, by filing separately from the Baldwin consolidated return. 
Thus a $4620 after tax profit was realized, instead of a loss of $6000, NIPIC, on 
the other hand, would incur a loss of $12,000, and by filing as part of the Baldwin 
consolidated return, it would reduce total consolidated income by $12,000 giving a 
tax benefit (to the consolidated group) of $5520. A total of $10,140 profit out of 
thin air! In addition, reinsuring within the holding company attributes a healthy 
appearance to the insurer when in fact it may be deficient. This is so because the 
ceded insurance is no longer the liability of the original insurer but the premium 
money from the policy flows to the reinsurer who invests it in various assets. 
Baldwin, by having NILIC reinsure with NIPIC, did just that. With its 
liabilities reduced, NILIC looked healthy on paper. NIPIC, in turn, in-
vested the ceded premiums heavily in Baldwin's affiliated securities, 
thereby funneling the premium dollars up to the parent. The result: the 
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vency of an insurer in a holding company system in an era of rapidly 
expanding financial services giants. 
security of the policyholder was actually dependent on the strength of 
the parent holding company. 
John R. Dunne, Intercompany Transactions Within Insurance Holding Com-
pany, 20 FORUM 445, 449-450 (1985). 
However, there are several flaws in this kind of financial legerdemain. First, 
NIPIC's constant operational losses required frequent infusions of new capital 
since its investments of premium money into Baldwin affiliates generated very 
little income. Secondly, the generation of tax losses is senseless unless there are 
income producing companies to take advantage of the losses, which gave rise to 
additional pressure for expansion by acquisition. At the same time that this fe-
verish expansion activity was going on, the explosive sale of SPDAs created a 
tension between two capital requirements: during a growth period insurance re-
serve requirements dictate the holding of capital at the insurance company level 
and may even require additional infusions of new capital (see supra note 159 and 
accompanying text) whereas aggressive expansion through new acquisitions re-
quires capital at the parent level. By the end of 1981 the cash needs of this con-
glomerate were far beyond the cash flows generated by the insurance companies 
and myriad other subsidiaries of Baldwin-United. The house of cards was about 
to collapse, when wizard Thompson came to the rescue in March of 1982 with the 
final and biggest acquisition of all: MGIC Investment Corporation. Unfortu-
nately this rescue turned into Baldwin's fiasco. MGIC was a mortgage guarantee 
insurance company from which Baldwin expected heavy cash flows. Thompson 
expected to finance the $1.17 billion purchase price by internally generated cash 
and borrowing $584 million from a bank consortium for one year. The internal 
raising of cash was accomplished by a series of complicated intercompany trans-
fers among Baldwin subsidiaries designed to draw the cash from the operating 
level to the level. NILIC, NIPIC and other insurance company subsidiaries were 
among the entities being depleted of cash. In March 1980 and again in March 1981 
the NAIC (National Association of Insurance Commissioners) examiner team de-
tected a need for regulatory attention of NIPIC. However, Arkansas, the primary 
domiciliary regulator, proceeded cautiously, not wanting to becloud the reputa-
tion of an insurer. It was not till early 1982 that a special examination was begun 
in conjunction with Missouri, Texas, Indiana and Arizona, also domiciliary regu-
latory states. By the time the audits were completed in late 1982, the financial 
community became aware that Baldwin had problems and their stock price began 
to plummet. Since a large portion of NILIC's and NIPIC's assets consisted of 
stock in Baldwin subsidiaries, these assets had to be revalued downward, result-
ing in NIPIC becoming statutorily insolvent unless new capital was infused im-
mediately. This was done, but it left Baldwin so bereft that it was unable to meet 
the payment of the loan due on the MGIC purchase. The house of cards fell; 
Chapter 11 followed. 
To summarize, Baldwin tried to accomplish its huge expansion program by 
trading assets, funding loans, providing collateral and purchasing equity interests 
among affiliated companies. The insurance companies were caused to transfer 
liquid assets to other affiliates to fund other acquisitions and received, in return, 
equity or debt securities in those affiliates. The goal of the Baldwin policy was to 
aggregate its assets in the regulated affiliates and to assemble the liabilities in the 
unregulated companies. But: 
[t]he same dollar cannot be used to pay debts incurred in acquisitions at 
one corporate level while meeting capital requirements at another corpo-
rate level. Baldwin became increasingly caught in a bind between the 
demand for adequate capital for regulatory purposes at the level of its 
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As indicated by the report of the 1969 Advisory committee, the 
1969 Model Act relied on regulation by disclosure. The amended 
Model Act of 1985 relies on prior regulatory approval of acquisitions 
of or mergers with domestic insurers, and any interaffiliate transac-
insurance subsidiaries and the demand for adequate cash to service debt 
at the holding company level. 
Examiner's Statement, supra at 23. 
The NAIC issued a paper in February 1985 entitled The Baldwin-United Cor-
poration Bankruptcy: Its Significance for Insurance Regulation. Its conclusion 
on page 13 is reproduced below: 
CONCLUSIONS 
Baldwin's accomplishments occurred with the cooperation of virtually 
all of the country's major retail stockbrokers, with state insurance de-
partment approvals, the silent acquiescence of federal agencies, as well 
as the active participation of dozens of the country's most sophisticated 
banks, plus a legion of lawyers, accountants and actuaries who had ac-
tively or passively approved the various stages of Baldwin's evolution. 
Most of the transactions and acquisitions received the approval of the 
appropriate regulatory agency-state or federal. Based on hindsight it is 
easy to observe that some of the acquisitions and/or transactions should 
not have been approved, but this raises larger issues for those in the busi-
ness of financial regulation. How can regulators detect a pattern detri-
mental to the viability of a corporate structure when each part appears 
sound? How can the group of affiliated companies be gauged if its struc-
ture is changing almost daily? How can regulators detect problems soon 
enough when management obscures the facts or engages in activity that 
is detrimental to its own health? How can the cumulative or synergistic 
effect of a series of permissible, but risky, transactions be measured? 
Most important, if the regulator's role is defined as that of oversight and 
supervision and not management of an insurer's operations, how can the 
regulator respond when management has charted a determined and dan-
gerous course. 
The normal difficulties plaguing financial regulators were exacer-
bated by the incredible complexities of Baldwin. This, added to an at-
mosphere of deregulation and new hybrid products, made life difficult 
for regulators and, unfortunately, the various publics they serve. While 
the situation is far from hopeless for Baldwin SPDA-holders due to the 
Rehabilitation Plan we, as regulators, should waste no time in attempt-
ing to prevent future Baldwins. 
Author's note: The material in this note is but a brief description of the activities 
and transactions of Baldwin-United. This information was gleaned from the fol-
lowing sources: Examiner's Statement of Investigation in Re: Baldwin-United 
Corporation and D.H. Baldwin Company, United States Bankruptcy Court, 
Southern District of Ohio, Western Division (1985); NAIC, THE BALDWIN-UNITED 
CORPORATION BANKRUPI'CY: ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR INSURANCE REGULATION 
(1985); John R. Dunne, Intercompany Transactions Within Insurance Holding 
Companies, 20 FORUM 445 (1985); Complaint for Plaintiff, In the Matter of the 
Rehabilitation of National Investors Pension Insurance Company, National In-
vestors Life Insurance Company and Mt. Hood Pension Insurance Company, 
Linda N. Garner Rehabilitator/Receiver of National Investors Life Insurance 
Company, National Investors Pension Insurance Company and Mt. Hood Pension 
Insurance Company v. Morley P. Thompson, Circuit Court of Pulaski County, 
Arkansas, Cause No. 84-5517 (1984); ARKANSAS INSURANCE DEPARTMENT REPORT 
OF EXAMINATION OF NATIONAL INvEsTORS PENSION INSURANCE COMPANY AS OF 
DECEMBER 31, 1982 AND JUNE 30, 1983 (1984). 
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tions such as reinsurance, service contracts, management agreements 
and expense allocations including taxes. Section 2 of the new Model 
Act enumerates permissible activities of an insurer's subsidiaries and 
sets out the limits of investment in them. Section 3 sets forth the ''big 
stick" procedures governing acquisitions of or mergers with insurers. 
The requirements include submission of detailed information to the 
commissioner, including specific data about the acquiring entity, 
source and amount of funds to be used for effecting the merger or 
acquisition, nature of the acquirer's business, future plans for the ac-
quired insurer, audited financial statements and many additional mat-
ters. It authorizes the commissioner to employ, at the acquirer's 
expense, attorneys, accountants, actuaries and other experts to assist 
in determining whether to approve or disapprove the application. 
The new philosophy of prior regulatory approval embodied in the 
1985 Model Act is clearly manifested in amended section 5, under 
which interaffiliate transactions199 or reinsurance agreements and 
199. (2) The following transactions involving a domestic insurer and any per-
son in its holding company system may not be entered into unless the 
insurer has notified the Commissioner in writing of its intention to enter 
into such transaction at least thirty (30) days prior thereto, or such 
shorter period as the Commissioner may permit, and the Commissioner 
has not disapproved it within that period. 
(a) sales, purchases, exchanges, loans or extensions of credit, guaran-
tees, or investments provided such transactions are equal to or ex-
ceed: (i) With respect to nonlife insurers, the lesser of three percent 
(3%) of the insurer's admitted assets or twenty-five percent (25%) of 
surplus as regards policyholders as of the 31st day of December next 
proceeding; (ii) With respect to life insurers, three percent (3%) of 
the insurer's admitted assets; as of the 31st day of December next 
preceding; 
(b) Loans or extensions of credit to any person who is not an affiliate, 
where the insurer makes loans or extensions of credit with the 
agreement or understanding that the proceeds of the transactions, in 
whole or in substantial part, are to be used to make loans or exten-
sions of credit to, to purchase assets of, or to make investments in, 
any affiliate of the insurer making the loans or extensions of credit 
provided such transactions are equal to or exceed: (i) With respect to 
nonlife insurers, the lesser of three percent of the insurer's admitted 
assets or twenty-five percent (25%) of surplus as regards policyhold-
ers as of the 31st day of December next preceding; b) with respect to 
life insurers, three percent (3%) of the insurer's admitted assets, as 
of the 31st day of December next preceding; 
(c) Reinsurance agreements or modifications thereto in which the rein-
surance premium or a change in the insurer's liabilities equals or ex-
ceeds five percent (5%) of the insurer's surplus as regards 
policyholders, as of the 31st day of December next preceding, includ-
ing those agreements which may require as consideration the trans-
fer of assets from an insurer to a non-affiliate, if an agreement or 
understanding exists between the insurer and non-affiliate that any 
portion of such assets will be transferred to one or more affiliates of 
the insurer; 
(d) All management agreements, service contracts and all cost-sharing 
arrangements; and 
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dividend payments2oo require thirty days prior notice. One of the les-
sons of the Baldwin-United collapse was that after-the-fact reporting 
(e) A:ny material transactions, specified by regulation, which the 
Commissioner determines may adversely affect the interests of 
the insurer's policyholders. Nothing herein contained shall be 
deemed to authorize or permit any transactions which, in the 
case of an insurer not a member of the same holding company 
system, would be otherwise contrary to law. 
(3) A domestic insurer may not enter into transactions which are 
part of a plan or series of like transactions with persons within the 
holding company system if the purpose of those separate transac-
tions is to avoid the statutory threshold amount and thus avoid the 
review that would occur otherwise. If the Commissioner determines 
that such separate transactions were entered into over any twelve 
month period for such purpose, he may exercise his authority under 
Section 10. 
(4) The Commissioner, in reviewing transactions pursuant to Sub-
section A (2), shall consider whether the transactions comply with 
the standards set forth in Subsection A (1) and whether they may 
adversely affect the interests of policyholders. 
(5) The Commissioner shall be notified within thirty (30) days of 
any investment of the domestic insurer in any one corporation if the 
total investment in such corporation by the insurance holding com-
pany system exceeds ten percent (10%) of such corporation's voting 
securities. 
MODEL Acr, supra note 183, § 5(A)(2)-{5). 
200. (B) Dividends and other Distributions. No domestic insurer shall pay 
any extraordinary dividend or make any other extraordinary distribu-
tion to its shareholders until (1) thirty days after the Commissioner has 
received notice of the declaration thereof and has not within such period 
disapproved such payment, or (2) the Commissioner shall have approved 
such payment within such thirty-day period. 
For purposes of this section, an extraordinary dividend or distribu-
tion includes any dividend or distribution of cash or other property, 
whose fair market value together with that of other dividends or distri-
butions made within the preceding twelve (12) months exceeds the 
lesser of (1) ten percent (10%) of the insurer's surplus as regards policy-
holders as of the 31st day of December next preceding, or {2) the net gain 
from operations of such insurer, if such insurer is a life insurer, or the 
net income, if such insurer is not a life insurer, not including realized 
capital gains, for the 12-month period ending the 31st day of December 
next preceding, but shall not include pro rata distributions of any class of 
the insurer's own securities. In determining whether a dividend or dis-
tribution is extraordinary, an insurer other than a life insurer may carry 
forward net income from the previous two (2) calendar years that has 
not already been paid out as dividends. This carry-forward shall be com-
puted by taking the net income from the second and third preceding cal-
endar years, not including realized capital gains, less dividends paid in 
the second and immediate preceding calendar years. 
Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, an insurer may declare 
an extraordinary dividend or distribution which is conditional upon the 
Commissioner's approval and the declaration shall confer no rights upon 
shareholders until (1) the Commissioner has approved the payment of 
the dividend or distribution or (2) the Commissioner has not disapproved 
such payment within the thirty (30) day period referred to above. 
Id. § 5{b). 
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was too late to prevent debilitating interaffiliate transactions.2o1 
Although the section 5 requirements should achieve control over 
potentially precarious activities of insurers within a holding company 
system, the information reaching the regulators even under this prior 
approval scheme would be fragmented or isolated and not easily corre-
lated. To ensure that the regulators obtain inclusive information 
about the total picture of a company's interaffiliate transactions, sec-
tion 4 of the Model Act sets up provisions for a comprehensive report-
ing format under a mandatory registration requirement. Every 
domestic insurer must register202 in its state of domicile and every for-
201. Baldwin-United was not the only holding company that milked its insurance sub-
sidiaries. During the late 1960s $1.5 billion was extracted from property-liability 
insurers by their parent holding companies in the form of dividends and other 
distributions. Richard de R. Kip, How to Get Capital Out of the Property-Liabil-
ity Insurance Business, 23 CPCU ANNALS 235, 236 (1970). 
202. The registration statement shall include the following information: 
(B) Information and Form Required. Every insurer subject to registra-
tion shall file the registration statement on a form prescribed by the 
NAIC, which shall contain the following current information: 
(1) The capital structure, general financial condition, ownership and 
management of the insurer and any person controlling the insurer; 
(2) The identity and relationship of every member of the insurance 
holding company system; 
(3) The following agreements in force, and transactions currently 
outstanding or which have occurred during the last calendar year be-
tween the insurer and its affiliates: 
(a) Loans, other investments, or purchases, sales or exchanges of 
securities of the affiliates by the insurer or of the insurer by its 
affiliates; 
(b) Purchases, sales or exchange of assets; 
(c) Transactions not in the ordinary course of business; 
(d) Guarantees or undertakings for the benefit of an affiliate 
which result in an actual contingent exposure of the insurer's as-
sets to liability, other than insurance contracts entered into in the 
ordinary course of the insurer's business; 
(e) All management agreements, service contracts and all cost-
sharing arrangements; 
(f) Reinsurance agreements; 
(g) Dividends and other distributions to shareholders; and 
(h) Consolidated tax allocation agreements; 
( 4) Any pledge of the insurer's stock, including stock of any subsidi-
ary or controlling affiliate, for a loan made to any member of the 
insurance holding company system; 
(5) Other matters concerning transactions between registered insur-
ers and any affiliates as may be included from time to time in any 
registration forms adopted or approved by the Commissioner. 
(C) Summary of Registration Statement. All registration statements 
shall contain a summary outlining all items in the current registration 
statement representing changes from the prior registration statement. 
* * * 
(E) Reporting of Dividends to Shareholders. Subject to Subsection 5B 
each registered insurer shall report to the Commissioner all dividends 
and other distributions to shareholders within fifteen (15) business days 
following the declaration thereof. 
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eign insurer doing business in the state must also do so, unless it is 
subject to registration in its domiciliary state under standards similar 
to those set forth in certain parts of section 5 of the Model Act. An 
examination of the listed items of information required by the provi-
sions evidences the attempt of the NAIC to correct the Baldwin-
United problems and forestall recurrences of similar fiascos.2oa 
V. PRESSURES ON BANKS TO EXPAND THEIR ACTIVITIES 
A. The Changes in the Financial Services Industry 
The skeletal discussion of bank regulation and insurance regula-
tion in the foregoing portions of this study was not intended to ex-
amine or express in detail the substance of the regulatory schemes 
governing the two industries, but merely to highlight the emphasis 
that such legislation places on the preservation of safety of the con-
sumer's investment. As long as banking, securities, insurance and real 
estate were kept apart, the banking industry was not aggressive in at-
tempting to diversify into financial areas verboten by the respective 
laws. However, during the past three decades the financial services 
industry has undergone revolutionary changes at a galloping pace. 
Unregulated entities have entered the field to perform services and 
offer products similar to those formerly available only through 
bpnks.204 More recently, tluift institutions were authorized to make 
certain consumer loans205 and provide NOW accounts.2os Addition-
(F) Information of Insurers. A:ny person within an insurance holding 
company system subject to registration shall be required to provide com-
plete and accurate information to an insurer, where such information is 
reasonably necessary to enable the insurer to comply with the provisions 
of this Act. 
MODEL Ar:::r, supra note 183, § 4B, C, D, E, F. 
203. The remaining portion of the MODEL Ar:::r (Sections 6 through 17) are not ana-
lyzed herein. 
204. For example, Sears opened financial centers offering insurance, securities, real 
estate services, check cashing facilities and credit card availability; American Ex-
press, aside from credit card services, offered insurance, investment banking and 
banking services through a Swiss bank. 
The nation's largest stock insurer, Aetna Life and Casualty, now owns 40 
percent of the Samuel Montagu and Company group, a leading British 
investment bank and 87 percent of Federated Investors Incorporated, 
this nation's second largest money market and mutual fund management 
firm. 
Security Pacific Corporation, one of the fastest growing and most di-
versified securities firms, now has among its $37 billion of assets the 
country's tenth largest bank. Its growing empire includes fifteen retail 
stockbroker offices, three wholesale bond houses, an investment bank-
ing group, a private Swiss bank, a group of sixteen common trust funds, a 
New York state chartered trust company, and a wholesale discount se-
curities brokerage firm. 
Dunne, supra note 6, at 345. 
205. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA), 
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ally, new financial products, such as money market mutual funds 
(MMMFs) and Cash Management Accounts (CMAs) were introduced 
to compete with traditional bank accounts. Because Regulation Q207 
imposed ceilings on the interest rates that banks could pay, there was 
an outflow or disintermediation of deposits into MMMFs, which paid 
higher rates. Although not a demand deposit account, an MMMF is 
similar to a traditional checking account in that it permits a depositor 
check writing privileges. Introduced in the 1970s, the CMA combined 
a securities brokerage account, a money market fund, a checking ac-
count with a bank and a debit card issued by the same bank.20s 
Through the use of computers and toll free telephone numbers instan-
taneous transfers of funds can be accomplished through the CMA 
account.209 
Not only have innovative products replaced traditional banking 
services, "old fashioned" nonbank entities have carved out thick slices 
of a highly profitable banking activity-consumer loans. Finance com-
panies and automobile finance companies have displaced commercial 
banks as the major providers of installment credit.21o Furthermore, 
the global aspects of the financial world have reduced the need for 
domestic bank services: 
The technology revolution has opened up twenty-four hour worldwide finan-
cial markets linked by instantaneously communicated financial information 
on a global scale. This development has made it possible for financial custom-
ers to bypass banks and meet their credit and investment needs directly and 
less expensively in the securities markets. By enhancing investor ability to 
Pub. L. No. 96-221, §§ 204-05, 94 Stat. 132, 143 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3503-04 
(1988)). 
206. Id. § 303. NOW (negotiable order of withdrawal) accounts are interest bearing 
checking accounts. Prior to 1980 interest was not permitted to be paid on demand 
deposits. Naturally many members of the public transferred their money from 
demand deposits to the NOW accounts of thrift institutions. 
207. 12 C.F.R. pt. 217 (1992). The Glass-Steagall Act prohibited payment of interest on 
demand deposits and authorized the Fed to impose interest rate ceilings on sav-
ings accounts or time deposits, such as certificates of deposit. The Banking Act of 
1933, Ch. 89, § 11, 48 Stat. 162, 181. The Fed implemented this authority through 
Regulation Q. But by the 1980s it became apparent that banks had been losing 
their deposits since the 1960s to other liquid investments due to higher market 
rates. In 1980 DIDMCA called for a phase-out of the ceilings with total elimina-
tion by March 31, 1986. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Con-
trol Act, Pub. L. No. 96-221, §§ 204-05, 94 Stat. 143 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3503-04 
(1982)). 
208. The CMA is the "invention" of Merrill Lynch and is now offered by many securi-
ties firms. 
209. When the owner of the CMA account purchases securities, writes a check against 
the account, or uses his debit card, the needed funds are automatically withdrawn 
and credited to the seller's or payee's account. The CMA account has become a 
powerful substitute for traditional deposit accounts. .AMERICAN BANKER (Octo-
ber 8, 1987 p. 1) reported that by 1987 the Merrill Lynch CMAs alone had $160 
billion in deposits. PITT supra note 102, at 712 n.21. 
210. Whiting, supra note 6, at 361. 
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assess credits and diversify risk without the need for banking expertise or 
FDIC protection, computer technology has dramatically altered the credit 
evaluation and diversification role of banks that once made them essential 
intermediaries.211 
The vast proliferation of retirement plans has also had its impact: 
Moreover, increased institutionalization of savings in the form of pension and 
retirement plans and the management of these funds by professional nonbank 
money managers has diverted vast pools of funds away from banks to the se-
curities markets.212 
Worst of all, banks began to lose their large corporate customers: 
Glass-Steagall's constraining effects have dramatically inhibited the ability of 
banks to respond to the evolving financial needs of large corporate customers, 
traditionally the strongest source of profitable banking activity. Prime corpo-
rate customers increasingly are sidestepping banks and satisfying their short-
term and intermediate credit needs by issuing commercial paper and securitiz-
ing their assets.213 Fifteen years ago, commercial banks controlled some 90% 
of the short-term loan market. Today, roughly half of this market is satisfied 
through the use of commercial paper.214 The securitization of assets has re-
duced the need for bank loans even further.215 
211. William M. Isaac and Melanie L. Fein, Facing the Future-Life Without Glass-
Steagall, 37 CATHOLIC U. L. REv. 281, 292-3 (1988)(footnotes omitted). 
212. Id. at 293 (footnote omitted). 
213. The Securities Industry Association boasts that securities firms' distribution of 
commercial paper enabled corporate borrowers to raise funds at costs well below 
the 250 to 300 basis point spread over costs of funds typically demanded in bank 
loans. Reform of the Nation~ Banking and Financial Services: Hearings Before 
the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance 
of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban .Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 122 (1988)(statement of John Bachmann, Chairman, Securities Industry 
Assoc.). · 
214. See Structure and Regulation [of Financial Firms and Holding Companies: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 99th 
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, 124 (1986)]. (statement of Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System); FEDERAL REsERVE BANK OF 
NEW YORK, RECENT TRENDS IN COMMERCIAL BANK PROFITABILITY: A STAFF 
STUDY, 159-77, (1986)(hereincifter COMMERCIAL BANK PROFITABILITY STUDY)]. 
The commercial paper market has more than doubled since 1980, from $31 billion 
to $78 billion in mid-1987. Structure and Role of United States Financial Institu-
tions: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the 
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1987)(statement 
of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System). 
215. For example, mortgage pass-through securities accounted for approximately one-
third of all residential mortgage credit in 1987. The President of the Federal Re-
serve Bank of New York has stated that, "if securitization were to continue to 
spread rapidly to other types of credit, the historic role of the deposit-based credit 
intermediation process could be seriously jeopardized." COMMERCIAL BANK 
PROFITABILITY STUDY, supra note [214], at xvi (foreword by E. Corrigan). [A pri-
mary function of financial intermediaries is to facilitate the flow of capital from 
savers to borrowers. Financial institutions exist because they can do this at a 
lower cost than would be possible through direct financing arrangements. Banks 
and other depository institutions perform this intermediary function by making 
loans and accepting deposits. Sometimes, however, a financial intermediary's de-
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By packaging automobile loans, leases, consumer loan receivables, and 
portfolios of other assets into pools, a company can fund its operating costs by 
selling interests in the pool directly to investors.216Bank loans are being used 
increasingly as a source of back-up liquidity rather than a primary funding 
source for many commercial customers.217 These customers need underwrit-
ing and distribution services to facilitate the sale of their own securities di-
rectly in the market. Glass-Steagall precludes banks from providing these 
services. While banks have gained limited authority to assist corporate cus-
tomers in privately placing commercial paper after a decade-long battle,218 
their ability to underwrite commercial paper and securitized assets has been 
narrowly circumscribed and is entangled in ongoing litigation initiated by the 
securities industry.2191220 
mand for loans at a given rate is greater than its supply of deposits, in which case 
it may purchase the Fed's funds or other uninsured deposits, sell securities under 
repurchase agreements, sell short-term securities such as commercial paper or 
bankers acceptances, or sell assets such as government securities or loans. When 
an institution sells loans, it can sell whole loans or loan participations, or it can 
"securitize" a portfolio of similar loans. 
Securitization is a recent innovation in asset sales. It involves the pooling and 
repackaging of loans into securities, which are then sold to investors. Like whole 
loan sales and participations, securitization provides an additional funding source 
and eliminates assets from a bank's balance sheet. Unlike whole loan sales and 
participations, securitization is often used to market small loans that would be 
difficult to sell on a stand-alone basis. Most importantly, securitization can in-
crease the liquidity and diversification of a loan portfolio. The ability to package 
and sell these otherwise illiquid assets in an established secondary market in-
creases their liquidity. Christine Pavel, Securitization, 10 ECONOMIC PERSPEC-
TIVE 16 (1986)]. 
216. The securitization of assets allows a company to eliminate intermediary expenses 
in obtaining funding, transfer credit and interest rate risks, enhance balance 
sheet liquidity, improve asset management, and diversify credit risk. The asset-
backed securities market is expected to grow to $100 billion in the next five years. 
Standard & Poor's, Dramatic Growth Expected, in AssET BACKED SECURITIZA-
TION CREDIT REV., Mar. 16, 1987, at 1. See generally Christine Pavel, Securitiza-
tion, 10 ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 16 (1986); AMERICAN BANKER AssET SALES REP., 
Jan. 11, 1988, at 5. 
217. See sources cited supra note [216]. Although the October 1987 stock market 
plunge temporarily boosted the demand for commercial loans as major borrowers 
fled from the volatile securities markets, the long-term downturn in the commer-
cial loan sector has not changed. Stock Crisis Could Boost Demand for Loans, 
AMERICAN BANKER, Oct. 30, 1987, at 22, col. 2. 
218. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 
U.S. 137 (1984); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve 
Sys., 807 F.2d 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1987); Bankers 
Trust New York Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull.138 (1987). See generally FEDERAL RE-
SERVE BOARD STAFF, COMMERCIAL PAPER PRivATE PLACEMENT ACTIVITIES 
(1977). Although banks may participate in the commercial paper market as issu-
ers of standby letters of credit providing back-up liquidity to issuers whose com-
mercial paper fails to sell in the market, they may not do so with respect to 
commercial paper they place under restrictions imposed by the Federal Reserve 
Board. Moreover, this activity is not a substitute for commercial loans. Id. 
219. In 1987, under the BHCA, the Federal Reserve Board approved for the first time 
major banking holding companies' applications to engage, through subsidiaries, in 
underwriting, and dealing in commercial paper, mortgage backed securities, mu-
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In summary, as banks lost their hold on the intermediation of finan-
cial activities, they began losing their profitability and viability. The 
integrity and stability of the national monetary system was 
threatened. The banking industry had to respond to what appeared to 
be a calamitous environment. 
B. The Banking Response 
1. Bank Holding Companies 
Banks sought to overcome the statutory limitations on their activi-
ties by forming bank holding companies (BHCs).221 In an effort to 
evade geographic restraints,222 a bank would create a BHC that would 
nicipal revenue bonds, and consumer receivable backed securities. The Chase 
Manhattan Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 367 (1987); Citicorp, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 473 
(1987) [hereinafter Board Order of April 30, 1987]; The Chase Manhattan Corp., 
73 Fed. Res. Bull. 607 (1987); Chemical New York Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 616 
(1987); Citicorp, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 618 (1987); Manufacturers Hanover Corp., 73 
Fed. Res. Bull. 620 (1987); Security Pacific Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 622 (1987); 
The Chase Manhattan Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 729 (1987); Chemical New York 
Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 731 (1987)(CRRs); Marine Midland Banks, Inc., 73 Fed. 
Res. Bull. 738 (1987); PNC Financial Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 742 (1987); J.P. 
Morgan & Co., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 875 (1987); First Interstate Bancorp, 73 Fed. Res. 
Bull. 928 (1987); Bank of New England Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 133 (1988). The 
Board limited such activities to no more than 5% of each underwriting subsidi-
ary's total gross revenues and limited each to no more than a 5% share of the 
market in each type of security. The Board also imposed numerous operating 
restrictions on such underwriting subsidiaries, including a prohibition on man-
agement interlocks with affiliated banks, restrictions on extensions of credit to 
issuers and purchasers of securities underwritten by the holding company's sub-
sidiary, and capital adequacy requirements. The Board's orders approving the 
applications have been challenged in court by both the Securities Industry Associ-
ation as well as the bank holding company applicants and are the subject of a 
judicial stay. See The Chase Manhattan Corp. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. 
Reserve Sys., No. 87-1333 (D.C. Cir. filed July 20, 1987); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. 
Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Nos. 87-4091, 87-4093, 87-4095 (2d 
Cir. filed July 1 and July 15, 1987); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors 
of the Fed. Reserve Sys., No. 87-4041 (2d Cir. filed May 1, 1987); Securities Indus. 
Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., No. 87-1169 (D.C. Cir. filed 
April17, 1987); Bankers Trust N.Y. Corp. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Re-
serve Sys., No. 87-1035 (D.C. Cir. filed Jan. 23, 1987); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. 
Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., No. 87-1030 (D.C. Cir. filed Jan. 20, 
1987). On Feb. 8, 1988, the Board's Order of April 30, 1987, was upheld by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, with the exception of the 
5% market limit which the court struck down. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of 
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., No. 87-4041 (2d Cir.Feb. 8, 1988). The Securi-
ties Industry Association has filed a petition for certiorari seeking Supreme Court 
review of the court's opinion. [cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (U.S. June 14, 1988).] 
220. Isaac and Fein, supra note 211 at 293-94. Original footnote numbers 61 through 67 
were renumbered 213 through 219. 
221. A bank holding company is any entity that controls one or more banks. 
222. Branch banking was strictly circumscribed. See supra text accompanying note 
142. 
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own it and also acquire other banks both in the home state and other 
states where state law permitted. Branch banking restrictions could 
be sidestepped because subsidiaries of BHCs were not considered 
branch offices but corporations with their own charters. Because the 
use of BHCs was fairly limited prior to the 1930s, Congress enacted no 
special legislation to curb their activities. The Banking Act of 1933, 
motivated by the 1929 crash, contained some controls on BHCs. Under 
the act all BHCs which were members of the Federal Reserve were 
placed under federal supervision.22a Like the Glass-Steagall provi-
sions,224 the goal of this ineffective provision was to separate banking 
from affiliates engaged in investment banking. Because of the slow 
but steady acquisition of nonbanking affiliates by BHCs,225 by the 
early 1950s concerns arose about the concentration of banking re-
sources in other financial fields. 
Congress reacted to these concerns by enacting the Bank Holding 
Company Act of 1956.226 However, since Congress was primarily con-
cerned with the anticompetitive factors of large BHCs, the 1956 Act 
applied only to BHCs controlling two or more banks.227 The 1956 Act 
placed BHCs under the regulating power of the Fed and prohibited 
BHCs and their nonbank subsidiaries from activities of a nonbank na-
ture, except those "of a financial, fiduciary or insurance nature . . . 
which the Board . . . has determined to be so closely related to the 
business of banking or -of managing or controlling banks as to be a 
proper incident thereto."22S Since one-bank BHCs were not covered 
by the 1956 act they were free to engage in nonbanking activities. As a 
result, the post 1956 period saw a surge in one-bank BHCs conducting 
interstate banking and nonbanking activities.229 Congress reacted to 
223. The provision was triggered only if at least one bank in the holding company 
entity was a member of the Federal Reserve System and the holding company 
voted its stock in the member bank. By refraining from voting (or simply not 
owning a member bank) the BHC did not come under the jurisdiction of the Fed 
and could engage in activities prohibited by Glass-Steagall. Thus the provision 
was a complete failure. Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 89, § 191(e), 48 Stat. 162, 188 
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 61), repealed in relevant part by Act of July 1, 1966, Pub. 
L. No. 89-485, § 13(c), 80 Stat. 236, 242. 
224. The Banking Act of 1933, Ch. 89 §§ 16, 20, 21, 32, 48 Stat. 162, 184, 188, 189, 194 
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 377, 378, 78 respectively (1988)); see also 
supra note 65. 
225. The National Bank Act regulates national banks and their operating subsidiaries, 
but does not regulate their affiliates or parents. 
226. Ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-49 (1988)). 
227. Congress expressly rejected regulation of one-bank holding companies because 
such companies were few in number and controlled only small banks. 
228. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, § 4(c)(6), 70 Stat.133,137 (codified as 
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)(1988)). 
229. By 1968 $100 billion of deposits (approximately 25% of total deposits) of insured 
commercial banks were held in this form. CORPORATE LAw AND PRACI'ICE, 
PRACI'ICING LAw INSTITUTE, ONE-BANK HOLDING COMPANIES 13 (1969). During 
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the surge by passing the 1970 amendments to the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act (BHCA),2ao which redefined the term "bank holding com-
pany" to include one-bank holding companies. This did not, however, 
deter the continued expansion in the number of BHCs. At present 
there are over 9,000 BHCs registered with the Fed. 
2. Nonbank Banks 
The nonbank bank phenomenon added to the arsenal of tools to be 
used to escape the pincers of the BHCA. After 1970 and prior to 1987 
the BHCA defined a bank as any institution "which (1) accepts depos-
its that the depositor has a legal right to withdraw on demand and (2) 
engages in the business of making commercial loans."231 Under this 
definition commercial banks that accepted demand deposits but made 
no commercial loans (or vice-versa) would not be banks for BHCA 
purposes. Such institutions are referred to as "nonbank banks." 
Soon this loophole was discovered by financial institutions and 
there was a rush by securities entities, insurance companies, invest-
ment banks and other firms to buy or establish nonbank banks not 
subject to the BHCA geographic and product limitations. Thus, banks 
and BHCs came under additional competition from a multitude of 
firms232 offering financial services previously the excltisive domain of 
banks. Organizations that were not regulated under the BHCA were 
able to enter the banking industry by acquiring FDIC-insured non-
bank banks. To offset this disadvantage, BHCs also acquired nonbank 
banks for use in interstate banking activities233 such as acceptance of 
deposits and consumer but not commercial lending. 
Through the BHCs and nonbank banks, the banking industry has 
attempted to expand its product and geographic activities. These vari-
1968 several major banks announced their intention to form one-bank holding 
companies. By 1970 there were 1100 companies in control of banks covering 40 
percent of total deposits. Richard M. Whiting, Bank Holding Companies: A Reg-
ulatory Primer, 2 BANKING L. REP. 190 (1986). These one-bank holding compa-
nies were engaged in about 100 different activities, including agriculture, mining, 
manufacturing, transportation, and retail trade. LAsH, supra note 5, at 49. 
230. Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, 84 Stat. 
1760 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
231. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(1982)(amended 1987). 
232. Some of these firms were: Merrill-Lynch, Prudential Insurance Company, 
American Express, Fidelity Investments, Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, 
Dreyfus Corp., Sears, J.C. Penney Co., and many others. 
233. BHCs were prohibited from acquiring any interest in banks outside the state in 
which the principal operations of such BHC's banking subsidiaries were con-
ducted unless a state positively permitted such branching. This provision is 
known as the "Douglas Amendment.'' Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 
240, § 3(d), 70 Stat. 133, (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d)(1988)). This 
provision supplements the interstate branching limitations of the McFadden Act. 
44 Stat. 1224 (1927)(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
778 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:726 
ous undertakings will be discussed in connection with the legislative, 
judicial, and administrative curbs that were being challenged. 
VI. REGULATORY PROHIBITIONS 
A. The Bank Holding Company Act 
The Bank Holding Company Act234 (BHCA) regulates the activi-
ties of BHCs and their affiliates in nonbanking functions (either di-
rectly or through investments) and prohibits the undertaking of 
business unrelated to banking. Germane to this paper are controver-
sies arising under section 3235 and section 4236 of the BHCA. Gener-
ally, section 3 prohibits any company, without the Fed's prior 
approval, from taking any action that would result in the creation of a 
bank holding company. Section 3 also prohibits any BHC from acquir-
ing control237 of any bank or merging with another BHC without prior 
Fed approval. The Fed is prohibited from approving an application for 
an acquisition or a merger that would result in a substantial lessening 
of competition, unless the anticompetitive effect would be clearly out-
weighed by the beneficial effects in meeting the convenience and 
needs of the local public. Furthermore, the Fed may not approve an 
application for an out of state acquisition or merger unless the laws of 
the target state expressly authorize the entry of the BHC. In contra-
distinction to section 3, which governs bank acquisitions, section 4 gov-
erns nonbanking acquisitions and activities of BHCs and their 
nonbanking affiliates. Section 4 opens with a broad prohibition on 
ownership or control by BHCs of "any company which is not a 
bank."23B Then follows a list of exemptions;239 the most important of 
which is section 4(c)(8). This exemption applies to: 
shares of any company the activities of which the Board after due notice and 
opportunity for hearing has determined (by order or regulation) to be so 
closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper 
incident thereto. In determining whether a particular activity is a proper inci-
dent to banking or managing or controlling banks the Board shall consider 
whether its performance by an affiliate of a holding company can reasonably 
be expected to produce benefits to the public, such as greater convenience, 
increased competition, or gains in efficiency, that outweigh possible adverse 
effects, such as undue concentration of resources, decreased or unfair competi-
tion, conflicts of interests, or unsound banking practices. In orders and regu-
lations under this subsection, the Board may differentiate between activities 
commenced de novo and activities commenced by the acquisition, in whole or 
234. 12 u.s.c. §§ 1841-1850 (1988). 
235. 12 u.s.c. § 1842 (1988). 
236. 12 u.s.c. § 1843 (1988). 
237. For this purpose control is more than 5% of the stock of the bank. 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1842(a)(1988). 
238. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(1)(1988). 
239. Id. §§ 1843(c){1)-(13). 
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in part, of a going concern.240 
Several elements of this provision bear closer examination. The 
parenthetical phrase indicates that the Board may make its determi-
nations either by regulation or by order. The former is generally 
made at the initiative of the Board; the latter in response to an applica-
tion. The Board has promulgated regulations241 in which there are 
listed twenty-five activities242 which are permissible under section 
4(c)(8) as meeting the requirement that they be "so closely related to 
banking ... as to be a proper incident thereto." In addition, the Board, 
has also approved by order more than twenty activities which are "in-
cident" to the business of banking. The applicant for a nonbanking 
activity must pass the "closely related" test and the ''benefits for the 
public" test in order to receive a favorable determination. 
In National Courier Association v. Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System, the D.C. Circuit Court considered the meaning of 
"closely related" and concluded that the intention of Congress was to 
ensure that banks would not undertake activities "which are so clearly 
of a purely commercial nature that the predominantly adverse effects 
of a bank's engaging in them may be presumed."243 The test for the 
requirement that the activity ''be a proper incident [to banking]"244 is 
referred to as the "public benefits" test because section 4(c)(8) specifi-
cally requires the Board to consider whether the activity will produce 
benefits to the public "that outweigh possible adverse effects."245 Na-
tional Courier246 held that this test must be applied on a case-by-case 
basis using the factors enumerated in section 4(c)(8), that is, the poten-
tial public benefits of greater convenience, increased competition, and 
gains in efficiency versus potential the adverse effects of concentration 
of resources, decrease in competition, conflicts of interest, and un-
sound banking practices.247 
B. Tiptoeing Through the Tulips of Restraints 
This section will briefly review the more significant attempts of the 
banking industry to overcome limitations on their financial activities 
in face of increased competition by entities not regulated by federal or 
state banking laws. 
240. Id. § 1843(c)(8)(1976). The quoted version contains the wording used prior to the 
1982 Amendment discussed irifra note 283. 
241. Regulation Y, 12 C.F.R. pt. 225 (1992). 
242. 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.22(a), (b), and 225.25(b)(1)-(24). 
243. National Courier Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 516 F.2d 
1229, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
244. See supra quotation accompanying note 239. 
245. Id. 
246. National Courier Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 516 F.2d 
1229, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
247. See supra quotation accompanying note 240. 
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Until 1963 it was commonly recognized that a mutual fund would 
be considered an "affiliate" of its sponsor. Thus, under section 20 of 
the Glass-Steagall Act248 neither a member bank nor a BHC249 could 
sponsor a mutual fund. In 1963 Comptroller Saxon promulgated a reg-
ulation250 permitting national banks to sponsor (establish and oper-
ate) mutual funds. The Investment Company Institute (ICI) 
challenged the validity of the regulation. The Supreme Court in ICI v. 
Camp251 rejected the Comptroller's position, holding that under sec-
tions 16252 and 21253 of the Glass-Steagall Act a national bank is pro-
hibited from sponsoring an open-end investment company (a mutual 
fund). The Court reasoned that shares of a mutual fund are securities 
and, therefore, the sponsoring bank would be underwriting and dis-
tributing securities in violation of section 16 because the sponsor is in 
control of the fund. Even though section 20 was not in issue, the Court 
implied that an open-end mutual fund sponsored by a BHC would be 
considered an affiliate of that BHC. 
The Board interpreted the holding to mean that a BHC could spon-
sor a open-end mutual fund as well as a closed-end investment com-
pany.254 The ICI challenged this regulation but lost. In Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. IC/255 the Court held that 
a BHC could sponsor a closed-end investment company without violat-
ing section 20 because neither the fund nor the sponsor would be "en-
gaged principally"256 in the issuance of securities. 
The complexity of the meaning of the phrase "engaged principally" 
248. 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1988) prohibits any affiliation between banks and securities orga-
nizations. See supra text accompanying note 140. 
249. For definition of "affiliate" see 12 U.S.C. § 221a(b)(1988). 
250. 12 C.F.R. § 9.18(a)(3)(1970)(current version at 12 C.F.R. § 9.18(a)(1)(1992)). 
251. 401 u.s. 617 (1971). 
252. For the contents of Section 16 (12 U.S.C. § 24 (1988 & Supp. II 1990)) see supra 
note 101. 
253. 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1982). It forbids any entity in the securities business to receive 
deposits. 
254. 12 C.F.R. § 225.125(f)(1992). The regulation explains the difference between 
open-end or mutual funds and closed-end investment companies as follows: 
Briefly, a mutual fund is an investment company which, typically, is con-
tinuously engaged in the issuance of its shares and stands ready at any 
time to redeem the securities as to which it is the issuer; a closed-end 
investment company typically does not issue shares after its initial or-
ganization except at infrequent intervals and does not stand ready to re-
deem its shares. 
12 C.F.R. § 225.125(c)(1992). 
255. 450 u.s. 46 (1981). 
256. Section 20 states: 
[N]o member bank shall be affiliated ... with any corporation, associa-
tion, business trust, or other similar organization engaged principally in 
the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sales, or distribution . . . of 
stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities. 
12 U.S.C. § 377 (1988)(emphasis added). 
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arose again when in 1984 and 1985 several BHCs applied to the Board 
for permission to engage, through affiliates, in underwriting and deal~ 
ing in bank~ineligible securities257 such as municipal revenue bonds, 
commercial paper, mortgage~related securities and other debt securi~ 
ties. The BHC applicants were Citicorp25S (the largest bank organiza~ 
tion in the country), Bankers Trust and J.P. Morgan & Co. The most 
crucial issue involved in the matter was a determination of the quanti-
tative limits of activity to be permitted in ineligible securities under 
section 20.259 The applicants contended that "engaged principally" 
meant that the volume of activity in ineligible securities would have to 
exceed fifty percent of the total business of the affiliate.260 Mter two 
years of deliberation, the Board, in a lengthy order,261 rejected this 
interpretation and held that five to ten percent of the affiliate's total 
gross revenue on average over any two year period would be the 
proper measure and also added a market share test. The order limited 
the applicants to the lower end of the scale, five percent. As required 
by the BHCA262 the Board found that the activities in which the appli-
cant intended to engage met the two required tests;263 i.e., the activi~ 
ties were so closely related to banking as to be an incident thereto and 
that the public benefits outweighed possible adverse effects. Thus, the 
Board granted approval for underwriting and dealing in commercial 
paper, municipal revenue bonds and mortgage related securities, sub~ 
ject to the five percent limitation and subject to a long list of condi-
tions and terms.264 
While the Board engaged in lengthy deliberation, Congress passed 
CEBA,265 which, inter alia, contained moratorium provisions which 
prohibited federal banking regulatory agencies to approve any BHC or 
affiliate thereof to engage 
in the flotation, underwriting, public sale, dealing in, or distribution of securi-
ties if that approval would require the agency to determine that the entity 
which would conduct such activities would not be engaged principally in such 
257. Section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act permits national banks to underwrite or deal 
in eligible securities such as federal government and general obligation municipal 
securities. All other securities (ie., those not listed in Section 16) are ineligible 
securities. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1988). 
258. This was Citicorp's revised application. It withdrew its earlier application when it 
became apparent that it would not be granted. 
259. 12 u.s.c. § 377 (1988). 
260. The applications, however, voluntarily limited the activities to a much lower 
percentage. 
261. Citicorp, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 473 (1987). 
262. See supra quotation accompanying note 240. 
263. See supra text following note 242. 
264. See supra note 261. The Board thereafter approved several applications from 
other banks, including Chase Manhattan, Chemical New York Corp., Security 
Pacific, Manufacturers Hanover and others. 
265. Pub. L. No.100-86,101 Stat. 552 (1987)(codified at scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
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activities.266 
The foregoing decisions of the Board were rendered after the effec-
tive date of the above provision, March 6, 1987. Immediately after the 
Citicorp decision, the Securities Industry Association (SIA) filed suit 
in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals challenging the Board's con-
struction of the term "engaged principally" and asking the court to 
stay the Board's orders in light of CEBA's moratorium.267 Several 
BHCs also filed suit in the same court challenging the Board's quanti-
tative and market limitations. The court imposed a stay on the orders 
until March 1, 1988, but proceeded to decide the substantive issues 
raised by the opposing parties and consolidated all the cases into 
one.2ss It denied SIA's challenges and affirmed the bank holding com-
panies' arguments as to the market limitation imposed by the Board. 
However, the court upheld the Board's quantitative limitation of five 
percent.269 
The Citicorp decision represents a foot in the door of securities ac-
tivities for BHCs. The result could be the dismantling of Glass-Stea-
gall. The subtle beginnings of such dismantling are already 
perceptible in Chemical New York Corporation270 in which the Board 
approved underwriting and dealing in consumer receivable-related se-
curities.271 A giant step in this incursionary process was the recent 
decision of the Board272 to permit BHCs, through nonbank subsidiar-
266. Competitive Equality Banking Act § 201(b)(2), 101 Stat. 552, 582 (1987). 
267. The moratorium was effective until March 1, 1988. Id. § 201(a). 
268. The citations to the court's orders staying all orders and its order of consolidation 
are omitted. 
269. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d 47 
(2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059, (1988). This decision again points out 
(by implication) that Glass-Steagall treats affiliates of banks (section 20) differ-
ently from banks (section 16). Thus a less stringent standard may be applied to 
activities of an affiliate than to a bank. See Board of Governors of the Fed. Re-
serve Sys. v. ICI, 450 U.S. 46, 60, 71 (1981). 
270. 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 731 (1987). 
271. An exhaustive exposition of the numerous securities related activities that banks 
or BHCs are now permitted to engage in would be too cumbersome and not essen-
tial to this paper. However, a sampling is worth mentioning. An acquisition of a 
discount brokerage house (Schwab) was approved by the Board in BankAmerica, 
69 Fed. Res. Bull. 105 (1983), upheld by the Supreme Court in Securities Indus. 
Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve System, 468 U.S. 207 (1984). In-
vestment advisory services to investment companies is permitted under Regula-
tion Y, 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(4)(ii)-(iii)(1992). Full service brokerage was 
approved in Bank of New England Corp., 74 Fed. Res. Bull. 700 (1988). Full ser-
vice brokerage to retail customers was allowed in respect to ineligible securities 
held as principal in connection with authorized underwritings and dealing activi-
ties in PNC Financial Corp., 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 396 (1989). 
272. J.P. Morgan & Co. Inc., 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 192 (1989). The SIA challenged this 
order and filed a petition in the U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit which was 
denied. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., 900 
F.2d 360 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
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ies, to underwrite and deal in all types of debt and equity securities 
within certain quantitative limits.273 Congressional reaction to this 
decision was immediate and vehement. Rep. John Dingell (D. Mich.), 
chairman of the House committee that oversees securities regulation, 
said through a spokesman, "The Fed is on 'its way to giving banks an 
invitation to shoot craps with the taxpayer's money. This is the kind 
of irresponsible behavior that gave us the savings and loan crisis and 
brought about the 1929 crash."274 House Banking Committee Chair-
man Henry B. Gonzalez (D. Tex.) said, "Some may argue that the Con-
gress has moved too slowly to resolve the issue. But this indicates the 
divisiveness and complexity of the issue and does not cloak the Fed-
eral Reserve with the authority to supplant congressional action."275 
In summary, BHCs may engage in discount brokerage; full-service 
brokerage; limited underwriting and dealing in commercial paper, mu-
nicipal revenue bonds, mortgage-backed securities, consumer-receiva-
ble-backed securities, corporate debt and equity securities, securities 
of affiliates; sponsoring closed-end mutual funds and numerous other 
securities activities. The Office of the Comptroller of Currency has 
authorized similar (and more expansive) activities for national banks 
and the FDIC has given permission to state nonmember banks subject 
to state law to engage through affiliates in even broader securities 
transactions. 
Banks have attempted to enter other financial spheres. The pres-
sure to expand products and services impelled the banking industry to 
cast an eye towards the lucrative insurance domain which had histori-
cally been closed to such competition. The legal separation which had 
existed between banking and insurance did not come about through 
any one particular piece of legislation as with the Glass-Steagall Act 
separating the banking and securities industries. Rather, the separa-
273. The revenue from securities trading cannot exceed five percent of the subsidi-
ary's revenue. The Board required that underwriting and dealing in equity secur-
ities be delayed for at least one year, pending a review of the track record 
established in bonds. These subsidiaries are referred to as section 20 subsidiaries. 
See supra note 256 and text accompanying notes 258-260. 
274. Kathleen Day, Fed Grants New Powers to 5 Banks, WASH. PoST, Jan.19, 1989, at 
Fl., F2. 
275. Id. But all this bluster and saber rattling did not cow the Board. As if to further 
challenge Congress, in its Modifications to Section 20 Orders, 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 
751 (1989), the Board raised from 5 to 10 percent the revenue limit on the amount 
of total revenues a section 20 subsidiary may derive from ineligible securities un-
derwriting and dealing activities. See supra note 273. In addition the modifica-
tions permit, with certain conditions, underwriting and dealing in securities of 
affiliates. Furthermore, in Bankers Trust New York Corporation, 75 Fed. Res. 
Bull. 829 (1989) and J.P. Morgan & Co. Inc., 76 Fed. Res. Bull. 26 (1990), the 
Board authorized the private placement of all types of securities, permitted the 
provision of related advisory services, and permitted the buying and selling of all 
types of securities on the order of investors as a "riskless principal." The Board 
also held that on such transactions the 10 percent limitation does not apply. 
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tion resulted from the generally accepted view that banks should not 
be allowed to engage in nonbanking activities.276 This perception was 
reflected by Congress's decision to permit banks to engage in minimal 
insurance activity embodied in section 92 of the national bank.laws.277 
When the Comptroller, a half century later, attempted to enlarge 
this power of national banks,278 he was overruled in Georgia Associa-
tion of Independent Insurance Agents, Inc. v. Saxon.279 The Comp-
troller had more success in empowering national banks to sell and 
underwrite credit life insurance and title insurance in connection with 
loans.2so As can be seen from the foregoing decisions, the Comptrol-
ler's Office has taken a fairly permissive attitude towards bank activ-
ity in the insurance field. 
A more significant matter was the right of national banks to en-
gage through their subsidiaries in underwriting of municipal bond 
guaranty insurance. Such underwriting not only raised the substan-
tive issue of banking and insurance but also raised a controversial ju-
risdictional issue between the Comptroller and the Board. In January 
1985, Citibank., a national bank and subsidiary of the BHC Citicorp, in 
a letter to the OCC proposed the establishment of a new operating 
subsidiary,2s1 American Municipal Bond Assurance Corporation 
(AMBAC) for the purpose of issuing "standby letters of credit" for 
municipal bonds. Municipalities issuing bonds would apply for 
AMBAC insurance and, if there were a default thereon, the bondhold-
ers would apply to AMBAC for payment of interest and principal due. 
The Citibank. reasoned in its proposal that this activity was not insur-
ance but standby letters of credit, a long standing permissible banking 
activity. In May 1985, the Comptroller approved Citibank.'s proposal, 
agreeing that this was not insurance.2s2 
In immediate response to this bombshell, the American Insurance 
276. See Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Independent Insurance Agents, Inc., 399 F.2d 1010 
(5th Cir. 1968). See supra text accompanying notes 115 through 118. Because of 
the lack of comprehensive legislation, each banking authority developed its own 
interpretations as to the sphere of insurance activity to be permitted. Thus, the 
Fed, the Comptroller, the FDIC and the state authorities made independent and 
conflicting decisions. 
277. 12 U.S.C. § 92 (1988). For subsequent history of§ 92 see supra note 125. For pro-
vision of § 92, see supra text accompanying note 119. 
278. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
279. 268 F. Supp. 236 (N.D. Ga. 1967), afj'd, 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968). For discus-
sion of this case, see supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
280. See supra notes 126-33 and accompanying text. 
281. Although section 16 of Glass-Steagall (12 U.S.C. § 24 (1982)) prohibits national 
and member banks from owning stock in a corporation, both the ace and the 
Fed ruled that such banks may establish operating subsidiaries with the restric-
tion that such subsidiaries may engage only in activities permitted their parents, 
12 C.F.R. §§ 5.34, 225.22(d)(1988). 
282. Comptroller Staff Interpretive Letter No. 338, reprinted in [1985-1987 Transfer 
Binder], Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1] 85,508 (May 2, 1982). 
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Association (AIA) filed suit in the D.C. District Court. The AIA 
raised several issues including the contention that the proposed activ~ 
ity was insurance and, furthermore, that this activity was prohibited 
under the BHCA as amended by the Garn~St Germain Act.283 The 
283. Under the 1956 BHCA, Ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133, (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. 
§§ 1841-49 (1988), and prior to the 1970 amendments thereto, Bank Holding Com-
pany Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, 84 Stat. 1760 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), the Fed permitted BHCs to engage in 
insurance activities which were far broader than what is considered permissible 
today. The language of the 1956 Act led to this latitude. This language prohibited 
BHCs and their nonbank subsidiaries from engaging in activities of a nonbank 
nature, except those "of a financial, fiduciary or insurance nature ... which the 
Board ... has determined (by order or regulation) to be so closely related to 
banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto." 
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, § 4(c)(6), 70 Stat. 133, 137 (codified as 
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)(1988)). In the 1970 Amendment, Congress, in-
ter alia, deleted the "of a financial, fiduciary, or insurance nature" language and 
substituted the language containing the two tests mentioned in the quoted text 
accompanying supra note 240; see also supra text accompanying notes 243-245. 
On the basis of this new language the Fed adopted regulations and interpreta-
tions which were more definitive and somewhat more restrictive by promulgating 
§ 225.4(a) of Regulation Y (now § 225.25), of which § 225.4(a)(9)(now 
§ 225.25(b)(8)) related to insurance activities. Section 225.4(a)(a) stated: [Permis-
sible activities which the Board determined to be so closely related to banking or 
managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto are]: 
(9) acting as insurance agent or broker in offices at which the holding 
company or its subsidiaries are otherwise engaged in business (or in an 
office adjacent thereto) with respect to the following types of insurance: 
(i) Any insurance for the holding company and its subsidiaries; 
(ii) Any insurance that (a) is directly related to an extension of credit by 
a bank or a bank-related firm of the kind described in this regulation, or 
(b) is directly related to the provision of other imancial services by a 
bank or such a bank-related firm, or (c) is otherwise sold as a matter of 
convenience to the purchaser, so long as the premium income from sales 
within this subdivision (ii)(c) does not constitute a significant portion of 
the aggregate insurance premium income of the holding company from 
insurance sold pursuant to this subdivision (ii); 
(iii) Any insurance sold in a community that (a) has a population not 
exceeding 5,000, or (b) the holding company demonstrates has adequate 
insurance agency facilities. 
12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(9)(1976). (Now 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(8)(1988)). 
The Alabama Association of Insurance Agents brought suit against the Board, 
contending that the activities listed in § 225.4(a)(9) violated § 4(c)(8) of the 
BHCA in that they were not sufficiently "closely related to banking". Alabama 
Ass'n, Ins. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 553 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976), 
vacated in part on rehearing, 558 F.2d 729 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978). 
As a result of this litigation BHCs could continue to engage in the following in-
surance activities: 
1. Credit life and credit accident and health insurance sold in con-
nection with extensions of credit by a bank holding company or its non-
bank subsidiary. This type of insurance may also be underwritten by 
bank holding companies. 
2. Property and casualty insurance sold, on an agency basis, in con-
nection with extensions of credit or the provision of a financial service 
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court granted summary judgment in favor of the Comptroller, holding 
(such as mortgage servicing). Bank holding companies may not under-
write this type of insurance. 
3. Insurance (liability, employee health, etc.) sold to banking subsid-
iaries of the bank holding company. This insurance cannot be under-
written by the holding company. 
4. General insurance to the public in towns with under 5,000 citi-
zens, so long as the parent bank holding company's principal place of 
banking is located in a town of less than 5,000. 
but are prohibited from the following activities: 
1. "Convenience insurance" (whole life or other types of insurance 
products not necessarily connected to any specific loan) usually sold to 
customers of a bank holding company or its nonbank subsidiaries; 
2. The sale of property and casualty insurance, fidelity insurance, or 
group life or health insurance for a bank holding company, any of its 
nonbanking subsidiaries, or employees thereof; 
3. The sale of renewal insurance after a loan from a bank holding 
company nonbank subsidiary has been repaid. 
4. The combined sale of mutual funds and insurance, that is, insur-
ance premium funding; and 
5. Underwriting life insurance not sold in connection with a credit 
transaction by a bank holding company or a nonbank subsidiary. 
S. REP. No. 97-536, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). 
This brings us to the Garn-St Germain Act, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). Congress, reflecting the 
traditional public view against concentration of economic power (see supra text 
accompanying note 27), became concerl).ed with the growing penetration of banks 
into the insurance industry. For several years prior to 1982, Congress held hear-
ings on legislation designed to restrict the insurance activities of BHCs. The re-
sult was a provision in the Garn-St Germain Act which divested the Fed of its 
duty and power under§ 4(c)(8) to determine whether an insurance activity is "so 
closely related to banking ... as to be a proper incident thereto." Section 601 of 
the Act, incorporated into § 4(c)(8), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8), has been modified as 
follows: 
[The prohibition that a BHC shall not acquire a company which is not a bank 
shall not apply to] 
(8) shares of any company the activities of which the Board after due 
notice and opportunity for hearing has determined (by order of regula-
tion) to be so closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks 
as to be a proper incident thereto, but for purposes of this subsection it is 
not closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks for a 
bank holding company to provide insurance as a principal, agent, or bro-
ker except .... 
There follow seven exemptions to this general prohibition. Exemption A permits 
BHCs to act as underwriters, agents or brokers with respect to credit life, disabil-
ity and involuntary unemployment insurance if the insurance is limited to paying 
off loan balances in case of the borrower's death, disability or involuntary unem-
ployment. Exemption B permits finance company subsidiaries of BHCs to sell 
(not underwrite) property insurance on loan collateral on loans of $10,000 or less 
(as adjusted annually by the Consumer Price Index). Exemption C permits 
BHCs and their nonbank subsidiaries to engage in general insurance agency ac-
tivities in towns of 5,000 or less population. Exemptions D and G are grandfather-
ing provisions. Exemption E authorizes BHCs to supervise retail insurance 
agents who sell insurance to the BHC or its subsidiaries. Exemption F permits 
small BHCs (assets of $50 million or less) to engage in any insurance agency activ-
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that the guarantee insurance offered by AMBAC was not insurance 
but the functional equivalent to providing standby letters of credit.284 
The court made short shrift of the AlA's argument that the proposed 
activity violated the BCHA by saying that it was unnecessary to ad-
dress this contention. The court noted that under section 4(c)(5) and 
the Board's own regulation a BHC bank subsidiary may own any oper-
ating subsidiary whose activities are deemed permissible under the 
National Bank Act by the Comptroller. The court further stated 
that the Board will defer to the Comptroller's judgment,285 in effect 
holding that the BHCA does not apply and the Board had no jurisdic-
tion in the matter. 
In American Insurance Association v. Clarke,286 in which the AIA 
appealed the decision, the D.C. Circuit Court in effect overturned the 
Comptroller and the district court. The court did agree with the OCC 
that the guarantee insurance was analogous to standby letters of credit 
and, as such, permissible under the National Bank Act. However, it 
noted that the OCC's 1985 decision that Board approval is unnecessary 
because the BHCA covers only the nonbank subsidiaries of the BHCs 
and not their banking subsidiaries, was incorrect. The BHCA does 
limit the activities of a BHC bank subsidiary's subsidiary. Section 
1843(a)(1)2S7 bars a BHC from acquiring "direct or indirect ownership 
or control of any voting shares of any company which is not a bank," 
unless an exception applies.2ss 
The court concluded that ultimate control of AMBAC by Citicorp, 
a BHC, triggered the section 4(c)(8) prohibition of a BHC engaging 
directly or indirectly through a subsidiary's subsidiary, here Citibank, 
in insurance activities. The decision that standby credits were not in-
surance activities was not a judgment that the Comptroller was to 
make, but was to be left to the Board. Finally, the court held that that 
district court's reliance on section 1843(c)(5)289 in its conclusion that 
the BHCA does not apply to any OCC approved investments by a na-
tional bank was also misplaced. Section 24 applies only to securities 
held for investment, but not to shares of an operating subsidiary such 
as AMBAC, which is neither a security nor an investment as contem-
ity, provided that sales of life insurance and annuities is limited to activities per-
mitted under exemptions A, B or C. 
284. American Ins. Ass'n v. Clarke, 656 F. Supp. 404 (D.D.C. 1987), qff'd on reh ~. 865 
F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
285. Id. at 413-14 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(5)(1982) and 12 C.F.R. 
§ 225.22(d)(1)(1985)). 
286. 854 F.2d 1405 (D.C. Cir. 1988), vacated in part, 865 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
287. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(1)(1982). 
288. 854 F.2d 1405, 1411 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
289. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(5)(1988). This section provides that national banks and their 
subsidiaries may only own stock explicitly authorized by statute for investment 
by national banks under the provisions of 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1988). 
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plated in section 24. To summarize, the D.C. Circuit held that Ci-
tibank must obtain Board approval before issuing "standby credits" 
(i.e., municipal bond insurance) through AMBAC, even though the 
OCC granted it permission to do so. This decision caused great con-
cern to the Comptroller and the banking industry as it was viewed as a 
shift of jurisdiction from the deregulation oriented OCC to the more 
conservative Board. This motivated the Justice Department, OCC, 
and Citibank, to petition the court to reconsider whether it had been 
appropriate for the court to consider the OCC's interpretation of the 
BHCA and whether the acquisition of an insurance subsidiary by a 
national bank subsidiary of a bank holding company required prior 
approval by the Board. The court granted a rehearing on October 24, 
1988. On January 6, 1989, the court vacated the portion of its decision 
relating to the BHCA issue, holding that, because the Board and not 
the OCC had exclusive jurisdiction in interpreting the BHCA the 
court would not review the OCC's interpretation.2so 
The Justice Department took the position that the Board does not 
have jurisdiction over the operating subsidiaries of holding company 
banks and refused to permit the Board to file its own brief in the re-
hearing.291 The Board, on November 21, 1988, decided to issue for 
comment proposed amendments to Regulation Y292 that would re-
scind its existing regulation293 which permits BHCs to acquire, with-
out the Board's approval, through their subsidiary state banks, 
companies engaged in activities that the bank is permitted to conduct 
under state law (the so called "South Dakota loophole").294 If the ex-
isting rule were rescinded, BHCs would be required to obtain approval 
under section 4(c)(8) prior to acquiring or creating an operating sub-
sidiary through a state bank. Until the AMBAC matter is resolved (at 
the date of this writing it still is in limbo) the Board will probably not 
extend its rulemaking proposal to national bank operating subsidiar-
ies. To understand the meaning of the issues involved as well as their 
implications, it is necessary to review two additional matters involving 
insurance, the "South Dakota loophole" and the Merchants National 
case. 
290. American Ins. Ass'n v. Clarke, 865 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The court did not 
say that Citibank cannot continue ownership of AMBAC and, therefore Citibank, 
at the time of this writing, is continuing with this activity. 
291. The Justice Department represents federal agencies in litigation and has the 
power to prevent individual agency self-representation. 
292. 53 Fed. Reg. 48915 (December 5, 1988). 
293. 12 C.F.R. § 225.22(d)(2)(ii)(1988). This rule is referred to as the "operating sub-
sidiary" rule. 
294. This rulemaking is not directed at the operating subsidiary rule at issue in 
AMBAC (where BHC ownership of the operating subsidiary was through a na-
tional bank) but it does address the same legal issues. The national bank operat-
ing subsidiary rule is found in 12 C.F.R. § 225.22(d)(1)(1992). 
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Late in 1982 when the Garn-St Germain Act was passed, the insur-
ance industry had cause for celebration: it hoped that Congress had 
finally passed a law that would separate banking and insurance once 
and for all, and thus thwart Citicorp's (and other banks') longstanding 
desire to enter the insurance business. Citicorp, however, began lob-
bying several states to allow state banks to engage in insurance activi-
ties. By March 2, 1983, the South Dakota legislature took the bait and 
passed a law allowing state banks and their subsidiaries to engage in 
"all facets of the insurance industry."295 At the same time, legislation 
was passed to permit out of state BHCs to acquire South Dakota 
banks.296 Thus the insurers' celebration did not last long. In April of 
1983, Citicorp filed an application with the Board to obtain permission 
to acquire American State Bank of Rapid City, a South Dakota state 
bank, and thus to enter into any insurance activity nationwide.291 Cit-
icorp's application was filed under section 3 of the BHCA (which gov-
erns the acquisition of banks)29S in an attempt to avoid the prohibition 
of section 4 which governs the acquisition of nonbanks.299 Citicorp re-
lied on section 4(a)(2),300 section 225.4(e) of Regulation yso1 and two 
295. S.D. CODIFIED LAws .ANN. § 51-18-30 (Supp. 1983). 
296. S.D. CoDIFIED LAws .ANN. § 51-16-40 to -42 (Supp. 1983). 
297. Soon thereafter, BankAmerica Corp., First Interstate Bancorp and Security Pa-
cific Corp announced plans to buy state banks in South Dakota for the purpose of 
entering the insurance business. Note, Paving the Way in the Financial Services 
Industry: South Dakota Opens the Insurance Industry to Banks, 29 S.D.L. REv. 
172, n.36 (1983). They all f'lled applications with the Board, but later withdrew 
them (including Citicorp) when the Board issued a statement in January 1984 
which concluded with the following paragraph: 
Taking account of the important and fundamental legal and policy 
issues raised by these applications, and their pending consideration 
before the Congress, the Board reached the tentative judgment that it 
could not approve the proposed bank acquisitions in view of present law 
and expressions of Congressional intent, subject to any further consider-
ation by the Congress. However, the Board has, in the past, taken the 
position that the processing of an application may be suspended where 
the issues raised are the subject of pending litigation, legislation or 
rulemaking. Accordingly, the Board staff has informed the Applicants 
of the Board's views on these matters and the Applicants have requested 
the Board to suspend the processing of their applications. Similarly, be-
cause of the pending legislation, the Board decided to defer further ac-
tion on the rulemaking now in progress on section 225.4(e) of Regulation 
Y, which permits subsidiaries of state banks that are owned by bank 
holding companies to acquire or form an operating subsidiary to engage 
in any activity that the Bank itself may engage in directly. 
Board Statement on Applications to Acquire State-Chartered Banks in South Da-
kota, January 5, 1984, (1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 11 
99,820. Citicorp requested the Board to reactivate its application in February 
1985. 
298. 12 u.s.c. § 1842 (1988). 
299. 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1988). See also text accompanying notes 238-240. 
300. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2)(1988). 
301. Now 12 C.F.R. § 225.22(d)(2)(1988). 
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old Board orders.ao2 Citicorp argued that the language of section 
4(a)(2) covers only the BHC itself and its nonbanking subsidiaries, but 
does not relate to its banking subsidiaries.aoa Under section 225.4(e) 
the Board declared in 1971 that 
So far as federal law is concerned, a state chartered bank or a subsidiary 
thereof may . . . acquire or retain all . . . of the shares of a company that 
engages solely in activities in which the parent bank may engage, at locations 
in which the bank may engage in the activity, and subject to the same limita-
tions as if the bank were engaging in the activity directly.304 
Citicorp contended that this language clearly exempted state banks 
owned by BHCs from the constraints of the "closely related to bank-
ing" standards of section 4(c)(8);aos the scope of their nonbanking ac-
tivities being subject only to the limitations of state law. In relation to 
the Piedmont and American Bancorp orders,aos Citicorp maintained 
that the Board had held that BHC insurance activities through state 
bank subsidiaries are consistent with the BHCA. These cases involved 
applications under section 3 for the formation of new BHCs by the 
existing banks, and under section 4 for the acquisition by the new 
BHCs of several finance companies. The existing banks were already 
engaged through subsidiaries in general insurance agency activities 
permitted by state law. Pursuant to section 4(c)(5) of the BHCA and 
section 225.4(e) of Regulation Y, the Board approved the applications 
and stated that Board approval was not required.a07 
The Board nevertheless denied Citicorp's application without spe-
cifically addressing Citicorp's contentions.aos The Board approached 
the matter from a wholly different point of view; it concluded that the 
proposed acquisition was an attempted evasion of the requirements of 
section 4.309 It analyzed the South Dakota statute as follows: 
South Dakota law specifically provides that an out-of-state bank holding 
302. Piedmont Carolina Fin. Servs., Inc., 59 Fed. Res. Bull. 766 (1973); American 
Bancorp, Inc., 39 Fed. Reg. 22,468 (1974). 
303. The language referred to is as follows: "No bank holding company shall ... retain 
direct or indirect ownership or control ... of any company which is not a bank or 
bank holding company or engage in any activities other than ... banking or of 
managing or controlling banks ... and ... those [activities] permitted under [Sec-
tion 4(c)(8)]." 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2)(1982)(emphasis added). 
304. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(e)(1983). In 1984 the Board replaced this provision with 
§ 225.22(d)(2), supra note 301, in which there was added the italicized phrase: "A 
state chartered bank or its subsidiary may, insofar as federal law is concerned 
and without the Board's prior approval ... acquire or retain all ... of the securi-
ties of a company." 12 C.F.R. § 225.22(d)(2)(1988)(emphasis added). This addi-
tional language seems to strengthen the argument set forth by Citicorp. 
305. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)(1988). 
306. See supra note 302. 
307. Piedmont Fin. Servs., Inc., 59 Fed. Res. Bull. 766, 768 (1973). 
308. Citicorp, 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 789 (1985). 
309. Thus leaving the South Dakota loophole issue still an open question. In fact the 
Fed specifically refused to decide that point: 
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company may acquire a single existing state chartered bank in South Dakota. 
S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 51~16-40(b)(1984). South Dakota law also permits 
all banks chartered under the laws of South Dakota to engage, either directly 
or through subsidiaries, in all facets of the insurance business. S.D. CODIFIED 
LAws ANN. § 51~18-30 (1984). Under South Dakota law, however, a South Da~ 
kota bank acquired by an out~f~state bank holding company is prohibited 
from expanding or acquiring new banking offices or remote service units by 
merger, acquisition or de novo and is required to conduct its insurance activi~ 
ties in South Dakota in a manner and at a location that is not likely to attract 
customers from the general public in South Dakota to the substantial detri~ 
ment of existing insurance companies, brokers and agents in the state. S.D. 
CODIFIED LAws ANN.§ 51~16-41 (1984). In addition, a de novo South Dakota 
bank acquired by an out~f-state bank holding company is limited to operating 
a single banking office in South Dakota and is required to conduct its banking 
business in South Dakota at a location and in a manner so that it is not likely 
to attract customers from the general public in South Dakota to the substan~ 
tial detriment of existing banks in the state. Id. South Dakota banks owned 
by South Dakota bank holding companies are not subject to the same limi~ 
tions or restrictions as apply to state banks owned by out-of-state bank holding 
companies, and may, for example, establish branches statewide.310 
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The Board concluded that the primary, if not sole, purpose of the pro-
posed acquisition is to enable Citicorp to engage in nationwide insur-
ance activities prohibited under section 4. It further found that the 
acquisition of the South Dakota bank would amount to the acquisition 
of a nonbank and an attempt to bypass the strictures of section 4(c)(8) 
because the acquired "bank" would be predominantly an insurance 
agency engaged in little, if any, banking business. The Board noted 
that it is authorized under section 5(b )311 to deny applications that 
manifest an evasion of the purposes of the BHCA, even if the proposal 
technically meets the letter of the law.a12 This decision raised fears in 
In light of this conclusion, the Board finds it necessary to make a 
determination regarding Protestants' contention that the nonbanking 
and insurance provisions of the Act apply to holding company banks. 
The Board has, however, previously determined that the nonbanking 
provisions of the Act apply to acquisitions by holding company banks of 
voting shares of a company. 12 C.F.R. 225.101. The Board has adopted a 
regulatory exemption from this prohibition, found in section 225.22(d)(2) 
of Regulation Y, for acquisitions by holding company state banks of all of 
the voting shares of a nonbanking company engaged only in activities 
that the bank may conduct directly. This exemption was adopted in or~ 
der to promote competitive equity between holding company banks and 
independent banks in the absence of evidence of use by bank holding 
companies of holding company banks to evade the nonbanking provi~ 
sions of the Act. Because Citicorp proposes to utilize Bank to evade the 
nonbanking provisions of the Act, the Board concludes that the proposal 
is not consistent with regulation. 
Citicorp, 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 789, 791, n.6. The Board is now in the process of 
resolving the matter through the rulemaking process. See supra text accompany~ 
ing notes 291~294. 
310. Citicorp, 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 789 (1985)(emphasis added). 
311. 12 u.s.c. § 1844(b)(1980). 
312. Citicorp, 71 Fed. Res. Bull 789, 790, n.3. Although the Board did not stress Cit~ 
icorp's § 225.4(e) argument, in its rulemaking notice for amending 
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the insurance industry that, absent an evasionary motive, the Board 
would approve BHC applications of the South Dakota-type loophole. 
The decision motivated Congress to hold hearings on the matter.a1a 
The main issue was whether the insurance prohibition provision of 
section 4(c)(8) of the BHCA314 should be applied to bank subsidiaries 
of BHCs. Under the present wording of that section and section 
4(c)(5) the Board has held that it only applies to the BHCs themselves 
and their nonbank subsidiaries.a1s Unfortunately, Congress did not 
follow through and act on this matter316 and the fears of the insurance 
industry were realized when the Board made its decision in the 
Merchants National Corporation case.317 
In 1986 the Board approved applications by Merchants, a BHC, to 
acquire two Indiana state banks, Anderson Bank and Mid State 
Bank.a1s Both banks had been engaged in selling insurance of all 
kinds, except life insurance, as authorized by Indiana law.a19 The 
Board approval included permission to continue the insurance busi-
ness, directly by the banks themselves and not through subsidiaries of 
the banks, reiterating the Board view that section 4(c)(8) does not ap-
ply to subsidiary banks of BHCs. The response of the insurance indus-
§ 225.22(d)(2)(the successor provision), see supra text accompanying notes 292-
294, the Board, in its introductory remarks stated: 
In adopting these rules in 1971, the Board noted that it did so based 
upon notions of competitive banks and in the absence of evidence that 
acquisitions by holding company banks were resulting in evasions of the 
Act. 36 Fed. Reg. 9292 (1971) .... The Board, however, recognized that 
over time these rules could become the focus for evasion of section 
4(c)(8) of the Act and cautioned that it would review the merits of its 
decision not to apply the Act to these subsidiaries from time to time 
based upon its experience in administering the Act. 
At year-end 1971, bank holding companies controlled 2,420 banks, or 
approximately 18 percent of the total banks in the United States. These 
banks held approximately 57 percent of the total assets in commercial 
banks in the country. By year-end 1987, bank holding companies con-
trolled 9,316 banks with 92 percent of assets in commercial banks. 
Citicorp, 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 789, n.3 (emphasis added). Thus it appears that the 
Board has in fact, sub silentio, applied the above quoted caveat in the Citicorp 
case, and therefore did not need to address the Piedmont and American Bancorp 
contentions, nor the other contentions of Citicorp. Piedmont Fin. Servs., Inc., 59 
Fed. Res. Bull. 766 (1973); American Bancorp, Inc. 39 Fed. Reg. 22, 468 (1974). 
313. The South Dakota Loophole: Hearing Before the Subcomm on Financial Institu-
tions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm on Banking, 
Finance and Urban .Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). 
314. See supra note 283. 
315. 12 C.F.R. § 225.22(d)(1988). 
316. Since 1982, Congress has repeatedly considered legislation that would restrict in-
surance activities of banks, but has not done so, notwithstanding numerous and 
extensive hearings on the subject. 
317. 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 876 (1987). 
318. 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 838 (1986). 
319. IND. CODE ANN. § 28-1-11-2 (Burns 1986). 
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try was immediate and vehement. A large number of trade groups 
protested the Board's order on the grounds that it violated section 4 of 
the BHCA. Merchants did not want to get involved in long litigation 
and, therefore, made a commitment that it would cause the two banks 
to divest themselves of their insurance agency activities within two 
years unless, within that time, the Board approved the banks to retain 
their insurance activities. During this period, Merchants agreed to sell 
only renewal policies. Subsequently, Merchants requested the Board 
to release it from its commitment on grounds not relevant to this dis-
cussion. The Board granted the release on the grounds that the insur-
ance prohibitions of section 4 of the BHCA do not in any way limit the 
direct activities of subsidiary banks of BHCs, except where the record 
demonstrates that the type of evasion described in the Citicorp/South 
Dakota case is present.a2o In the instant case, the Board concluded 
that: 
the record does not show that the banks would be operated by Merchants 
predominantly as insurance agencies or that the acquisition of the banks is a 
device to enable the applicant to engage in insurance activities. Rather, the 
record shows that the insurance activities of the banks are incidental and 
small relative to their banking operations.321 
Thus, the Board apparently legitimized the South Dakota loophole. 
The Board went further; even though the Merchants case did not in-
volve nonbank subsidiaries of state banks in a BHC system, the Board 
used this case as a vehicle to clarify its view as to applicability of sec-
tion 4 of the BHCA including the Garn-St Germain amendment. The 
Board stated that it draws a distinction between direct activities and 
those conducted through a subsidiary of a bank. As to the latter, the 
restrictions of section 4 of the BHCA do apply.a22 Thus, if the 
Merchants order is permitted to stand, bank holding companies will be 
free to enter the insurance business through the acquisition of state 
chartered banks provided that all insurance activities not expressly 
permitted by section 4(c)(8) are conducted directly by the state bank 
and not through a subsidiary. 
The insurance industry was very upset, especially since this prece-
dent could be expanded to permit BHC bank subsidiaries not only to 
sell insurance but also to underwrite insurance and engage in any non-
banking activity authorized by the particular state. The Independent 
Insurance Agents of America (IIAA) immediately filed a motion to 
stay the Board's order pending judicial review in the Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit. The suit was grounded on several substantive 
320. Merchants Nat'l Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 876, 878 (1987). The Board also noted 
that the insurance prohibitions of the Garn-St Germain Act do not apply. "Thus, 
the provisions of the Garn-St Germain Act have no applicability where the non-
banking provisions of -section 4 of the Act do not apply." Id. at 878 n.7 (1987). 
321. 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 876, 878 n.9 (1987). 
322. Id. at 888. 
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issues and on the CEBA323 moratorium324 which bars the Board from 
issuing orders of the type issued here.325 The Second Circuit vacated 
the Board's order,326 holding that it fell within the CEBA moratorium 
provisions but did not address the substantive issues involved.327 Af-
ter the expiration of the moratorium, Merchants requested that the 
Board reissue the order. On March 3, 1989 the Board granted the re-
lief prayed for,a2s reiterating its view that section 4 of the BHCA does 
not regulate the direct activities of bank subsidiaries of BHCs.329 The 
323. Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (1987)(codified as amended at scattered sections 
of 12 U.S.C.). 
324. Id. at§ 201(b)(4). 
The provision reads as follows: 
[The Board] may not approve the acquisition of a bank holding company 
... of ... a State chartered bank, unless the bank holding company, ... , 
has agreed to limit the insurance activities in the United States of the 
company to be acquired to those permissible under section 4(c)(8) .... 
12 u.s.c. § 1841 (1988). 
325. The Fed in its order stated that the moratorium provision did not apply in 
Merchants because "[t]he Board's decision to grant relief from the commitments, 
... , does not constitute the authorization of any activity under the BHC Act." 73 
Fed. Res. Bull. 876, 893 (1987)(emphasis added). In other words, the Fed felt that 
the relief granted "would not increase the banks' insurance powers since the 
banks already had the powers by virtue of state law and those powers were not 
and never had been limited by the BHC Act." Merchants National Corp., 75 Fed. 
Res. Bull. 388, at 389 (1989). 
326. Independent Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 838 F.2d 
627 (2d Cir. 1988). 
327. We have no authority to predict that the Board, now advised that the 
moratorium applies to the approval of Merchants National's application, 
will choose to reissue its order with an effective date of March 1, 1988. 
The proper course is to vacate the order and permit the Board to proceed 
as it sees fit in a manner consistent with our decision and applicable law. 
In view of our disposition, it is both unnecessary and inappropriate 
for us to review that portion of the Board~ order that concerns the scope 
of the nonbanking prohibitions of section 4 of the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act. 
The petition for review is granted, and the order of the Board is 
vacated. 
Id. at 635 (emphasis added). 
328. Merchants Nat'l Corp., 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 388 (1989). 
329. The Board carefully analyzed §§ 1843(a)(1) and (a)(2)(12 U.S.C. 
§ 1843(a)(1982)(see supra note 303), and concluded that: 
By its terms, this restriction in section 4 does not apply to shares of a 
company that is itself a bank. Thus, a bank holding company that con-
trols an institution that qualifies as a "bank" under the definition in the 
Act is not required, in order to acquire or retain the shares of the institu-
tion, to limit the institution's activities to those permitted under the 
closely related to banking standard of section 4 (or one of the other lim-
ited exceptions in the Act), except where the record demonstrates an 
evasion of the Act, such as presented in the Citicorp (South Dakota) 
case. It is only companies that do not qualify as ''banks" under the Act 
that must limit their nonbanking activities to those permitted under the 
closely related to banking standard in section 4(c)(8) of the Act (or qual-
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IIAA immediately appealed to the Second Circuit,330 which handed 
down a shattering decision in November of 1989. Unless the Supreme 
Court reverses or Congress takes some action to limit the effect of the 
holding, the Second Circuit's decision may have an enormous impact 
on financial institutions. 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit analyzed sections 3 
and 4 of the BHCA.331 It found that section 3 sets forth factors gov-
erning Board approval of bank acquisitions by BHCs. Section 4 sets 
forth two sets of prohibitions, characterized as the "ownership clause" 
and the "activities clause." The former provides that a BHC may not 
<~retain direct or indirect ownership or control of any voting shares of 
any company which is not a bank or bank holding company."332 The 
latter forbids a BHC to "engage in any actiVities other than (A) those 
of banking or managing or controlling banks ... and (B) those permit-
ted under [section 4(c)(8) of the Act] .... "333 Section 4(c)(8)334 sets 
forth the "closely related to banking" exception to the nonbanking 
provision.335 
The court then reviewed the Board's decision which held that the 
provisions of section 4 limiting the nonbanking activities of the BHCs 
do not apply to bank subsidiaries of a BHC. The Board held that the 
limitations of section 4(a)(2)336 apply in express terms only to BHCs, 
not to banks. Furthermore, the "ownership clause" of section 4 re-
stricts the entities a BHC may acquire or retain while the "activities 
clause" restricts the activities the BHC itself may engage in. If the 
restriction on activities were to apply to subsidiaries of the BHC, the 
Board determined, the restriction on acquisition of nonbank entities 
would be superfluous. The inclusion of the phrase "direct or indirect" 
in the "ownership clause" and its omission in the "activities clause" 
further compelled the Board's decision that the restrictions of section 
4 do not apply to BHC subsidiaries. Finally, relying on section 
2(g)(1)337 of the BCHA, the Board held that the insulation of bank 
subsidiaries of BHCs from section 4 limitations does not apply to the 
banks' own subsidiaries. Section 2(g)(l) provides that stock of such 
third generation entities are deemed to be held indirectly by the BHC 
ify under some other exception in section 4) in order to be acquired or 
retained directly or indirectly by a bank holding company. 
Merchants Nat'l Corp., 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 388, 391 (1989)(footnote omitted). 
330. Independent Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 890 F.2d 
1275 (2d Cir. 1989). 
331. 12 u.s.c. §§ 1842, 1843 (1988). 
332. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2)(1988). 
333. Id. 
334. Id. at § 1843(c)(8). 
335. See supra note 283 for the wording of this provision. 
336. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2)(1988). 
337. 12 u.s.c. § 1841(g)(1)(1988). 
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and, therefore, in the Board's view, the question of the ownership of 
such entities and the scope of activities of such entities are governed 
by section 4. The Board further noted that the legislative history of 
the BHCA and its amendments shows Congress's purpose to maintain 
the power of state and national chartering authorities to determine 
the scope of permissible activities of a BHC's bank subsidiaries regard-
less of whether the BHC is subject to the jurisdiction of the Board.33S 
The court initially noted that the BHCA did not speak precisely to 
the question at hand: 
We find no provision that says, in substance, 'The Board may not regulate the 
activities of bank subsidiaries of bank holding companies' or 'Bank subsidiar-
ies of bank holding companies may engage in nonbank activities to the extent 
permitted by their chartering authorities.' The Board reads the Act as if it 
contained such language. On the other hand we find no provision that says, in 
substance, 'Bank subsidiaries of bank holding companies may not engage in 
nonbank activities.' The IIAA reads the Act as if it contained this wording. 
The question for us is whether the Board's interpretation of the language that 
does appear in the Act is reasonable .... 339 
Although the court found some of the Board's arguments fallacious, it 
found somewhat more persuasive textual arguments arising from 
comparisons of the "activities clause" with certain other provisions of 
section 4(a)(2). The grandfather clause of section 4(a)(2) permits a 
BHC to conduct those activities "in which directly or through a subsid-
iary" it was engaged in at the designated times and conditions. No 
similar clause modifies the "activities clause." Additionally the "own-
ership clause" prohibits retention of "direct or indirect" ownership of 
nonbanks, but no such phrase modifies the "activities clause." The 
court found stronger support for the Board's interpretation in the 
structure of the Act. The Board argued that if the "activities clause" 
did apply to subsidiaries of a BHC, then the "ownership clause" would 
be superfluous, since under that reading, the "activities clause" alone 
would preclude a BHC from owning a nonbank. The court agreed 
with this view, but found perplexing the Board's contention that it had 
no authority to regulate bank subsidiaries of BHCs in their nonbank 
activities but did have the authority to regulate the subsidiaries of the 
bank subsidiary. It found the IIAA's interpretation of the BHCA 
more consistent. 
The IIAA pointed out that the section 4(c)(8) exemptions including 
those of the "activities clause," use the term "company" to describe 
338. The view of the Board as to the congressional intent in the BHCA in respect to 
limitations on permissible activities of subsidiary banks of BHCs is again a mani-
festation of the traditional national concern of balancing of federal and state au-
thority over banking. See supra note 78. See also supra text accompanying notes 
11-28. 
339. Independent Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve Sys., 890 F.2d 
1275, 1281 (2d Cir. 1989). 
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those entities. "Company" is defined in section 2(b)340 to include a 
bank. Further, section 4(c)(8) requires of the Board, in determining 
whether a particular activity is a "proper incident to banking", to as-
sess whether the performance of that activity ''by an affiliate of a 
holding company" will produce public benefits. Section 2(b)341 defines 
"affiliate" to include "company", and thus a bank. Therefore, the 
IIAA argued, subsidiary banks should be subject to the "activities 
clause" because they are within the class exempted from that clause 
by section 4(c)(8). The IIAA maintained that, it is more logical to hold 
that the Board has regulatory power over the nonbanking activities of 
all three tiers (the BHC, the bank subsidiary of the BHC and the 
bank's subsidiary) rather than permit the generation-skipping effect, 
which would result from the Board's interpretation.342 
Although the court seemed to indicate that the IIAA had espoused 
a more justifiable position, it ultimately held for the Board. The court 
seemed to ignore the force of the IIAA's contentions regarding section 
4(c)(8) and relied on legislative history to reach its conclusion: 
Plainly, as the ownership clause commands, Congress did not want bank hold-
ing companies to own nonbanks. The legislative history, however, is remarka-
bly free of clear statements indicating disapproval of nonbanking activities 
engaged in directly by bank subsidiaries. If such were the intent of Congress, 
one would expect to find a clear statement of such purpose in the key House 
and Senate reports. Finally, during the hearings the attention of Congress 
was specifically called to the range of activities that state chartering authori-
ties were permitting for bank subsidiaries of bank holding companies, ... , and 
some Congressmen expressed the view that the holding company still would 
not modify the state regulatory authority .•.. 343 
In connection with the 1970 amendments to the Act, the court quoted 
the following portion of the Banking Committee report: 
It should be emphasized that these two prohibitions [insurance activities and 
sale of mutual funds] apply only to the bank holding company and its non-
banking subsidiaries and not to the bank subsidiaries of bank holding compa-
nies whose insurance agency and mutual fund operations are governed by 
other Federal and State laws. This is in keeping with the original concept of 
the 1956 act, which was to regulate bank holding companies and not subsidi-
ary banks. [Emphasis added]344 
The IIAA's petition for certiorari was denied.345 
340. 12 u.s.c. § 1841(b)(l988). 
341. Id. at § 1841(k) 
342. The IIAA points out that under the Board's interpretation the prohibition of the 
"ownership clause" can be avoided by merging the "grandchild" into the bank 
subsidiary and then conducting the nonbank activities itself. 
343. Control and Regulation of Bank Holding Companies: Hearings on H.R. 2674 
Before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 536, 553 
(1955). 
344. H.R. REP. No. 387, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1969)(emphasis added). The bill on 
which the quoted portion of the report was made did not pass. 
345. Independent Ins. Agent of America v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve 
Sys., 111 S.Ct. 44 (1990). 
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To summarize the present situation it may be stated that the posi-
tion of banks with respect to insurance is in a state of obfuscated 
limbo. The Board's interpretation of section 4 of the BHCA supports 
the view that direct activities of bank subsidiaries of BHCs are not 
regulated by the nonbank activities regulatory provisions of the 
BHCA, and, therefore, such bank subsidiaries may engage in such ac-
tivities to the extent permitted by the applicable state laws or the N a-
tiona! Bank Act. The Second Circuit agreed with this view. 
Nonbank subsidiaries of state banks in a BHC system are consid-
ered by the Board to be under its jurisdiction, but under its present 
regulation they are subject to the liberal "operating subsidiary" 
rule,346 now under review by the Board.347 For nonbank subsidiaries 
of national banks in a BHC system the "operating subsidiary" rule348 
seems to give all jurisdiction to the Comptroller. Clark,349 however, 
draws this matter into question and the Board does not seem to wish 
to clear it up.35o It appears that the Board, the Comptroller and the 
courts are all waiting for Congress to stabilize the matter legislatively. 
C. Congressional Activity and Lack Thereof 
Since the early 1980s Congress has sought solutions to the 
problems raised by the new financial environment.351 Extensive hear-
ings have been held352 and many bills have been introduced, but virtu-
346. See supra text accompanying note 294. 
347. See supra text accompanying note 293. 
348. 12 C.F.R. § 225.22 (d)(1)(1992). 
349. American Ins. Ass'n v. Clarke, 854 F.2d 1405 (D.C. Cir. 1988) vacated in part 865 
F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
350. See supra text following note 294. On the other hand, the banking industry con-
tends that not only are subsidiary banks of a holding company free from section 4 
BHCA regulation (as per the Fed) but that their nonbanking subsidiaries are 
likewise so. The insurance industry argues that all subsidiaries of BHCs are sub-
ject to section 4 of the Act. The courts are divided. 
351. See supra part V. A. 
352. A sampling (chronologically listed) is as follows: 
Bank Holding Company Legislation and Related Issues: Hearings Before 
the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, and Insurance of 
the House Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1980); Competition and Conditions in the Financial System: 
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Af-
fairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); Financial Institutions Restructuring 
and Services Act of 1981: Hearings on S.1720 Before the Senate Comm. on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); Fi-
nancial Institutions Restructuring and Services Act: Hearings on S.1686, 
S.1703, S.1720, and S.1721 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous-
ing, and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1981); Depository Institu-
tions Amendments of 1982: Hearings on S.2879 Before the Subcomm. on 
Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the 
House Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1982); Competition in Financial Services: Hearing on H.R. 3537 
Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Transportation and Tourism of the 
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ally no remedial legislation has emerged from this feverish activity. 
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); Fi-
nancial Services Industry: Oversight: Hearings Before the Senate 
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1983); Competitive Equity in the Financial Services Industry: Hearings 
on S.2181 and S.2134 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and 
Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1984); Financial Restructuring: The 
Road Ahead: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, 
Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and 
Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); How the Financial System can 
Best Be Shaped to Meet the Needs of the American People: Hearings 
Before the House Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 98th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); The South Dakota Loophole: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insur-
ance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 99th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); Bush Task Group Report on Regulation of Finan-
cial Services: Blue Print for Reform: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the 
House Comm. on Government Operations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); 
Comprehensive Reform in the Financial Services Industry: Hearings 
Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 99th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); Structure and Regulation of Financial Firms and 
Holding Companies: Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. 
on Government Operations, 99th- Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); Structure and 
Regulation of Financial Firms and Holding Companies: Hearings 
Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Government Operations, 99th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); Financial Condition of Federally Insured Deposi-
tory Institutions: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous-
ing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); The Financial 
Modernization Act of 1987 and the Financial Services Oversight Act: 
Hearings on S.1886 and S.1891 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); Reform of the 
Nation~ Banking and Financial Systems: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance 
of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 100th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); The Structure of the Financial Services Industry: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of 
the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1987); Modernization of the Glass-Steagall Act: Hearings Before the Sen-
ate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1987); New Securities Powers for Bank Holding Companies: Hear-
ings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, and Housing, and Urban ./if-
fairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); Implications of New Technology for 
Banking Regulation: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban .Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); Role of Finan-
cial Institutions: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunica-
tions and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1987); Changes in Our Financial System: Globalization 
of Capital Markets and Securitization of Credit: Hearings Before the 
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1987); Legislative Proposals to Restructure our Financial System: 
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban ./if-
fairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); Financial Restructuring Proposals: 
Hearings on H.R. 3063 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, 
and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); Interrelationships of 
the Banking and Insurance Industries: Hearing Before the Senate 
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1987); Reform of the Nation~ Banking and Financial Systems: Hear-
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For example, a bill proposed by Senator Garn353 in 1981 would have 
permitted increased flexibility in lending transactions between a bank 
and its affiliates, allow all depository institutions to sponsor and sell 
shares in mutual funds, restrict bank holding company insurance ac-
tivities and authorize commercial banks to underwrite municipal rev-
enue bonds. It would have broadened the powers of savings and loan 
associations allowing them to offer checking accounts, make commer-
cial loans and invest in nonresidential real estate and corporate debt 
instruments.354 However, the thrust of S.1720 was directed toward fa-
cilitating, under extraordinary circumstances, interstate and cross 
country mergers and acquisitions of troubled S & Ls.355 The Regula-
tors' Bill,356 another 1981 bill that focused the ailing thrift industry, 
offered only short-term relief as distinguished from the long-term out-
look of S.1720.357 However, the Senate Banking Committee submitted 
an alternative bill, the Deposit Insurance Flexibility Act358 which also 
offered solutions to the endangered thrift institutions but with a 
broader panoply than the Regulators' Bill. 
Having witnessed the failure of these proposed bills, Senator Gam 
introduced a new bill, the Depository Institutions Amendments of 
1982.359 The bill would have amended Glass-Steagall to permit banks 
to establish "bank securities affiliates," which could underwrite and 
deal in municipal revenue bonds and also organize, sponsor, under-
write and distribute shares of mutual funds. However, the Senate 
Banking Committee amended the bill and substituted it for the House-
passed H.R.6267, which then required a joint conference committee to 
resolve the differences between the two bills. The result was the 
Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982.360 
This was a massive piece of legislation focused mainly on relieving 
the growing crisis in the thrift industry.361 A number of provisions 
ings Before the House Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban .Affairs, 
100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); Financial Modernization Act of 1988: Hear-
ings on S.1886 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Ur-
ban .Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988). 
353. The Financial Institutions Restructuring and Services Act of 1981, 8.1720, 97th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). 
354. The very items that eventually became permitted activities of S & Ls and brought 
about the calamitous disaster in that industry. 
355. It was already obvious at the beginning of the 1980s that disaster would hit the S 
& L industry, yet Congress waited to the end of the decade to come to the rescue, 
at a projected cost to the taxpayer of $300 billion. 
356. H.R. 4603, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). 
357. See supra note 353. 
358. 8.2532, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., (1982). Other bail-out bills were the Capital Assist-
ance Act of 1982,8.2531, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) and the Net Worth Guarantee 
Act, H.R.6267, 97th Cong., 2d Sess (1982). 
359. 8.2879, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). 
360. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat.1469 (1982)(codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
361. The problem of the thrift industry did not develop overnight; Congress had con-
1992] BANKING AND INSURANCE 801 
did, however, deal with the problems of insurance and banking. Title 
VI of the Act362 restricted BHCs from engaging in insurance activities 
except certain specific enumerated types.363 
In 1983 the Isaac Bill, sponsored by the FDIC, was introduced in 
the House and Senate.364 This bill not only failed to address restruc-
turing the financial services industry, but reinforced then existing 
laws and eliminated the loopholes created by the courts and regula-
tory agencies.365 In contrast to the Isaac Bill, Senator Garn and Rep-
resentative St Germain introduced the Financial Institutions 
Deregulation Act of 1983,366 (FIDA). FIDA was designed to revamp, 
deregulate and reorganize the financial services industry. It provided 
for partial repeal of sections 20 and 32367 of the Glass-Steagall Act, to 
allow banks to be affiliated with securities affiliates and permit cross 
employment of directors, officers, and employees' between banks and 
their securities affiliates. FIDA would have enabled banks to indi-
rectly involve themselves in securities underwriting and dealing and 
also sponsoring mutual funds. These activities would have been ef-
fected through Depository Institution Holding Companies,368 
(DIHCs), and Depository Institution Securities Mfiliates, (DISAs). 
BHC formation would have been simplified and the creation of non-
bank banks369 would have been eliminated. One significant provision 
of FIDA would have been the expansion of BHC permitted activities 
to include "activities of a financial nature," insurance underwriting 
and other risky ventures, such as real estate investment and develop-
ment.370 The provision "activities of a financial nature" was to be in-
terpreted broadly by the Board so as to include such services as are 
sidered many relief bills prior to the 1982 Act, but passed none of them. Among 
the relief measures were provisions authorizing the FDIC and FSLIC to arrange 
acquisitions of financially troubled entities, to make loans to or deposits in, or 
purchase the assets or assume the liabilities of, such institutions. Another provi-
sion gave thrifts the power to make nonresidential real estate loans and con-
sumer loans. This led to speculative investments by the more venturesome S & 
Ls and accelerated the fiscal calamity that followed. See supra note 355. 
362. Pub. L. No. 97-320, tit. VI, § 601, 96 Stat. 1536-38 (1982)(codified at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1843(c){8)). 
363. See the latter portion of supra note 283 for a more detailed discussion of this 
provision. 
364. S.1682, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R.3768, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). 
365. For example, the nonbank banks. 
366. S.1609, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 3537, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). 
367. 12 U.S.C. §§ 377, 378 (1982); see also supra note 256. 
368. In order to permit the creation of the DIHCs, nine federal statutes would have 
required amendment: The Glass-Steagall Act, The Securities Act of 1933, The 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, The BHCA, The SLHCA (Savings & Loan Hold-
ing Company Act), The Bank Service Corporation Act, The Investment Company 
Act, the Home Owners Loan Act and the Federal Reserve Act. 
369. See supra text accompanying notes 231-33. 
370. If S & Ls can, why not commercial banks? 
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offered by companies not regulated as BHCs.371 Additional bills372 
were introduced in 1983, but no law came forth that year. 
The Financial Services Competitive Equity Act of 1984373 was a 
watered down version of FIDA.374 Introduced in the Senate, this bill 
would have eliminated the nonbank bank loophole, would have pro-
hibited insurance activities for BHCs and all their subsidiaries, but 
would have exempted certain instruments from the coverage of Glass-
Steagall. It would have also permitted the creation of DISAs through 
which banks and BHCs could deal in and underwrite certain securi-
ties.375 The House Banking Committee reported out the Financial In-
stitutions Equity Act of 1984,376 which provided for the closing of the 
nonbank bank and South Dakota loopholes and also for tightening 
certain provisions of Glass-Steagall, a much more conservative ap-
proach than the Senate's. With such divergent views in the House and 
Senate no banking legislation came out of Congress in 1984.377 In 
1985, the one bill that would have dealt with bank regulation, 
H.R.20, 378 submitted by Representative St Germain, never made it to 
the House floor.379 
The year 1986 was an extremely active insofar as bills being intro-
duced, but no fruit was harvested from any of them. The most encom-
passing bill was the omnibus bill introduced by Senator Garn, the 
Deposit Insurance Reform and Competitive Enhancement Act 
371. See supra text accompanying notes 204-220. 
372. The Financial Services Competitive Equity Act of 1983, S.2181, 98th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1983), a massive bill similar to FIDA with some additional provisions. The 
Depository Institutions Holding Company Act of 1983, S.2134, 98th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1983), introduced by Sen. Proxmire, provided for the elimination of non-
bank banks and closing the South Dakota loophole. S.2072, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1983) would have closed the loophole now opened wide by the Merchants Na-
tional decision, 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 388 (1989), by prohibiting bank subsidiaries of a 
BHC from engaging in activities prohibited to a BHC or any subsidiary thereof. 
This bill would have prevented the decision in the aforementioned case as well as 
the Fed's incipient order in this case and its view and interpretation of 
§ 4(c)(8)(see supra note 329). Had S.2072 become law in 1983, a great deal of liti-
gation would have been eliminated in the latter part of the '80s. 
373. S.2851, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). 
374. Supra note 366. 
375. By 1990 court decisions and Fed orders had not only empowered BHCs to engage 
through subsidiaries in such activities but in additional ones, too. See supra text 
following note 275. 
376. H.R. 5916, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). 
377. With one exception: The Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, 
Pub. L. No. 98-440, 98 Stat. 1689 (1984)(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
But this act is not germane to this paper. 
378. H.R.20, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). 
379. Although it was reported out of the House Banking Committee, it was blocked in 
the House Rules Committee, because its chairman, Claude Pepper, opposed the 
nonbank bank loophole closing provisions therein. 
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(DIRCEA).380 This was a massive comprehensive bill which included 
provisions for expansionary (i.e., deregulatory) powers for banks that 
were included in the 1984 FSCEA381 as well as provisions for inter-
state purchases of banks (failing or about to fail) which would have 
given great impetus to interstate banking, and provisions to close the 
nonbank bank and South Dakota loopholes and many provisions of 
earlier bills which addressed narrow separate issues only. But opposi-
tion from the House and from those who did not want the nonbank 
bank loophole closed forced Senator Gam to abandon efforts to pass 
the bill. On the House side Representative St Germain introduced an 
omnibus bill382 with restrictive measures rather than expansionary 
ones. Many other bills were introduced during 1986,383 but none came 
to fruition. 
The year 1987, however, did bring forth CEBA, a massive piece of 
legislation.384 Before discussing CEBA it would be instructive to 
briefly review two of the many other bills that were introduced during 
1987. One of the earliest ones was The Financial Service Holding 
Company bill, introduced as H.R. 3360.385 It was proposed by the As-
sociation of Bank Holding Companies and endorsed by four other 
banking associations (including the American Bankers Association, 
the largest national banking association) and introduced by Republi-
can Representatives Dreier of California and Roth of Wisconsin. This 
bill would have, in effect, repealed most of the Glass-Stegall limita-
tions and the BHCA limitations on bank activities or BHC activities 
and would have permitted: 
(1) the control of a savings and loan association; (2) underwriting and distrib-
uting securities; (3) operating, sponsoring, and selling securities of an invest-
ment company; (4) acting as an investment advisor; (5) engaging in the 
business of selling and underwriting insurance; (6) engaging in real estate de-
velopment and brokerage; and (7) engaging in any activity permissible for a 
multiple savings and loan association or a bank holding company.386 
These activities would be carried out through financial services 
holding company (FSHC) subsidiaries, a FSHC being "defined by own-
ership of a BHC and any other subsidiary engaged in 'financially re-
380. S.2592, 100th Cong., 2d Sess (1986). 
381. See supra note 373 and accompanying text. 
382. H.R. 5565, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). 
383. The 1986 Regulators' Bill, S.2372, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), H.R. 4701, 99th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); The Federal Deposit Insurance Improvements Act of 1986, 
H.R. 4997, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance 
and Financial Regulations Act, S.2752, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); The Banking 
Stability, Housing Improvement and Consumer Protection Act of 1986, H.R. 5565, 
99th Cong. 2d Sess. (1986). 
384. Pub. L. No.100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (1987)(codified at scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
385. H.R. 3360, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). 
386. Richard W. Whiting, A Perspective on Financial Services Restructuring, 37 CATH. 
U. L. REV. 347, 366 (1988). 
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lated' activities."3B7 "Financially related" is defined to encompass the 
activities mentioned in the above quotation. It may be noted that 
many of the above quoted activities are now permitted to banks or 
BHCs through judicial and administrative decisions. ass Time does not 
wait for Congress' indecisiveness. 
Senators Wirth (D-Colo.) and Graham (D-Fla.) introduced the Fi-
nancial Services Oversight Act,389 a complex bill, conceived by Gerald 
Corrigan, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. It pro-
posed three different types of holding companies, most germane to 
this paper being the bank holding company. This entity could engage 
(through subsidiaries) in all sorts of financial activities including se-
curities and insurance as well as normal banking business. It would 
also have access to the payments system and discount window through 
its depository subsidiaries. The subsidiaries would be regulated by ex-
isting regulators, the parent being subject to Board supervision. The 
second type would be called a financial holding company. It could en-
gage in financial services but could not own depository institutions. It 
would have limited access to the discount window, but full access to 
the payments system. The third type would be the commercial finan-
cial holding company. Such a company could pursue both commercial 
and financial activities except for banking (i.e., ownership of a bank or 
thrift) and it would have no access to the payments system or discount 
window. While this third type holding company could be owned by a 
nonfinancial entity, the other two types could not be so owned. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the two aforementioned bills (as 
well as some others) were broadly deregulatory in orientation, CEBA 
did not address the issues of expanded or continued limited bank (or 
BHC) activities in securities, insurance, real estate, mutual funds, rev-
enue bonds, mortgage-backed securities and other financial products. 
CEBA did close the nonbank bank loophole (with a March 5, 1987 
grandfather clause), apply §§ 20 and 32 of Glass-Steagall390 to non-
member banks (i.e. tighten rather than deregulate), and provide a 
moratorium until March 1, 1988, during which period no federal bank-
ing agency was permitted to expand the real estate and insurance pow-
ers of banks and bank holding companies within their respective 
jurisdictions.391 However, it further provided that state chartered 
387. Id. 
388. See supra text following notes 273 and 322. 
389. 8.1891, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). 
390. 12 U.S.C. §§ 377, 378 (1988); see also supra note 256. 
391. Note that the statute specifically prohibited the Fed from approving (during the 
moratorium) the acquisition of state chartered banks that engage in insurance 
activities, yet the Fed approved such in Merchants National. See supra text ac-
companying notes 323-327. The statute also specifically prohibited the Comptrol-
ler from permitting national banks to expand their geographic limits of insurance 
activities. See supra text accompanying notes 119-123. 
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banks that are not under BHC control are not subject to the morato-
rium and may engage in any insurance activity that state law per-
mits.392 The bulk of CEBA, however, was focused on repairing the 
badly ailing thrift industry, and is not germane to this paper. In addi-
tion, CEBA included a provision which mandated a comprehensive re-
view of the nation's banking and financial laws with a view of 
legislating a restructuring thereof.393 
Since CEBA did not address the restructuring issues that have 
plagued Congress for several years, several bills were introduced after 
its passage to bring about some resolution of the matter. Senators 
Proxmire and Gam introduced the Proxmire Financial Modernization 
Act of 1987394 which would have in effect repealed most of the Glass-
Steagalllimitations, permitting commercial banks to affiliate with se-
curities firms. The bill did not provide for expanded insurance or real 
estate activities for BHCs, as did the Corrigan proposal.395 A bill dif-
ferent from the others was H.R.3063396 introduced by Representative 
Thomas Casper (R-Del.). This bill provided that, subject to disap-
proval by the Comptroller, a national bank may engage (through a 
subsidiary) in the same activities that state banks are permitted in the 
state in which the national bank is located. This would be a South 
Dakota loophole with a vengeance! The most "radical" bill (as a back-
lash to CEBA) was introduced by Senators Cranston (D-Cal.) and 
D' Amato (R-N.Y.), called the Depository Institution Mfiliation Act.397 
This bill would have eliminated the distinction between investment 
and commercial banking and would have permitted "depository insti-
tutions holding companies", through subsidiaries, to engage in virtu-
ally every kind of financial activities (including selling and 
underwriting insurance) as well as commercial activities. Functional 
regulation of the subsidiaries would continue under present regula-
tory agencies. Inter-affiliate transactions would be strictly limited to 
preserve safety of the depository affiliates.a9s 
The Proxmire bill399 having failed to pass in 1987, was again taken 
up in 1988, and, after many amendments in the Senate Banking Com-
mittee, was passed by the Senate as the Proxmire Financial Moderni-
392. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 295, 296. 
393. 12 U.8.C. § 203(a)(1988). 
394. 8.1886, 100th Cong., 1st 8ess. (1987). 
395. See supra text accompanying note 389. 
396. H.R. 3063, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). 
397. 8.1905, 100th Cong., 1st 8ess. (1987). 
398. Among other bills proposed in 1987 were: The Barnard bill, H.R. 3799, 100th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), a broad deregulatory proposal; the American Bankers As-
sociation pressed for the passage of 8.60, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) and H.R. 50, 
100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), also a proposal for expanded bank powers. 
399. Supra note 394. 
806 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:726 
zation Act of 1988.400 The House passed its own bill, H.R. 5094,401 a 
much less expansionary bill than the Senate bill. Unfortunately, the 
two chambers were unable to reconcile the differences and the lOOth 
Congress closed without any law coming forth, leaving it to the judici-
ary and regulatory agencies to determine what banks may do. 
During 1989 Congress was deeply concerned with the crisis in the 
savings and loan industry and concentrated on passing a law to solve 
it. It did pass the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and En-
forcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA),402 not germane to this study. How-
ever, there were two bills submitted, proposing expanded powers to 
banks and BHCs. The first, the Proxmire Financial Modernization 
Act of 1989,403 would have repealed §§ 20 and 32 of the Glass-Stegall 
Act,404 permitting BHCS to acquire securities affiliates and also would 
have amended the BHCA to permit limited insurance activities to 
state banks owned by BHCs. The second bill was the Depository Insti-
tution Affiliation Act,405 a broad deregulatory bill which would have 
permitted affiliates of a DIHC (Depository Institution Holding Com-
pany) to engage in activities of a financial nature, including securities, 
insurance and real estate. Banking and other insured affiliates would 
be prohibited from direct involvement in the foregoing activities and 
would be insulated from the other affiliates of the DIHC by being ex-
tensively prohibited from interaffiliate transactions. 
From the foregoing skeletal discussion it can be seen that Congress 
was not idle in 1980s in regard to banking reform proposals, but was 
unable to reach a consensus on the appropriate action to take. Some 
state legislators, however, saw an opportunity to take advantage of 
Congress' indecision and went ahead with legislation of their own.406 
400. S.1886, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988). 
401. H.R. 5094, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988). 
402. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989). 
403. S.305, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). 
404. 12 u.s.c. §§ 378, 378 (1988). 
405. H.R. 1992, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). 
406. The most familiar state law is that of South Dakota, referred to as the "South 
Dakota Loophole", passed on March 2,1983, S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN.§ 51-18-30 
(1984). It permits South Dakota state banks and their subsidiaries to engage in 
"all facets of the insurance industry". In addition, S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN.§ 51-
16-40(b)(1984) permits out-of-state BHCs to acquire South Dakota banks. How-
ever, under S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 51-16-41 (1984) a South Dakota bank ac-
quired by an out-of-state BHC must conduct its insurance business in such a 
manner as to not attract customers from the general public in South Dakota to 
the detriment of existing insurance companies, brokers and agents in the state. 
In effect the goal of this statute is to entice out-of-state BHCs to come into South 
Dakota to acquire South Dakota "banks" (i.e. non-member banks) to be used as a 
vehicle to do a nationwide insurance business, but not within the state. For the 
Board's view of the matter, see the text following supra note 309. 
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A statute was passed by Delaware on May 30, 1990,407 which per-
mits Delaware state banks to sell and underwrite all types of insur-
ance nationwide. A most unusual aspect of this law is its authorization 
to conduct the insurance business directly within the bank, rather 
than through a legally separate subsidiary (although such is also au-
thorized). If conducted within the bank, it must be in a separate de-
partment with separate officers and a separate set of books, with the 
same minimum capital requirement as the Delaware Insurance Code 
requires of independent insurance companies. Mter providing for this 
superficial facade of separateness, the statute goes on to authorize the 
bank to "make loans to and transact other business with such depart-
ment, division or subsidiary" as it would with other customers.4os It is 
astonishing to find that this statute authorizes a behavior pattern 
which even the most expansionist proponents of bank deregulation 
would be opposed to, viz., that the insurance business be permitted to 
be conducted inside the bank and that interaffiliate loans and transac-
tions between the bank and the insurance entity be allowed. Almost 
without exception, deregulation proponents advocate absolute separa-
tion of the insurance and securities functions from the banking activ-
ity (through a subsidiary of the holding company), and mandatory 
comprehensive financial insulation of the bank (i.e. the bank subsidi-
ary within the holding company structure) from the other affiliates 
(referred to as noninsured affiliates, i.e. not insured by the FDIC). 
But as shall be seen from the Citicorp and Family Guardian Life In-
surance order, there was "method to the madness" of the Delaware 
legislation. 
In addition, the Delaware legislature apparently did not make a 
legal analysis to determine the legal status of the insurance "depart-
ment" or "division." Such status can become extremely important in 
certain situations. Suppose a BHC wants to acquire a Delaware bank 
with an insurance department. The Board, in order to grant or deny 
the application, will have to determine whether the "department" is 
or is not in fact a separate subsidiary for purposes of the BHCA. It 
might become an extremely delicate legal issue, only determinable on 
a case-by-case basis. Or suppose the bank becomes insolvent and the 
FDIC has to take over? Will the assets of the insurance "department" 
be swept in with the other assets of the bank to compensate the FDIC 
for its salvage operation? In other words, will the policyholders of the 
insurances underwritten by this insurance "department" bail out the 
depositors of the bank, leaving the policyholders with no assets? And 
in such a case would the insurance guaranty funds of the various states 
be required to rescue the policyholders? The foregoing two examples 
407. The Bank and Trust Company Insurance Powers Act of 1989, DEL. CODE . .ANN. 
tit. 18, § 2304 (Cum. Supp. 1990). 
408. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 767(b)(Cwn. Supp. 1990). 
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are but a fraction of the situations where the legal status of the insur-
ance "department" becomes a critical matter. These are the kinds of 
statutes that become the nightmares of regulators and judges. 
The Independent Insurance Agents of America (IIAA) moved 
quickly to nullify the potential effects of this legislation, by filing with 
the Federal Reserve Board a "petition for enforcement" to require 
Citicorp to terminate prohibited insurance activities conducted pursu-
ant to the aforementioned Delaware statute by its nonbank subsidiary, 
Family Guardian Life Insurance Company.409 The IIAA argued that 
Citicorp cannot rely on the "operating subsidiary"410 rule to continue 
insurance activities through Family Guardian. It maintained that the 
statute does not permit state banks to directly underwrite or sell in-
surance, but only permits their quarantined and separated "insurance 
division" to do so. Thus, the fundamental requirement of the "operat-
ing subsidiary" rule is missing. Citicorp's response was weak: it con-
tended that the rule does apply since the statute "on its face" 
authorizes Delaware state banks to transact an insurance business and 
the requirement that it be done in a separate department is the tradi-
tional way of doing it. 
The Board rejected Citicorp's arguments. The Board reiterated the 
operating subsidiary rule limiting a subsidiary of a state bank to the 
same activities that the parent bank may engage in directly. The 
Board found that although on its face the statute permits Delaware 
state banks to underwrite and sell insurance, 
[T]he Board cannot ignore the fact that this authorization is conditioned on 
compliance with an unprecedented and comprehensive set of regulatory re-
strictions, the practice effect of which is to treat the insurance division as a 
separate corporate entity. For example, the separation has been carried to 
such an extent that the routine authority of the state bank regulator over the 
insurance division is restricted, and the insurance division is regulated under 
the insurance laws as a separate corporate entity from the bank. Thus, in the 
Board's view, the Delaware statute does not authorize banks to engage in the 
insurance business directly, as is required by the operating subsidiary rule.41l 
The Board then ordered Citicorp to immediately prohibit Family 
Guardian from providing any further insurance services (except as al-
lowed under § 4(c)(8)(A)412 of the BHCA). 
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
A. In General 
The principal objectives of bank regulation that have developed 
409. Citicorp, 76 Fed. Res. Bull. 977 (1990). 
410. 12 C.F.R. § 225.22(d)(1992); see also supra text accompanying notes 293, 294. 
411. Citicorp, 76 Fed. Res. Bull. 977, 978 (1990). 
412. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)(A)(1988). 
1992] BANKING AND INSURANCE 809 
through the years are safety and soundness413 of the individual banks 
and stability of the financial system.414 Safety and soundness were 
accomplished by intense risk control regulation415 and stability 
through the deposit insurance protection416 of the FDIC and FSLIC. 
At the time these regulatory laws were passed and for decades there-
after, they were acceptable to the banking industry because banks' in-
termediation function was all pervading and their lending rates 
assured them of a good return with relatively little risk. There was no 
need for banks to diversify417 into other activities. But since the late 
1960s, the financial markets have undergone a major revolution. The 
cash flow from savers' checking accounts, savings accounts and bank 
CDs began to bypass the banking system en route to borrowers. There 
was a vast disintermediation from banks to other institutions,41S such 
as money market mutual funds, cash management accounts, pension 
plan funds, nonbank CDs, and other nonbank investments.419 Fur-
thermore, individual borrowers have substantially replaced the banks 
as their main source of funds, obtaining loans from finance companies, 
credit unions and thrifts. Worst of all, major corporations which were 
the heaviest bank customers are now relying on the commercial paper 
and securities markets as their sources of credit.420 To add salt to the 
wounds, the very raison d'etre of banks, lending, has become less prof-
itable. Repeal of Regulation Q raised the cost of funds to banks,421 
reducing the profit on the lending of these funds. 
Thus it became obvious that the legal and financial environment 
under which banks are now422 operating has changed drastically since 
passage of Glass-Steagall and the BHCA.423 The question continues to 
be raised whether these statutory barriers are adequately performing 
their intended functions or whether they have become counterproduc-
tive and imperil the safety, soundness and stability of the banking sys-
tem.424 The insurance industry, and to a much lesser degree the 
securities industry425 maintain that regardless of the changes in the 
413. See supra text following note 73. 
414. See supra text accompanying note 62. 
415. See supra note 65, 101, and text accompanying note 234. 
416. See supra text accompanying notes 67-69. 
417. From 1933 to 1970 there was only one case interpreting Glass-Steagall, Board of 
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441 (1947). 
418. See supra text accompanying notes 204-220. 
419. Id. 
420. See supra text accompanying notes 213-216. 
421. See supra note 207. 
422. Or more precisely, during the past 30 years. 
423. 1933 and 1956 respectively. 
424. Unfortunately, Congress has not yet answered this question. See part VI. C. 
425. The securities industry has lost case after case, both before the Board and the 
courts. Bowing to the inevitable, the SIA (Securities Industry Association) sub-
mitted a compromise bill. 
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financial industry environment, the barriers must remain, lest a der-
egulated banking industry result in calamity.426 
426. Bank failures during the six year period 1985-1990 almost equal the number of 
failures in the fifty year period 1934-1984! 
Failures 
1934-1984 1165 
1985 116 
1986 138 
1987 184 
1988 200 
1989 206 
1990 169 
1013 
Source: Various FDIC annual reports. Reports on file with author. In addi-
tion, during 1985-1990, 53 banks received financial assistance from the FDIC. 
Those who oppose deregulation point to (among other things) the Continental 
Illinois debacle in 1983. There were lengthy Congressional hearings in this mat-
ter, which revealed many disturbing aspects of the banking industry, Inquiry into 
Continental fllinais Corp. and Continental nlinois National Bank: Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and In-
surance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 98th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). 
Continental Illinois National Bank (CINB) has been in business more than 
125 years. It began as a conservative institution, focusing on time deposits and 
lending to good credit risks. Continental illinois Corporation, incorporated in 
1968, began operating in 1969 after acquiring almost all of the outstanding stock 
of CINB. The Corporation engaged in lease and debt financing, mortgage lending 
and banking, asset-based financing, merchant banking overseas, reinsurance of 
certain credit life and credit health insurance, fiduciary and investment services, 
and most importantly, financing of energy development and exploration. In 1976 
bank management announced their decision to become one of the top three 
American corporate lenders. The adverse effects of the bank's pro-growth policy 
were not obvious for many years. In 1978, Dun~ Review, a widely respected fi-
nancial magazine, described Continental as one of the five best managed compa-
nies in America. At the end of 1983, it was the largest bank in Chicago and the 
seventh largest in assets and deposits among some 15,000 national and state banks 
in the United States. 
The hearings offer an insight to the reasons of the failure of this mammoth 
bank as well as an insight into the current relationship between banks and their 
regulatory agencies, the inadequacies of our regulatory system, and the amount of 
risk that bank management will take given a federally insured guarantee of suc-
cess. The recent destruction of the wall between the banking and securities in-
dustries and the possibility of an upcoming merger between the banking and 
insurance industries make the insights offered by the Continental fiasco even 
more important. During the hearings on the problems of Continental, Congress-
man Stewart McKenney (Conn.) asked the question: "Why should we trust a 
banker who can't manage a loan portfolio to be able to successfully engage in 
insurance, securities, or real estate?" Id. at 89. 
Continental tried to put the blame on the downturn in the economy, espe-
cially the· downward spiral of oil and gas prices which caused huge loans to go 
bad. But Subcommittee Chairman St Germain did not agree: 
And if the problems of Continental were simply an unexpected 
downturn in prices of an otherwise solid oil and gas portfolio, one must 
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B. The Arguments for Deregulation 
1. The Capital Mobility Problem 
Members of the banking industry and others who favor deregula-
tion are surprisingly willing to use the horrendous increase in bank 
again wonder the regulator. Regulators, like prudent bankers, presuma-
bly do watch the concentration of assets in a single industry and are in a 
position to demand the type of diversification that would enable the 
bank to ride out unforseen storms. Id. at 2. 
With this statement, the problems at Continental stood exposed. The banks 
weren't prudent, and the regulators must have been daydreaming. Although 
nothing illegal became evident in the hearings, one must wonder whether there 
was dishonest activity, or whether the bankers and regulators were really so in-
ept that it just seems that way. Somehow, the bankers and regulators had al-
lowed heavy concentration in oil and gas loans, averaging twenty percent of the 
total loan portfolio, leaving the bank extremely vulnerable to the decline of this 
highly volatile industry. Between July 1982 and September 1984, oil and gas 
loans accounted for approximately two-thirds of the bank's losses. 
The oil and gas loan problems were only a manifestation of the larger 
problems at the bank. CINB management failed to set corporate loan quality 
standards. The aggressive lending policy of CINB was extremely decentralized, 
allowing loan account officers to respond directly to customers, rather than re-
quiring loan approval by committee, like most banks. According to the OCC, 
"[t]op management had created an environment where aggressive lending was 
not only condoned but encouraged. In this atmosphere, a high quality system of 
controls was secondary." ld. at 205. In fact, the policies and controls governing 
loan approval, review, and classification could hardly have been worse. It is inter-
esting that the deficiencies in the internal controls seem to have been noted by 
bank examiners, but without any sense of urgency. During the summer of 1981, 
Kathleen Kenefick, a loan officer in the oil and gas division, wrote a five page 
memo describing the deficiencies in the internal control system and recom-
mending ways to fix it. Although her memo stressed the urgency of the bank's 
problems and the need for immediate action, and although the memo was in pos-
session of both her supervisor and the bank examiner, it went largely ignored 
both by her superiors and the bank examiner. However, the bank examiner's 
1981 report described the oil and gas division as follows: 
CINB is adequately staffed with both sound lending officers and scien-
tific (engineers and geologists) personnel to handle current relationships 
and meet continued strong growth anticipations .... No significant 
problems are evident. 
Id. at 62. 
Also during this examination the examiner noted a near doubling in the loans 
going unreviewed by the bank, which failed to review $1.6 billion one year and 
$2.4 billion the second year. As noted by the writers of the 1984 staff report to the 
subcommittee, these statistics would seem to indicate a severely deficient and 
worsening credit review and quality control system in the bank, and they de-
served some attention. However, in his letter to the Board of Directors the exam-
iner wrote a shamefully weak statement: 
... the issue of timeliness or frequency of review is noted since bank 
records indicate a general increase in the number ... of loans not being 
reviewed. . . . Although this list is up from last examination, it has not 
adversely impacted the reported results from Loan Administration. 
In June 1982 the examiner was offered employment with Continental, which he 
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failures427 to bolster their contention that these failures are due to the 
regulatory limitations on bank activities. These limitations inhibit the 
mobility of capital both out of and into the banking industry. These 
restraints protect other industries from a fully competitive banking 
industry. For example, the securities industry is protected from incur-
sions by the banking industry, thus enabling brokerage firms to esca-
late their fees with impunity. 
The banking industry also argues that regulation prevents the nor-
mal outflow of capital from a declining industry (i.e., profits are fall-
ing).42S This causes the retention of an excess number of entities, 
while the weaker ones go bankrupt.429 In fact the number of bank-
ruptcies may actually be increased (beyond what would take place 
normally) by intense rivalry among banks seeking a share of the de-
clining business. Such rivalry motivates the making of riskier loans 
(real estate development, oil, third world countries, etc.) and other 
risky transactions. 
Conversely, preventing entry into the banking industry by other 
financial or non-financial entities permits banks to conduct their af-
fairs less responsibly430 and efficiently431 since they fear no competi-
tion. Furthermore, this restraint prevents the use of outside capital 
from shoring up weak banks. Thus, a strong investment bank or 
strong brokerage house (or for that matter a strong auto manufac-
accepted after removing himself from the examination to avoid a conflict of inter-
est. 
These are only a few examples of the serious oversights and understatements 
made by the regulators and the risky and poorly managed lending practices that 
created the need for a very expensive bailout funded without consent by the tax-
payers of our nation. Thus it would be highly dangerous to expand the industries 
into which banks may enter when experience has shown that bankers can be 
irresponsible, regulators can be blind, and Uncle Sam will reward this dangerous 
combination with a 100 percent insurance guarantee at the taxpayers' expense. 
So say those who fear and oppose deregulation. They also point out that at pres-
ent the banking industry is functioning at an extremely high operating leverage, 
that its credit quality has deteriorated to unacceptable levels (write-offs are the 
worst in its history) and because of a public perception of high risk, there is a 
withdrawal of investment and credit (deposit) support. To allow banks to now 
assume additional (and different) risks would be suicide, according to this view. 
427. See id. 
428. When profits fall within an industry the affected members (here the banks) 
would normally shift their capital into more profitable industries by making ac-
quisitions therein. The result would be a revival in the industry which is being 
reduced (here the banking industry-the same total profit divided among fewer 
entities). 
429. With the FDIC paying off the depositors or even a bailout of the bank at taxpay-
ers' cost. 
430. Since FDIC insurance will take care of losses. 
431. Entry of new competitors into an industry is the motivating force of competition. 
Even the mere perception of entry by "outsiders" greases the wheels of the com-
petition machine (so as to discourage entry). 
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turer) could not acquire a weak commercial bank and infuse it with 
new additional capital. 
It appears that in this age of revolution in the financial services 
industry432 and disintermediation of the banking function433 the 
Glass-Steagall restrictions actually have an adverse effect on the sta-
bility and soundness of commercial banking, the very things that the 
act is supposed to protect. Therefore it is the author's opinion that 
most of the limitations of Glass-Steagall and the BHCA need to be 
removed-what was good in 1932 is not necessarily good in 1992. At 
the same time, the safety and stability of the banking system and 
soundness of the FDIC must be retained even at a more exacting level 
of control than under the present system. Consequently; any of the 
additional activities to be permitted to banks must be performed in a 
holding company structure with the permissive activities to be effectu-
ated in subsidiaries of the holding company while the bank is com-
pletely insulated from all other affiliates of the holding company. 
Under the BHCA a BHC can only own banks or other entities per-
mitted under§ 4(c)(8).434 Under the proposed system a financial serv-
ices holding company structure would be formed under enabling 
legislation. Such a holding company (FSHC) could own commercial 
banks, investment banks, brokerage firms or any kind of financial 
services company.435 The FSHC itself need not be a bank or financial 
institution but can be any type of commercial entity.436 Indeed, the 
FSHC itself could be the subsidiary of a nonfinancial entity. The per-
ceived additional risk to the banks and the FDIC under such a struc-
ture can be minimized by proper insulation of the banks. The FSHC is 
to be so structured that its management can allocate financial re-
sources among the subsidiaries at its discretion based presumably on a 
desire to maximize its return provided that the bank subsidiaries will 
always be allocated the minimum statutory capital requirements and 
such minimums will always be maintained. This sort of scheme would 
in large measure solve the mobility of capital problem described 
above. 
2. Retention of the Wall-The Insulation Device 
As indicated above,437 under the author's proposal the affiliates of 
a bank could be other financial institutions or commercial entities ex-
432. See supra part V. A. 
433. See supra text accompanying notes 213-219. 
434. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)(1988). 
435. The term "financial service company" does not include an insurance company. 
436. There are at present many commercial companies that own financial services 
companies. See supra note 204. 
437. See supra text accompanying notes 435, 436. 
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cept insurance companies.43S It shall be imperative that no lending 
take place between any bank and any of its affiliates, and "lending'' 
shall include purchase of any kind of assets by the bank from an affili-
ate, or the sale of any kind of an asset by the bank to an affiliate. Thus 
the prohibitions of §§ 23A and 23B439 would be expanded to an abso-
438. The legislative means of generally achieving this result is to repeal portions of 12 
U.S.C. §§ 24, 377 and 378 (Glass-Steagall §§ 16, 20 and 32 respectively) and 12 
U.S.C. § 1843 (Federal Reserve Act § 4). 
439. 12 U.S.C. § 37lc-371c-1 (1988). Portions of each follows: 
§ 37lc. Banking affiliates 
(a) Restrictions on transactions with affiliates 
(1) A member bank and its subsidiaries may engage in a covered 
transaction with an affiliate only if-
(A) in the case of any affiliate, the aggregate amount of covered 
transactions of the member bank and its subsidiaries will not exceed 
10 per centum of the capital stock and surplus of the member bank; 
and 
(B) in the case of all affiliates, the aggregate amount of covered 
transactions of the member bank and its subsidiaries will not exceed 
20 per centum of the capital stock and surplus of the member bank. 
(2) For the purpose of this section, any transactions by a member bank 
with any person shall be deemed to be a transaction with an affiliate to 
the extent that the proceeds of the transaction are used for the benefit 
of, or transferred to, that affiliate. (3) A member bank and its subsidi-
aries may not purchase a low-quality asset from an affiliate unless the 
bank or such subsidiary, pursuant to an independent credit evaluation, 
committed itself to purchase such asset prior to the time such asset was 
acquired by the affiliate. 
§ 371c-1. Restrictions on transactions with affiliates 
(a) In general 
(1) Terms 
A member bank and its subsidiaries may engage in any of the 
transactions described in paragraph (2) only-
(A) on terms and under circumstances, including credit stan-
dards, that are substantially the same, or at least as favorable to such 
bank or its subsidiary, as those prevailing at the time for comparable 
transactions with or involving other nonaffiliated companies, or 
(B) in the absence of comparable transactions, on terms and 
under circumstances, including credit standards, that in good faith 
would be offered to, or would apply to, nonaffiliated companies. 
(2) Transactions covered 
Paragraph (1) applies to the following: 
(A) Any covered transaction with an affiliate. 
(B) The sale of securities or other assets to an affiliate, including 
assets subject to an agreement to repurchase. 
(C) The payment of money or the furnishing of services to an af-
filiate under contract, lease, or otherwise. 
(D) Any transaction in which an affiliate acts as an agent or bro-
ker or receives a fee for its services to the bank or to any other per-
son. 
(E) Any transaction or series of transactions with a third party-
(i) if an affiliate has a financial interest in the third party, or 
(ii) if an affiliate is a participant in such transaction or series of 
transactions. 
(3) Transactions that benefit an affiliate 
For the purpose of this subsection, any transaction by a member 
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lute restraint. In fact, one of the provisions of the enabling legislation 
ought to provide that in case of failure of any bank affiliate, the FSHC 
will have to reimburse the FDIC for the monies disbursed by the lat-
ter. The reason for such an exacting provision is to prevent the FSHC 
from siphoning off440 resources of a bank to assist an affiliate that is 
faltering, causing the bank to fail. Managers of entities not subject to 
control and supervision as are banks,441 need be made to understand 
that banks under their control are not merely another subsidiary. The 
temptation for the above described bail out is especially great because 
a bank's assets can cover another affiliate's losses many times larger 
than the bank's own capital. If the bank fails as a result of this drain, 
the parent FSHC stands to lose only the equity invested in the bank; 
the rest of the affiliate's loss (equal to the deficit in the bank) would 
be, in effect, redeemed by the FDIC.442 
Strict insulation would also ensure that legal separateness not ever 
be questioned. Thus if an affiliate were to cause a loss to a third party, 
such person should not be able to make a claim against the bank. This 
matter is only one of the many problems with the Delaware deregula-
tion statute.443 
C. Other Matters 
1. Subtle Anti-competitive Issues 
An additional argument against affiliate connections is the belief 
that the bank would use subtle means of "steering" its customers to-
ward the services offered by these affiliates, thereby creating unfair 
bank or its subsidiary with any person shall be deemed to be a trans-
action with an affiliate of such bank if any of the proceeds of the 
transaction are used for the benefit of, or transferred to, such 
affiliate. 
440. To see how this was done in the insurance industry see supra notes 174-182, 198 
and accompanying text. 
441. The FSHC would not be a regulated entity per se as the BHCs are at present, 
except for supervision limited to determination that minimum capital require-
ments of banks within the FSHC are maintained, as well as sufficient minimum 
capital within the FSHC to be able to provide the minimum bank capital needs at 
any and all times is available. Neither the acquisition of banks nor divestitures 
thereof require prior approval of a regulatory agency such as the FRB. Mere 
notification is sufficient. On the other hand, regulation and supervision of the 
banks themselves will continue under the same agencies. If the bank is a national 
bank it will be supervised by the Comptroller of the Currency and the FDIC; if it 
is a BHC (as a subsidiary of an FSHC), by the Fed; and if it is a state member 
bank then by the state agency and FDIC. 
442. In fact, one of the arguments against permitting banks to affiliate with others is 
the belief that such affiliates will then indirectly enjoy the benefits of the insured 
bank (i.e. FDIC insurance). Not only is it imperative that such a situation not 
exist, but it is absolutely essential that any perception of such an advantage to an 
affiliate must be eliminated. Absolute insulation is, of course, the answer. 
443. See supra text following note 408. 
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competition. For example, assume a bank is affiliated with a stock 
brokerage firm, a mutual fund, a title insurance company, a casualty 
insurance company, a life insurance company, an automobile dealer-
ship, and an investment bank, all under the umbrella of an FSHC. A 
customer of the bank requests a loan and is willing to pledge securities 
he owns. The loan officer indicates that it would be more convenient 
for the bank if the customer deposited the securities with the affiliate 
broker and then assign the account to the bank (thus the bank would 
not have to "handle" the securities). The customer complies believing 
it necessary to get the loan. Or a customer of the bank requests an 
auto loan. A bank officer explains that loans on autos purchased from 
its affiliate auto dealer are much easier to process. Since the auto 
dealer has the same car at same price that customer wants to buy, 
customer complies. Or a customer of the bank requests a mortgage on 
a home he is in the process of buying. The bank officer tells him that 
the bank relies on affiliate title insurance company more than on 
other title companies, and that an affiliate casualty insurer is very 
knowledgeable in writing insurance on homes. The customer obtains 
both title and casualty insurance from the bank's affiliated companies. 
That such abuses might develop cannot be denied. However, if a 
bank officer is prone towards such behavior, he could do so whether or 
not there is affiliation. The solution of such problems lies in proper 
enforcement of existing laws. Proper execution of present oversight 
powers by the regulatory agencies should reduce such abuses to a min-
imum whether or not deregulation takes place. 
2. The Case Against Insurance Integration 
The additional activities to be permitted commercial banks as sug-
gested heretofore, 444 would be congruent with activities presently per-
mitted them445 and there would therefore be a "natural" extension of 
functions with which bankers are familiar and experienced. These ad-
ditional activities would be very much related to and similar to bank-
ing activities, thus enabling the bankers to assess the risk level they 
would be assuming when entering the "new" fields. Insurance under-
writing is a totally different matter. It is not similar to usual banking 
transactions,446 bankers are not familiar with the nature of the indus-
444. To do as investment banks do (i.e. underwrite all kinds of securities), as broker-
age firms do, as mutual funds do, etc. 
445. See supra notes 101, 219, 271 and text accompanying note 273 and text following 
note 275. 
446. There is a strong view that insurance and banking are very similar and compati-
ble: insurance policies and demand deposits are both ways of funding investment 
assets. Insurance, at least from the underwriter's perspective, is like a demand 
deposit. The depositor or insured exchanges money in the present for the bank's 
or insurer's promise to pay in the future. The underwriter can use the premiums 
to buy investments, just as a bank uses demand deposits or any other debt obliga-
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tion. A bank is willing to pay interest, giving its depositors more than the amount 
deposited. Similarly, an insurance underwriter is willing to pay out more in 
claims than it has taken in as premiums. This is because both the bank and the 
insurer can more than offset the deficit with investment income generated before 
paying back the obligation. From a bank's point of view, insurance could be an-
other source of funding for its asset portfolio. 
Payment of insurance claims are not on a definite time schedule; they are tied 
to the hands of fate. Nevertheless the unpredictable nature of the liability is not 
a deterrent because this does not prevent the insurer from determining the prob-
able amounts of claims each year. An insurer has a large pool of similar obliga-
tions and can analyze historical data to find the probability of an average 
customer claim. For example, an underwriter or' automobile collision insurance 
may conclude from available data that an average driver in his pool has a 5% 
chance of having an accident in any given year, that an average customer sub-
scribes for 10 years and that an average accident costs the insurer $100. If there 
are 1000 customers in this pool and it charged a premium of $4.7619 per year it 
would be as if it had taken 1000 $4.7619 time deposits with an average maturity of 
10 years at 5% interest in that given year. Whenever it receives a $4.7619 pre-
mium it may expect to pay $5 in claims to the insured, just like a bank that takes 
deposits and repays the principal plus interest. Because the· insurer has a large 
pool of customers, it can use averages and historical data to predict the amount it 
expects to pay each year. Any variance between the estimated liability and actual 
claims paid is usually small and therefore not a significant concern. Such annual 
volatility is adjusted in the following year's estimate. Bankers too are not stran-
gers to volatility of liabilities, but with bankers it is on the asset side of the bal-
ance sheet: It makes loans with the expectations that some of them will not be 
repaid; a bank must determine an expected amount of default. The actual amount 
will vary around this eA"Pected amount. The risk of default is implicit in the inter-
est rate. 
There are similar economic components in insurance (as a liability) and loans 
(as an asset). There is an extension of credit and an assumption of risk for each. 
An insurer in effect borrows money from its customer, which it can use until it 
must pay a claim. To some extent part of the premium rate reflects an expected 
risk-free interest rate, determined by the demand for and supply of money from 
premiums. In addition, insurance premiums also reflect the risk that the insurer 
assumes in agreeing to pay when a claim is made. Similarly, the bank loan inter-
est rate partly reflects the price of risk-free credit, which is a function of the 
supply and demand for money. In addition, it also reflects the risk of default. A 
bank can enter into the insurance business without introducing any new ele-
ments onto its balance sheet. 
A primary benefit from adding insurance underwriting to the business of 
banks is a reduction in the risk of illiquidity due to interest rate movements by 
reducing the interest rate gap between the interest rate banks must pay on de-
mand deposits and the interest rate they receive on their loans. The interest rate 
gap creates a risk of illiquidity because bank assets (loans) are usually of longer 
duration than bank liabilities (deposits), and it is possible for interest rates to 
move up sharply and unexpectedly, leaving a bank stranded with relatively low 
yielding assets which it must fund with more expensive higher interest rate lia-
bilities. (This is one of the causes of the savings and loan crisis.) Insurance liabil-
ities are usually of longer duration than demand deposits and other bank 
liabilities, and to the extent that bank assets are usually of longer duration than 
bank liabilities, adding insurance to banks' business would reduce the risk of li-
quidity problems created by suddenly increased interest rates. 
Another benefit would be the decrease in the cost of gathering information 
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try and, therefore, could not accurately assess the risks involved447 in 
entering the field. The insurance industry has been in a near crisis 
state for the past few years.44B In fact, the insurance industry's 
which would occur by each customer using only one financial institution for 
many of his/her financial services. A customer with credit cards, mortgages, car 
loans, checking accounts, etc. would be more efficiently evaluated by a single in-
stitution rather than several. A bank that has underwritten life insurance for an 
individual who later asks for a car loan would have an easier time evaluating the 
risk, since it has already done much of the preliminary information gathering. 
A third benefit is that with increased knowledge of a loan candidate's insur-
ance coverage, a bank can more accurately assess the risk of lending and can price 
its loans more competitively. For example, a personal loan candidate with in-
dependent personal liability insurance and property insurance poses little risk of 
default due to some catastrophic accident. This implies that tie-in sales would be 
a beneficial practice. The risk of default is implicit in the interest rate paid on a 
loan. This risk premium is presently not situation specific; it represents an aver-
age bundle of what can go wrong. But what can go wrong varies greatly between 
customers. Forcing all those who are on a particular risk to insure against it 
would reduce the risk of lending to them, and it would make the process of charg-
ing for the risk of lending more explicit and subject to clear negotiation. 
447. Notwithstanding the argument id., it is recognized that insurance underwriting 
carries dissimilar risks. See supra note 8. Furthermore, a time of crisis in the 
banking industry, see supra note 426, is not the time to experiment by permitting 
unfamiliar risky undertakings by this weakened financial group. 
448. One would have thought that after Baldwin-United (see supra note 198) and after 
the post-Baldwin Model Insurance Laws (1985)(see supra note 199 and accompa-
nying text) the insurance industry would be safe. Not so. Since then many large 
insurers failed, causing vast losses to the public. One such was Mission Insurance 
Company: 
The factual causes of Mission's demise are quite clear. As the re-
ceiver succinctly stated, the two direct causes were high losses from the 
nature of the business Mission held, coupled with the failure of the com-
pany's reinsurers to pay their share of those losses. He described the 
situation as two guns, one pointed at each temple. The cause of insol-
vency was a question of which bullet did the job, since each was a fatal 
shot on its own. 
The receiver estimated the ultimate cost to the public of Mission's 
collapse will be $1.6 billion. The obvious question is, "How could a com-
pany with less than $240 million in capital surplus write enough bad 
business to cause a $1.6 billion failure?" The answer lies in excessive use 
of reinsurance. 
Failed Promises: Insurance Company Insolvencies, Report by the Subcomm. on 
Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1990)(emphasis added)[hereinafter Dingell]. 
Reinsurance is the process whereby insurance companies spread 
their risk exposure by transferring portions of specific policy liability to 
other insurance companies in return for their receiving part of the pre-
miums. The company that originates business is compensated for its ef-
forts, brokers earn commissions for arranging reinsurance of the 
business, and intermediary agencies receive commissions for managing 
pools where reinsurance companies share in specific risks as joint ven-
ture participants. These reinsurance pools are a key method for coordi-
nating the joint participation of many companies in sharing business that 
is centrally managed. 
Agencies that manage reinsurance pools are usually responsible for 
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problems can be traced back to the late 1970s. The high interest rates 
that developed during that period along with the money market funds 
flooding the market449 and the interest rate deregulation450 has had a 
tremendous adverse impact on life insurance companies. Policyhold-
ers borrowed against their policies at ridiculously low rates451 and in-
vested the proceeds in higher yielding instruments (MMFs; CDs; 
NOW accounts; municipals; government bonds, notes and bills; and 
other similar instruments). The life insurance industry responded by 
issuing new high yielding products, such as single premium annuities, 
universal life policies, variable universal life policies, and guaranteed 
investment contracts452 (GICs). In order to be able to pay these high 
yields, life insurers had to invest into risky, high yielding instruments, 
including "junk bonds." The collapse of the junk bond market in 1989 
underwriting business accepted by the pools, handling claims, collecting 
and distributing premiums to pool members, and establishing adequate 
reserve guidelines. Within set limits per risk and general management 
terms, such agencies can obligate pool members on any type of property/ 
casualty business, and accept as many separate risks as they consider de-
sirable during the one-year period common to most pool agreements. 
Pool members are, therefore, dependent on the managing agency to de-
termine the quality and amounts of business accepted by a reinsurance 
pool. 
For reinsurers, the benefit of reinsurance participation is an opportu-
nity to share for a fee in the business generated by other companies, 
without the responsibility for developing customers and handling claims. 
For insurance companies whose business is reinsured, the benefit is to 
reduce their risk exposure on specific policies, and increase the amount 
of new policies they can write. Business that is properly reinsured and 
secured by letter of credit or trust funds put in escrow by the reinsurer 
can be removed from the originating company's balance sheet. Because 
a company's ability to accept new business is controlled by the ratio of 
business on its books to its capital surplus, transferring business to the 
books of reinsurance companies creates room to write new business and 
earn more fees [and this excess new business is what breaks the camel's 
back]. 
Id. at 9. 
Reinsurance abuse has been a key factor in every insolvency studied 
by the Subcommittee. The level of reinsurance has been excessive, the 
quality has been poor, and controls on reinsurers have been minimal or 
nonexistent. Conflicts of interest in arranging reinsurance have been 
fairly common, and reinsurance problems seem to grow geometrically 
with the number of reinsurers involved. In addition, letters of credit 
have not worked to guarantee the performance of these reinsurers, and 
foreign reinsurers appear beyond the effective reach of state regulators, 
especially when they are domiciled in countries where regulation is 
weak. 
Id. at 69. 
449. See supra text accompanying note 218. 
450. 12 C.F.R. pt. 217 (1992); see also supra note 207. 
451. Typically the rate is five percent. Low rates were written into the terms of mil-
lions of insurance policies issued prior to the 1980s. 
452. Some of these were guaranteeing an 18% return for terms as long as ten years. 
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has put enormous pressure on the stability and solvency453 of the life 
insurance industry. In addition, even mortgage loans, the "safe" tradi-
tional investment vehicle of insurance companies, has recently turned 
into an underperforming asset (i.e. the debtors can't make their pay-
ments).454 The alarming increase in death claims due to AIDS and 
AIDS related causes of death has put, and will continue to put, a sharp 
dent into the assets of life insurers.455 
The investment scenario of the property and casualty insurance in-
dustry is much rosier since it apparently avoided involvement with 
junk bonds. The industry's investment income has been high; how-
ever, the underwriting performance has been negative for a long time. 
Earthquakes, floods, and now unforseen environmental cleanup liabil-
ities and asbestosis claims have resulted in deteriorating operating in-
come.456 Insolvencies in the insurance industry have been heavy,457 as 
is the case in the banking industry.458 Now is not the time to permit 
integration of two weak and poorly regulated industries.459 
453. Two giant life insurers were taken over by the State of California in 1991 due to 
their insolvency directly attributable to their holdings of large amounts of junk 
bonds. 
454. As an example, Travelers Insurance, a giant in the industry, has set up reserves 
of over $1 billion against its holdings of about $4 billion of underperforming mort-
gage loans. In other words Travelers has practically written off $1 billion of as-
sets! See INVESTMENT VISION, Nov.-Dec. 1990, p.27. 
455. The industry anticipates $50 billion in claims for premature deaths due to AIDS 
in the next ten years alone. Id. 
456. Operating income is the net result of investment income and underwriting in-
come (loss). 
457. 
Insurance Industry Insolvencies 
LIFE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY 
1985 9 25 
1986 12 16 
1987 19 14 
1988 13 12 
1989 43 23 
1990 30 10 (1/2 year) 
Sources of figures on file with the author. 
458. See supra note 426. 
459. But if the same insulation devices as described in supra part VI. B. 2. were er-
ected around a bank affiliated with an insurance company, would that not be 
enough protection? Probably not. It appears that regulation of insurers is in dis-
array. Here is what the California Insurance Commissioner had to say about this 
matter: 
Legislative and regulatory oversight to the insurance industry now is 
"very weak" and will likely "get worse before it gets better," according 
to California Insurance Commissioner Roxani Gillespie. 
"The trend in government in the last 10 years has been paralysis," she 
said. 
Despite "a lot of fire and brimstone" from regulators and elected offi-
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3. The 1991 Treasury Department Deregulation Proposal 
On March 20, 1991 a Treasury Department banking reform bill was 
introduced in the House and Senate: The Financial Institutions Safety 
and Consumer Choice Act of 1991.460 The intent of this massive piece 
of legislation is summarized as follows: 
Section 2 provides that the purposes of the Financial Institutions Safety and 
Consumer Choice Act of 1991 (FISCCA) are to return deposit insurance cover-
age to its original purposes of protecting small depositors and promoting fi-
nancial stability; to strengthen the role of capital, enhance the supervision, 
and restrict risky activities of insured depository institutions; to permit na-
tionwide banking and branching; to authorize the establishment of financial 
services holding companies to permit companies owning depository institu-
tions to engage in other financial services with appropriate safeguards; to pro-
mote consumer convenience by permitting banking organizations a broader 
range of financial products; to simplify the regulatory structure for depository 
institutions by establishing a consolidated regulatory agency, the Office of De-
pository Institutions Supervision; and to recapitalize the Bank Insurance 
FuncL461 
A large portion of the bill is devoted to reforming the Federal Deposit 
Insurance system by placing new limits on deposit insurance coverage, 
by requiring the FDIC to use the least costly method to resolve in-
sured depository institutions, by requiring the setting of insurance 
premiums for depository institutions on a risk-based assessment sys-
tem, by cracking down sooner on troubled banks, by expanding the 
bank examinations, by raising capital requirements and by several 
other changes from the present law. Another portion of the bill tight-
ens regulations in relation to foreign banks operating in the United 
States. The bill also proposes a restructuring of the regulatory entities 
cials, there has been very little real action in terms of insurance regula-
tion, charged Ms. Gillespie . 
• • • 
"The expectations of the public and the ability of government to de-
liver are poles apart," Ms. Gillespie noted. 
Stacy Adler, Oversight of Insurers 'Weak~ Gillespie, BUSINESS INSURANCE, Aug. 
20, 1990, at 14. 
The Dingell report observed: 
Under the present regulatory framework, state insurance depart-
ments are responsible for regulating insurance company solvency, and 
administering the liquidation of insolvent companies. The Sub-commit-
tee found numerous weaknesses and breakdowns in this system, includ-
ing lack of coordination and cooperation, infrequent examinations based 
on outdated information, insufficient capital requirements and licensing 
procedures, failure to require use of actuaries and independent audits, 
and improper influence on regulators. Inadequate staffing and regula-
tory resources is also a serious problem, yet state governments collect 
twenty times more from premium taxes than they spend on insurance 
regulation. Realistically, can the present system correct these problems 
when 50 state legislatures and insurance commissions are involved? 
Dingell, supra note 444 at 72. 
460. S.713, H.R. 1505, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). 
461. Id. § 2, as summarized by the Treasury Department's section-by-section analysis. 
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by abolishing the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the 
Office of Thrift Supervision and creating the Office of Depository In-
stitutions Supervision with broad administrative and supervisory pow-
ers over particular institutions. 
There are several other areas of regulatory matter, but the one 
most germane to this paper is Title II of the bill, entitled "Financial 
Services Modernization." It creates (as of January 1, 1993) the Finan-
cial Services Holding Company (FSHC) and the Diversified Holding 
Company (DHC). The FSHC will be able to own banks directly and 
engage in activities currently permissible for BHCs (except that a 
bank will not be able to be a FSHC) as well as participate in a broad 
range of financial services through subsidiary institutions. Thus, 
banks owned by a FSHC will be affiliated with a variety of financial 
entities. A DHC may own or control a company engaged in activities 
not permitted for FSHC subsidiaries. A DHC may not own a bank 
directly, but it may own or control a FSHC and thus control a bank 
indirectly. A bank may not be a DHC, but any commercial entity may 
be a DHC. A sketch of these holding companies follows: 
Financial Service Holding Company 
A FSHC itself will be permitted to engage directly only in what 
was permitted BHCs under the "closely related" standard462 of 
§ 4(c)(8),463 but not in any new activities that may be approved under 
the "financial nature" standard,464 nor in the securities or insurance 
activities authorized under §§ 4(c)(15) and 4(c)(16).465 All of these 
new activities will have to be undertaken through subsidiaries. Thus, 
a FSHC can continue to pursue those activities permitted under the 
regulations and orders of the Board466 in which it was engaged as a 
BHC on December 31, 1992. However, specific provisions address the 
question of underwriting and dealing in ineligible securities.467 The 
FSHC will be permitted to continue these activities468 for a period of 
only three years (subject to the limitations imposed by the Board 
when it authorized such activity469) and then convert the § 20 subsidi-
ary470 into a§ 4(c)(15) subsidiary.471 A FSHC will be permitted toes-
tablish (or acquire) securities affiliates, referred to as § 4(c)(15) 
462. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)(1976). The closely related standard has been replaced 
in the FISCCA by the "financial nature" standard. The Board will determine (by 
regulations, rules and orders) what activities are permissible under this new 
standard. 
463. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)(1982). 
464. See supra note 445. 
465. 8.713, H.R. 1505, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., § 203(a)(2)(C)(1991). 
466. See supra text accompanying notes 241-242, 275. 
467. See supra note 257. 
468. Referred to as section 20 subsidiaries. See supra note 273. 
469. See supra text accompanying notes 257-264, 272 and 273. 
470. See supra note 273. 
471. See supra note 465. 
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subsidiaries. Such a subsidiary may engage in underwriting, distribut-
ing and dealing in any type of security; organize, sponsor, control and 
distribute mutual fund shares; do private placements, investment ad-
visory services, full service brokerage activities and so on. A FSHC 
will also be permitted to establish or acquire insurance affiliates, re-
ferred to as § 4(c)(16) subsidiaries. Such a subsidiary will be able to 
provide insurance as a principal (i.e. underwrite), broker or agent 
without geographic or product limitations. 
The FISCCA classifies banks into 5 zones. Zone 1 banks are the 
highest level, as expressed in terms of capital. Thus a zone 1 bank is 
defined as a bank that maintains a risk-based capital ratio that is sig-
nificantly in excess of the minimum ratio required by the appropriate 
federal banking agency under its risk-based capital standard and tier 1 
capital that is significantly in excess of the required minimum for tier 
1 capital.472 Zone 5 banks are banks that are at the level of need for 
immediate salvaging action by the appropriate federal banking 
agency.473 A FSHC that owns a zone 1 bank has certain privileges and 
rights in procedures relative to expansion and acquisition of subsidiar-
ies. Similarly, the bounds of permissible activities of FSHCs that con-
trol banks other than zone 1 banks are determined by the zone 
classifications of the banks they hold. 
Diversified Holding Company 
Section 204 of the bill474 establishes the DHCs, a means whereby 
there can be affiliation between commercial firms and banks. DHCs 
may own only well capitalized banks, and own them only indirectly. 
In practical terms it means that DHCs may acquire FSHCs, but only 
those that meet the requirements of zone 1. Furthermore, all lending 
between a FSHC or any of its subsidiaries, and an affiliated DHC or 
any of its affiliates is strictly forbidden. Additionally, a number of 
other transactions between the aforementioned entities is prohibited. 
Other Matters 
Amendments to the Glass-Steagall Act are included in order to 
conform the permissible activities of national banks to the expanded 
powers of FSHCs. Similarly, amendments have been made to the Se-
curities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as well as 
the Investment Company Act of 1940. Provision for nationwide bank-
ing by FSHCs and branch banking by national and state banks has 
been included in the bill. 
For a decade Congress has been presented with bills to modernize 
472. " 'Tier 1 capital' shall have the meaning given [that] term by the appropriate Fed-
eral banking agencies in the risk-based capital standards adopted by such agen-
cies." S.713, H.R. 1505, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., § 251(a)(1991). 
473. Zones 2, 3 and 4 are, of course, between these extremes. Each zone is described at 
length in § 251 of the bill. 
474. S.713, H.R. 1505, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., § 204 (1991). 
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the American financial services system,475 without a successful resolu-
tion. Will it work this time? 
The banking overhaul, championed by Treasury Secretary Nicholas F. 
Brady, faces a myriad of legislative obstacles, as well as a mine field of special 
interests. And lawmakers fear that they may be wading into another savings 
and loan quagmire, which is blamed in part on deregulation legislation of the 
early 1980s. 
* * * 
"It will require Herculean effort and Job-like patience to get the whole 
thing through," said Bryce L. Harlow, until recently the Treasury's liaison 
with Congress and now a lobbyist. "There is a fantasmagoria of special inter-
ests cutting this way or that. It's going to be a tough job to get those groups 
together." 
White House Chief of Staff John Sununu told a group of California bank-
ers last week, "It is doubtful you'll see this legislation [get] through the Con-
gress this year," and Rep. Chalmers Wylie (R-Ohio), the ranking minority 
member of the House Banking Committee, has given the measure only a 50-50 
chance of passing. 
* * * 
"I don't see the perception out there of the seriousness, the depth, the com-
plexity of the crisis facing the banking system," said Gonzalez.476 "If we had 
the perception of what the real serious nature of the crisis is, the people would 
demand that we concentrate on the fundamentals."477 
A miracle is apparently needed. Miracles do happen. Let's hope. 
VIII. ADDENDUM 
On June 10, 1991 the Second Circuit overruled478 the Board's rul-
ing in Citicorp479 and put to rest, at least for the time being, uncertain-
ties over the Board's state bank "operating subsidiary" rules.480 The 
court appears to have determined that once the Board conceded that it 
had no jurisdiction over state bank subsidiaries of BHCs481 it had cut 
off its jurisdiction over the subsidiaries of those banks. 
Later in the year, on November 27th, Congress passed the Federal 
475. See part VI. C. 
476. Rep. Henry B. Gonzalez (D-Tex.), chairman of the House Banking Committee. 
477. The Washington Post, March 21,1991, p. Bll, col. 5. Jerry Knight & Steve Muf-
son, Hill Obstacle Course Awaits Banking Bill; Administration Expects Congres-
sional Fight, WASH. POST, March 21, 1991, at Bll. 
478. In Citicorp v. Board of Governors, 936 F.2d 66 (2d Cir. 1991). 
479. 876 Fed. Res. Bull. 977, 978 (1990); see also supra 411 and accompanying text. 
480. 12 C.F.R. § 225.22(d)(2){ii). See also supra notes 293, 304 and accompanying text. 
481. The Board ruled that whether bank subsidiaries may engage in non-
banking activities is a matter for the chartering authorities of those 
banks, and not for the Board. Once that decision was made, we cannot 
agree that the Act can sensibly be construed to permit the Board to dis-
place bank-chartering authorities in determining what activities are per-
mitted for the subsidiaries of bank subsidiaries. 
Citicorp v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys., 936 F.2d 66, 75 (2d 
Cir. 1991). 
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Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991,482 which 
was signed by the President on December 19, 1991. The scope of this 
banking omnibus act is extremely broad, and only the one aspect ger-
mane to this paper will be mentioned here. Section 303 of the FDIC 
Improvement Act effectively overturns the decision in Citicorp 483 as 
well as Merchants National484 and thus (again, for the time being) 
forecloses the underwriting of insurance by banks. 
The last relevant event to be mentioned is Independent Insurance 
Agents of America v. Clarke,485 in which the D.C. Circuit Court of Ap-
peals declared section 92486 void, thereby eliminating the loophole cre-
ated by the Comptroller of the Currency in permitting national banks 
located in towns of less than 5,000 population to sell insurance to any 
customer.487 
482. Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991). 
483. See supra note 481. 
484. See supra text accompanying notes 330 through 357. 
485. 955 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
486. 12 U.S.C.A. § 92 (West 1945). 
487. See supra notes 118-125 and accompanying text. 
